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Longitudinal barriers are commonly used to shield hazards, including stiff bridge 
rail ends and slopes. In some locations, a secondary roadway intersects the primary 
roadway within the guardrail’s length-of-need (LON). Some intersections have as little as 
15 ft (4.6 m) between the intersection and beginning of the bridge railing, which require 
short-radius guardrail systems. No short-radius systems have been tested and approved to 
current impact safety standards for shielding hazards with these conditions.  
Site conditions provided by the Nebraska Department of Roads were used to 
determine the constraints for a new safety treatment for intersecting roadways and 
include intersection radii, bridge railing offset distances, and clear zone distances. An 
examination of the site conditions determined that the bridge railing end should be treated 
as a hazard, as defined in the Roadside Design Guide. The hazard would begin at the 
bridge railing end with a width extending to the clear zone. Several design concepts were 
developed to treat these situations with a preference on using existing technologies that 
could be adapted for this hazard scenario.  
Fifteen concepts were brainstormed with three considered for further analysis and 
evaluation. These concepts included net attenuation/end terminal, inertial barrel array/end 
terminal, and a bullnose with a secondary energy absorber inside of it. All three systems 
were capable of stopping a vehicle in the space available, but only the net attenuation/end 
terminal concept was considered likely to accommodate the site conditions using a 
moderate slope behind the system. Four dynamic bogie tests and two static tests were 
performed on potential net attenuators to evaluate their use as energy absorbers in the 
preferred design concept. Recommendations for further development of the net 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Project Statement 
Bridge rails are commonly used to shield errant vehicles from falling into a 
hazard that is spanned by the bridge. A common occurrence in many rural and some 
urban locations is the presence of a secondary road intersecting near a bridge located on a 
higher classification roadway. This intersection often provides very little distance for 
installing an effective approach guardrail and stiffness transition to shield the bridge rail 
end. Crashworthy guardrail systems with transitions and end terminals are frequently 
utilized to shield the ends of the bridge railings and to provide guardrail runout length 
upstream from the bridge hazard. The minimum length of guardrail required to shield a 
hazard is determined using length-of-need (LON) formulas found in the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Official’s (AASHTO’s) Roadside 
Design Guide [1]. In some instances, the location of a bridge end is very close to an 
intersection, such as the secondary or intersecting roadway located within the guardrail 
LON. 
Historically, short-radius guardrail systems were designed to address this situation 
and prevent errant vehicles from interacting with the bridge hazard as well as to provide a 
stiffness transition to the bridge rail end. To date, no systems have been approved 
according to the Test Level 3 (TL-3) impact safety standards identified in either the 
National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report No. 350 [2] or the 
AASHTO Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH) [3]. Recently, the Texas 
A&M Transportation Institute (TTI) has developed and tested a system that has passed a 
limited number of tests using TL-3 MASH guidelines. Early short-radius guardrail 
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systems were tested in accordance with NCHRP Report No. 230 [4]. The Yuma County 
short-radius guardrail system was first tested in accordance with the AASHTO Guide 
Specifications for Bridge Railings [5] and was later approved for use according to 
NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-2 impact conditions [6]. 
Although short-radius guardrails have been recommended in Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) Technical Advisory T5040.32 [7], and other testing has 
approved short-radius systems for NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-2 impact conditions, there 
still exists the need to develop a new TL-3 attenuation system that can accommodate the 
practical site constraints. The new design should address the issues inherent in current 
short-radius systems, including improved impact performance and decreased overall 
system length. 
1.2 Research Objective 
The objective of this study was to pursue the long-term development of a MASH-
compliant attenuation system for intersecting roadways while minimizing its footprint. 
This initial phase would consist of brainstorming new concepts, analysis/design of those 
concepts, preliminary component testing, and recommendations as to their feasibility. 
Preference was given to designs that incorporated currently existing end terminals, cable 
elements, arrestor systems, and/or other energy-absorbing devices. 
1.3 Scope 
The proposed research began with a review of previous short-radius designs as 
well as potential terminal, crash cushion, and arrestor systems that could be used in the 
design concepts. Standards provided by the Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) for 
intersecting roadways were used to identify general site constraints. Next, new concepts 
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were brainstormed to identify designs for further development. Engineering analysis and 
LS-DYNA computer simulations were then used to evaluate and refine the three most 
promising concepts. These concepts included a net attenuation/end terminal, inertial 
barrel/end terminal, and a bullnose with secondary energy absorption. 
Critical components of the most promising concepts were subjected to dynamic 
testing in order to investigate failure mechanisms and quantify failure load. The most 
promising designs were then subjected to high-speed bogie tests to examine the dynamic 
performance and structural adequacy for impact conditions believed to produce the 
greatest risk of failure. A net attenuation/end terminal concept was considered most likely 
to accommodate the site conditions and possibly a moderate slope behind the system.  
Four dynamic bogie tests and two static tests were performed on potential net attenuators 
to evaluate their use as energy absorbers in the design concept. Finally, recommendations 




CHAPTER 2 SHORT RADIUS AND BULLNOSE 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to the development of new concepts for safety treatments at intersecting 
roadways, a literature search was conducted to investigate the various short-radius and 
bullnose guardrail systems that have been tested and/or are currently in use. The site 
constraints and testing methods used to develop and evaluate those systems could then be 
considered when new systems were developed. 
Several short-radius guardrail systems were successfully tested according to 
criteria presented in NCHRP Report No. 230 No. [4]. The tested systems typically 
consisted of W-beam guardrail with radii between 8 and 10 ft (2.4 and 3.0 m) mounted on 
rectangular or circular Controlled Release Terminal (CRT) posts with 42-in. (1,067-mm) 
embedment depths and anchorages [8, 9, 10]. Safety criteria presented in NCHRP Report 
No. 230 required a minimum of four crash tests to be conducted at 60 mph (97 km/h): 
1) 4,500-lb (2,041-kg) sedan at 0 degrees, centerline aligned with stiff bridge rail; 
2) 4,500-lb (2,041-kg) sedan at 25 degrees, at the critical impact point (CIP) near 
the transition; 
3) 4,500-lb (2,041-kg) sedan at 25 degrees, centerline aligned with midpoint of 
radius; 
4) 1,900-lb (862-kg) small car at 20 degrees, centerline aligned with midpoint of 
radius. 
The Yuma County short-radius guardrail system was tested in accordance with 
the Performance Level 1 (PL-1) impact conditions found in the AASHTO Guide 
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Specifications for Bridge Railings [5]. A total of six tests conducted at 45 mph (72 km/h) 
were required:  
1) 1,984-lb (900-kg) small car at 20 degrees, at the CIP near the transition; 
2) 5,401-lb (2,450-kg)  pickup truck at 20 degrees, at the CIP near the transition; 
3) 1,984-lb (900-kg) small car at 20 degrees, centerline aligned with midpoint of 
radius; 
4) 5,401-lb (2,450-kg) pickup truck at 20 degrees, centerline aligned with 
midpoint of radius; 
5) 1,984-lb (900-kg) small car at 0 degrees, centerline aligned with stiff bridge 
rail; 
6) 5,401-lb (2,450-kg) pickup truck at 0 degrees, centerline aligned with stiff 
bridge rail. 
No short-radius guardrail systems have been approved under NCHRP Report No. 
350 [2] or MASH [3] for TL-3 impact conditions. The Texas Transportation Institute 
(TTI) has tested a system that has passed a limited number of tests according to the TL-3 
impact criteria under MASH. Seven tests were required according to NCHRP Report No. 
350 crash test conditions and are discussed in literature [10-11]. 
A summary of previously-tested short-radius guardrail systems are shown in 
Tables 1 through 3. Bullnose systems, which share many similar features with short-
radius systems, are summarized in Tables 4 through 6. 
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2.2 Historical W-Beam Short-Radius Guardrail Systems 
2.2.1 Systems Tested to NCHRP Report No. 230 
Two W-beam short-radius systems were successfully tested according to NCHRP 
Report No. 230 criteria and included the Washington [8] and Texas A&M Transportation 
Institute (TTI) [9] designs. Each design consisted of curved W-beam guardrail mounted 
on wooden breakaway posts connected to a downstream anchorage and rigid or semi-
rigid bridge railing. 
The final Washington short-radius guardrail system is shown in Figure 1. The 
system consisted of a curved W-beam end termination and 25 ft (7.6 m) of W-beam, 
including a Breakaway Cable Terminal (BCT) end anchorage system with two cable 
anchors, one attached to each BCT post. The cables were spliced together near the 
groundline. The guardrail radius was 8 ft -6 in. (2.6 m), and 25 ft (7.6 m) of W-beam 
guardrail was used to transition to a rigid bridge rail. The system was configured such 
that the barrier adjacent to the secondary roadway was installed parallel with the road, 
whereas the primary side of the system had a 10:1 flare upstream from the bridge rail. 
Posts installed at the transition were 6-in. x 8-in. x 72-in. (152-mm x-203-mm x 1,829-
mm) rectangular timber posts, and posts installed on the radius and secondary side of the 
system were 6-in. x 8-in. x 72-in. (152-mm x 203-mm x 1,829-mm) rectangular CRT 
posts. One CRT post on the primary roadway side and all six transition posts utilized 6-
in. x 8-in. x 14¼-in. (152-mm x 203-mm x 362-mm) timber blockouts. The final design 
was determined to pass all crash test criteria according to NCHRP Report No. 230. 
The TTI W-beam short-radius system utilized round CRT timber posts instead of 
rectangular posts, and anchored the W-beam on the secondary roadway with a W-beam 
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turndown anchor [9]. The TTI system is shown in Figure 2. The W-beam guardrail was 
nested throughout the radius section. The transition utilized tubular, nested rail with an 
additional rail mounted backwards against the post. A cable anchor was attached to the 
rail downstream of the radius to develop tension in the transition region. 
The TTI W-beam system was tested and evaluated according to NCHRP Report 
No. 230 evaluation criteria. The system performed acceptably during each crash test, with 
one exception. After the 4,500-lb (2,041-kg) sedan impacted the curved rail at 15 degrees 
and 90 percent of the vehicle’s energy was dissipated, the rail disengaged from the 
bumper and rose up the vehicle’s front end, crushing the windshield. Although this 
performance was determined to be unacceptable, researchers postulated that since this 
impact type was both infrequent and relatively severe, the system would perform 
acceptably in the majority of impacts. Thus, the system was recommended for use in 
locations with intersecting roadways. 
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Figure 2. TTI W-Beam Short-Radius Guardrail System [9] 
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2.2.2 System Tested to AASHTO Guidance Specifications for Bridge Railings 
The Yuma County system [6] was designed specifically for one oblique 
intersection, with a 5.5-degree system flare. The final details for the successfully tested 
system are shown in Figure 3. Researchers identified five different critical impact 
locations with associated impact angles to assess system performance. Light-truck 
impacts were used to assess structural adequacy and pocketing near the transition when 
impacted tangentially to the bridge rail, as well as for an angled impact on the nose. 
Small-car impacts were used to evaluate the tendency to underride the system when 
impacting tangentially to the bridge rail and at an angle to the nose. 
The preliminary design of the Yuma County system performed acceptably 
according to AASHTO PL-1 criteria with one exception. For one test, both of the 
secondary-side anchorage BCT posts fractured and the spliced two-cable BCT anchor 
released, thus allowing the vehicle to encroach behind the barrier system. Researchers 
lengthened the secondary side of the system to increase anchoring capacity, and the 





Figure 3. Yuma County Short-Radius Guardrail System – Final Details [6, 27] 
2.3 Short-Radius Systems Tested to NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH 
No short-radius systems have yet been approved according to the TL-3 crash test 
conditions required in NCHRP Report No. 350 or MASH. The Texas A&M 
Transportation Institute (TTI) has tested a system that has passed a limited number of TL-
3 impact criteria found in MASH. The majority of NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH-
compliant tests on short-radius systems were conducted at either TTI or the Midwest 
Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF). 
Two cables to 
develop upstream 
and downstream 
tension at post 
nos. 1 and 2 
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2.3.1 TTI Thrie-Beam Short-Radius 
TTI Researchers designed a thrie-beam alternative to the TTI W-beam short-
radius system successfully tested according to NCHRP Report No. 230 [10]. Final design 
details are shown in Figure 4. Researchers observed that the bending section of a nested 
12-gauge (2.7-mm) W-beam section was approximately equivalent to the bending 
strength of a 10-gauge (3.4-mm) thrie-beam section. Due to the broader capture area of 
the thrie-beam, the higher top mounting height and lower bottom corrugation height, and 
ease of construction relative to the nested W-beam guardrails, particularly at splice 
locations, researchers postulated that the thrie-beam should perform approximately as 
well as the W-beam system. 
Initially, the design was tested according to the TL-3 impact condition criteria 
presented in NCHRP Report No. 350. The first crash test, consisting of a 2000P vehicle 
impacting the system at 60.9 mph (98.0 km/h) and 26 degrees near the transition, was 
determined to be successful. The remaining two tests conducted with a 2000P vehicle 
into the curved nose of the system were both determined to be failures, due to override 
and vaulting. Researchers concluded that the system would require extensive 






Figure 4. Final TTI Thrie-Beam Short-Radius Guardrail System [10] 
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Testing continued with the 1,800-lb (816-kg) small car and 4,500-lb (2,041-kg) 
sedan with angled hits into the center of the curved radius in compliance with NCHRP 
Report No. 230. The two tests passed with marginal performance due to the release of the 
rail from the upstream turned-down anchor in the sedan test and underride of the small 
car. The marginal performance of the system was unexpected, because the increased top 
mounting height of 31 in. (787 mm) also resulted in a lower bottom mounting height of 
13 in. (330 mm), so underride was not expected. 
2.3.2 MwRSF Short-Radius Guardrail System – R&D Project 
The Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) also attempted to develop a 
crashworthy system according to the TL-3 test criteria presented in NCHRP Report No. 
350 [11-13], as shown in Figure 5, and subsequently tested the system to the criteria 
presented in MASH [14]. The final system that was tested under MASH is shown in 
Figure 6. The short-radius guardrail system was based on the NCHRP Report No. 350-
tested, thrie-beam bullnose system and was constructed using curved thrie-beam 
elements. Rectangular CRT posts were used to support the rail on both the primary and 
secondary sides of the systems. 
The curved nose piece initially had a 7-ft 9¾-in. (2,381-mm) radius, which was 
later changed to 8 ft – 11⅜ in. (2,727 mm) when a parabolic flare was added to the 
system. Early tests utilized sloped terrain behind the system to replicate real-world 
conditions with roadside slopes, but the slopes were removed due to the increased risk of 
vaulting and artificial increase in instability due to interaction with the back side of the 
sloped cutout during testing. 
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A total of six tests were conducted in compliance with NCHRP Report No. 350 
TL-3 test criteria [11-13], and two tests were conducted in compliance with MASH TL-3 
test criteria [14]. Impact conditions for each test are described in Table 3. Only one test 
was determined to be successful, which consisted of a 2000P pickup truck impacting the 
system with the centerline of the truck aligned with a tangent line to the bridge rail. The 
remaining tests, primarily consisting of angled impacts with 2000P, 820C, and 2270P 
vehicles into the center of the nose, failed due to vaulting, rollover, or underride.  
Researchers concluded that the system performed reasonably well despite the 
failure to comply with the evaluation criteria. Thus, it was believed that it would likely be 
acceptable according to TL-2 safety criteria. However, the system was excessively large 
on the primary and secondary sides and it was generally undesirable to test under a lower 













Figure 6. Final MwRSF Thrie-Beam Short-Radius Guardrail System [14] 
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2.4 Bullnose Systems Tested Prior to NCHRP Report No. 230 
Bullnose systems vary widely, but all systems utilized W-beam or thrie-beam as 
the primary rail element. One of the oldest crash-tested bullnose systems was the 
asymmetrical Minnesota W-beam bullnose [15]. The system resembled a parabolically-
flared W-beam guardrail system located upstream from a median hazard that was 
connected to an identical, parabolically-flared system shielding the hazard from opposite 
direction crashes. Flares were transitioned over approximately 2⅓ sections of 12-ft 6-in. 
(3,810-mm) W-beam. A single curved W-beam rail section connected the flared rail on 
one side of the system to the straight rail on the other side. The system was tested in the 
early 1970s before NCHRP Report No. 230 was published. Tests consisted of a 4,500-lb 
(2,041-kg) sedan and a 2,290-lb (1,039-kg) small car impacting at approximately 60 mph 
(97 km/h) and 0 degrees relative to the nose of the system and with the centerline of the 
vehicle aligned with the center point of the radius. Both tests were determined to be 
satisfactory. 
All of the remaining bullnose systems that were tested under the NCHRP Report 
No. 230 test criteria were symmetrical. One system design utilized a W-beam guardrail 
with a 4-ft 6-in. (1,372-mm) radius and a 10-degree flare from the nose. It was 
successfully tested by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) after 
extensive revisions to the initial design [16].  
A novel crumpling bullnose system with a very sharp front-end profile was 
evaluated by TTI for the Colorado Department of Transportation [17]. The crumpling 
bullnose system consisted of W-beam rail flattened at the first four post locations, with 
staggered post locations to control W-beam buckling. A flattened, curved, buffer nose 
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piece was attached at the front of the system to act as the impact head, eliminating the 
need for any curved W-beam rail segments. Four successful end-on crash tests were 
conducted into variations of the flattened-rail system, although one crash result was 
marginal due to occupant compartment deformation. 
A third W-beam bullnose system was tested and modified by the Southwest 
Research Institute (SwRI), incorporating a curved frontal W-beam nose section, a curved 
W-beam transition section, and straight sections of W-beam downstream from the nose 
[18]. Cable anchors, ground struts, foundation tubes, post sizes, spacings and 
orientations, and rail slots were extensively modified during the development of the W-
beam bullnose system. The system was successfully tested according to NCHRP Report 
No. 230 with 4,500-lb (2,041-kg) sedans and 1,800-lb (816-kg) small cars. A total of 16 
tests were conducted on design modifications before the system was determined to be 
crashworthy according to NCHRP Report No. 230 performance criteria. 
2.5 Bullnose Systems Tested to NCHRP Report No. 350 
MwRSF conducted a series of tests on a bullnose system according to NCHRP 
Report No. 350 between 1997 and 2010 [19-24]. The crash test matrix for the bullnose 
system was similar to the required tests on the short-radius guardrail crash tests, as shown 
in Figure 7. The initial concept for the bullnose system was similar to the design that was 
tested and evaluated by SwRI according to NCHRP Report No. 230 test criteria. The 
system was composed of a 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) curved and slotted thrie-beam section 
which formed the nose, a 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) curved and slotted transition thrie-beam 
section, and two 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) straight thrie-beam sections parallel to the 
roadways on the respective sides.  
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Initially, the 2000P pickup truck vaulted the system when struck at a 0-degree 
angle, and the slot tabs were shortened. In subsequent tests, the 2000P vehicle ruptured 
the rail and penetrated the system. The design was modified to include cables in the nose 
section of the thrie-beam to facilitate capture after the rail tore through the slot tabs.  
 
Figure 7. Required Bullnose Crash Tests According to NCHRP Report No. 350 
Further tests with the 2000P vehicle into the critical impact point (NCHRP Report 
No. 350 test no. 3-35) resulted in vehicular launching. Researchers determined that the 
groundline 
strut connecting the first and second posts along each side of the system facilitated 
vehicle launching by lifting the vehicle and allowing the rail to pass beneath the vehicle’s 
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tire on the impacting corner. After further modifying the system, including eliminating 
the groundline strut, modifying several soil tubes, and reducing post spacing, the system 
successfully passed to the NCHRP Report No. 350 test designation no. 3-35, consisting 
of a 2000P vehicle impacting at 20 degrees and 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) at the critical 
impact point (CIP) of the system. Additionally, the system was successfully tested in 
accordance with NCHRP Report No. 350  test designation nos. 3-30 and 3-32, consisting 
of an 820C small car impacting the center of the nose of the system with a ¼-point offset 
at 62.1 mph (100 km/h) and 0 degrees, respectively.  
2.6 Current Best Practices – Short-Radius Guardrail Systems 
2.6.1 FHWA Technical Memorandum T5040.32 
In 1992, the Federal Highway Administration published a technical advisory with 
regards to curved W-beam guardrail installations at intersecting roadways [7]. This 
advisory suggested using a curved guardrail system similar to the Yuma County system 
with radii ranging between 8 ft - 6 in. and 35 ft (2,591 mm and 10,668 mm), as shown in 
Figure 8.  
Recommendations were also included for the installation of short-radius guardrail 
systems including design drawings; capture area criteria based on radius size; slopes; and 
other important installation guidelines. The FHWA advised that existing curved guardrail 
installations may be replaced or upgraded as the opportunity becomes available [7]. 
2.6.2 Roadside Design Guide 4th Ed. 
The AASHTO Roadside Design Guide (RDG) provided guidance on how to treat 
a minor road or driveway that intersects a main road close to a bridge end, a location that 
is difficult to adequately shield [1]. The RDG-preferred solution is to close or relocate the 
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intersecting road and install a standard transition section with approach railing and 
crashworthy end terminal. When this option is not feasible, other alternatives should be 
considered even though the crashworthiness of the barrier may be reduced in some 
instances. The guide also notes that the use of appropriate crash cushions or other 
commercially-available appurtenances may provide cost-effective solutions for shielding 
the bridge rail end. However, these systems may not provide adequate length-of-need 
(LON) for treating all hazards. 
One possible solution outlined by the RDG is to use a curved guardrail system 
that was successfully crash-tested according to the requirements found in NCHRP Report 
No. 230. Based on research conducted by TTI, it was acknowledged and determined 
appropriate that the NCHRP Report No. 230 system continue to be used for this 
installation on all high-speed routes, including the National Highway System (NHS), 
until an acceptable system was developed. When that the 4
th
 edition of the RDG was 
published, no NCHRP Report No. 350 or MASH-approved system had been developed. 
The guide also recommended following FHWA Technical Advisory T5040.32 for 
guardrail installations at intersecting side roads.  
2.6.3 TTI Modified Yuma County System at TL-2 Acceptance 
In 2010, TTI investigated the performance of previously-tested short-radius 
guardrail systems to determine if any of these systems would meet TL-2 of NCHRP 
Report No. 350 [25]. The system that was tested for Yuma County, Arizona formed the 
basis for developing a short-radius guardrail system that satisfied the TL-2 evaluation 
criteria of NCHRP Report No. 350. The nose section of this short-radius guardrail system 
consisted of a 12-ft 6-in. (3.8-m) curved W-beam segment, which had an 8-ft (2.4-m) 
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radius. The curved section was mounted on breakaway CRT posts. Using dynamic bogie 
testing, the researchers determined that two CRT posts could be removed without 
significant change in system performance. Based on a review of previous short-radius 
guardrail systems, a short-radius guardrail system was developed to satisfy TL-2 of 
NCHRP Report No. 350, as shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
2.6.4 Best Practices for Barrier Protection of Bridge Ends (2014) 
In 2014, TTI completed a study to identify best practices for treating situations 
where the length-of-need requirements for bridge approach rails cannot be met [26]. 
Surveys were sent to State Departments of Transportation (DOTs) to acquire data 
concerning: practices or standards for bridge barriers when LON cannot be met; variation 
in practices according to design speed; use of different types of crash cushions; and 
installation of a short-radius guardrail in front of a slope. 
From the information collected, short-radius guardrails were generally the 
preferred option by state DOTs for bridge locations where LON could not be met. 
Although a few states DOTs indicated the use crash cushions at bridge locations where 
LON cannot be met, other states noted a very limited use due to higher installation and 
maintenance costs. In addition, crash cushion use may be impractical and undesirable on 
rural road sections with multiple driveway and side roads when considering their 
footprint. Some state DOTs preferred to relocate obstacles and driveway access to a point 
beyond the LON. When unfeasible, state DOTs used different treatments to shield 
obstacles, which included the use of short-radius guardrail systems, crash cushions, or 



















Figure 10. Acceptable Short-Radius Guardrail Designs, TTI NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-2 System [25]
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CHAPTER 3 END TERMINALS 
A literature search was performed on existing guardrail end terminal systems to 
investigate their use in new concepts for safely treating intersecting roadways. These 
situations often occur where there is limited space. Therefore, the overall dimensions and 
dynamic deflections were collected for existing guardrail end terminals to determine their 
suitability for this application.  
End terminals are used to prevent a vehicle from stopping abruptly when 
impacting the end of a roadside barrier. These devices are essentially crashworthy 
anchorages and are used to anchor a flexible or semi-rigid barrier on its upstream and 
downstream ends, likely when located within the clear zone. For this research study, only 
energy-absorbing guardrail end terminal systems meeting Test Level 3 conditions of 
NCHRP Report No. 350 or MASH were investigated. These test conditions are 
summarized in Tables 7 and 8. 
FHWA resource charts for roadside and median end terminals served to aid field 
and design personnel in identifying and selecting barrier hardware [27, 28]. These charts 
served as the basis for the list of systems shown in Table 9. The list contains all available 
TL-3 energy-absorbing, guardrail end terminal systems. Except for the Trinity SOFT-
STOP Terminal, all systems were tested under NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-3 conditions. 
The overall dimensions and dynamic deflections of these systems were found using the 
approval letters for End Treatments and Crash Cushions on the FHWA’s website [29]. 
The data were gathered from the listed approval letter or one of their derivatives. The 
length value in the table refers to the distance from the end of the terminal to the 
beginning of standard guardrail. With typical end terminal lengths of 37 ft-6 in. (11.4 m), 
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most systems were potentially too long for the shortest intersection geometries. This 
finding was more concerning when these systems would also require a guardrail-to-
bridge rail transition system in addition to the listed system. Many end terminal systems 
allow oblique impacts to gate through the system from post one through three. Tension-
based, energy-absorbing end terminals that do not allow the vehicle to gate in this region 
may offer advantages due to a LON closer to the end of the system. 











Speed         
mph (km/h) 
Nominal 







G/NG 3-30 820C 62.1 (100) 0 
G/NG S3-30 700C 62.1 (100) 0 
G/NG 3-31 2000P 62.1 (100) 0 
G/NG 3-32 820C 62.1 (100) 15 
G/NG S3-32 700C 62.1 (100) 15 
G/NG 3-33 2000P 62.1 (100) 15 
G 3-34 820C 62.1 (100) 15 
G S3-34 700C 62.1 (100) 15 
G 3-35 2000P 62.1 (100) 20 
NG 3-36 820C 62.1 (100) 15 
NG S3-36 700C 62.1 (100) 15 
NG 3-37 2000P 62.1 (100) 20 
NG 3-38 2000P 62.1 (100) 20 




G 3-40 820C 62.1 (100) 0 
G S3-40 700C 62.1 (100) 0 
G 3-41 2000P 62.1 (100) 0 
G 3-42 820C 62.1 (100) 15 
G S3-42 700C 62.1 (100) 15 
G 3-43 2000P 62.1 (100) 15 















Speed         
mph (km/h) 
Nominal 







G/NG 3-30 1100C 62 (100.0) 0 
G/NG 3-31 2270P 62 (100.0) 0 
G/NG 3-32 1100C 62 (100.0) 5/15 
G/NG 3-33 2270P 62 (100.0) 5/15 
G/NG 3-34 1100C 62 (100.0) 15 
G/NG 3-35 2270P 62 (100.0) 25 
G/NG 3-36 2270P 62 (100.0) 25 
G/NG 3-37 2270P 62 (100.0) 25 




G 3-40 1100C 62 (100.0) 0 
G 3-41 2270P 62 (100.0) 0 
G 3-42 1100C 62 (100.0) 5/15 
G 3-43 2270P 62 (100.0) 5/15 
G 3-44 2270P 62 (100.0) 20 










CHAPTER 4 CRASH CUSHIONS 
A literature search was performed on existing crash cushion systems was 
performed to investigate their use in new concepts for safely treating intersecting 
roadways. These situations often occur where there is limited space. Therefore, the 
overall dimensions and dynamic deflections were collected for existing crash cushions to 
determine their suitability for this application.  
Crash cushions are designed to protect an errant vehicle from impacting a fixed 
object by gradually decelerating the vehicle to a safe stop or by redirecting the vehicle 
away from the obstacle. Crash cushions are typically anchored to the road surface, except 
for inertial barrier systems (e.g., sand barrels). For this research study, only crash cushion 
systems meeting the Test Level 3 of NCHRP Report No. 350 or MASH were 
investigated. These test conditions are summarized in Tables 7 and 8. 
Crash cushions are categorized by two qualities: (1) gating versus non-gating and 
(2) redirective versus non-redirective. With a gating crash cushion, a vehicle impacting at 
an angle on the nose or the side of a crash cushion near the nose, allows a vehicle to pass 
or gate through the crash cushion. A non-gating cushion prevents a vehicle from passing 
through the crash cushion even under impacts at the nose or on the side of a crash 
cushion near the nose but at an angle. With a redirective crash cushion, a vehicle 
impacting along the side of the crash cushion but downstream of the nose will be safely 
redirected back along traffic. A nonredirective system will capture the vehicle or let it 
pass through the barrier. For this study, a non-gating, redirective systems could be 
advantageous if it would limit system interference when multiple safety treatments are 
used near one another.  
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FHWA resource charts for crash cushions served as an aid for field and design 
personnel in identifying and selecting barrier hardware [30]. These charts served as the 
basis for systems shown in Tables 10 through 12. These lists consisted of all commonly-
available TL-3 crash cushion systems. The overall dimensions and dynamic deflections 
of these systems were found using the approval letters for End Treatments and Crash 
Cushions on the FHWA website [29]. The data were gathered from the listed approval 










Table 10. Non-Redirecting Crash Cushions and Dynamic Deflections 
 
Test Level
NCHRP 350 3-38 3-40 3-41 3-42 3-43 3-44
Absorb 350 Barrier Systems, Inc. TL-2, TL-3 24" VARIABLE 19'-4" (45 mph) to 32'-0" (60 mph) 32" NR NR NR NR NR CC-66
ACZ-350
Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-2, TL-3 20" 31'-7" 33" 106 218 67 CC-47
Big Sandy TrafFix Devices TL-2, TL-3 Varies to fit site VARIABLE (30 to 65 mph) 35" to 47" N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A CC-52
CrashGard Plastic Safety Systems TL-2, TL-3 Varies to fit site VARIABLE (25 to 70 mph) 53" NR NR NR NR NR CC-97
Energite
Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-2, TL-3 Varies to fit site VARIABLE (30 to 65 mph) 32" to 36" NR NR NR NR NR CC-29
Fitch
Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-2, TL-3 Varies to fit site VARIABLE (30 to 65 mph) 33" NR NR NR NR NR CC-28
SLED TrafFix Devices TL-2, TL-3 22 1/2" 25'-3" 42" N/A N/A N/A N/A
CC-114       
CC-117
NR = Test was performed but dynamic deflection was not reported
N/A = Test was performed but dynamic deflection was reported as "N/A"
Length Height



























Table 11. Redirecting, Non-Gating Crash Cushions and Dynamic Deflections 
 
NCHRP 350 MASH 3-30 3-31 3-32 3-33 3-34 3-35 3-36 3-37 3-38 3-39
Compressor TrafFix Devices TL-3 48.7" 21'-3" 53.5" 31 28 20 134 N/A 4 CC-95
Hybrid Energy Absorption 
Reusable Terminal (HEART)
Trinity Highway Products, 
LLC
TL-3 28"
15'-9 1/2" (45 mph or less); 28'-3" (50 mph or 
greater); 30'-9" (70 mph)
32.2" 232 126 215 20 7 CC-89
QuadGuard Elite
Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-2, TL-3
Narrow: 24" to 
36"; Wide: 69" or 
90"
5 Bay - 18'-0" (45 mph or less); 8 Bay - 27'-0" 
(50 mph or greater); 11 Bay - 36'-0" (70 mph); 
7 Bay - 18'-0" (45 mph or less); 8 Bay - 27'-1" 
(50 mph or greater); 11 Bay - 36'-0" (70 mph)




Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-2, TL-3 TL-2, TL-3
Narrow: 24", 30", 
36"; Wide: 69" or 
90"
Narrow: 9' - 0" (45 mph) to 27'-0" (70 mph); 
Wide: 12'-0"(50 mph) to 27'-0" (70 mph)
32" 185 242 130 173 4 4 12 0
CC-35       
CC-42       
CC-43       
CC-45       
CC-57
QuadGuard LMC




Wide: 69" or 90"
Narrow: 5 Bay - 18'-0" (45 mph or less); 8 Bay 
- 27'-0" (50 mph or greater); 11 Bay -36'-0" (70 
mph);; Wide: 7 Bay - 18'-0" (45 mph or less); 8 
Bay - 27'-1" (50 mph or greater); 11 Bay - 36'-
0" (70 mph)
32" 185 NR 201 NR 185
CC-43         
CC-45
QuadGuard M10
Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-3
Narrow: 24", 30", 
36"; Wide: 69" or 
90"
Narrow: 9' - 0" (45 mph) to 27'-0" (70 mph); 
Wide: 12'-0"(50 mph) to 27'-0" (70 mph)
32" 161 96 3 8 8 CC-112
QUEST
Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-2, TL-3 24"; 30; 36;
22'-0" (45 mph or less); 28'-0" (50 mph or 
greater); 34'-0" (70 mph)
31" 114 169 110 161 8 16 20 8 CC-87
REACT 350 & REACT 350 II




Wide: 60"; Wide 
96"; Wide 120"
13'-9" and 15'-3" (45 mph); 19'-5" and 21'-3" 
(62 mph) REACT II; 26'-9" and 30'-7" 




189 267 181 278 N/A 33 CC-26
Smart Cushion Innovations 
(SCI)
SCI Products TL-2, TL-3 24"
13'-8" (45 mph or less); 21'-8 1/4" (60 mph or 
greater)
33.4" 202 125 202 8 4 CC-85
Trinity Attenuating Crash 
Cushion (TRACC) Family














25'-9" (70 mph); 21'-3" (50 mph or greater); 14'-
3" (45 mph or less); 25'-8" to 48'-10" (70 mph); 
21'-0" to 44'-2" (50 mph or greater); 14'-1" to 
37'-3" (45 mph or less)
32" 114 259 99 152 15 9 181 CC-54
Universal TAU II Family Barrier Systems, Inc. TL-2, TL-3
Narrow: Up to 
36"; Wide: 42" up 
to 102" in 6" 
increments
Narrow: 8'-6" (30 mph) to 37'-0" (75 mph); 
Wide: 8'-8" (30 mph) to 31'-6" (70 mph)
32" 25 6 N/A 15 14 19 19 18 CC-75
Universal TAU II R Barrier Systems, Inc. TL-2, TL-3
Narrow: Up to 
36"; Wide: 42" up 
to 102" in 6" 
increments
Narrow: 8'-6" (30 mph) to 37'-0" (75 mph); 
Wide: 8'-8" (30 mph) to 31'-6" (70 mph)
32"
X-TENuator Barrier Systems, Inc. TL-3 21" 24'-9" 31 3/16" 23 3 93 3 15 15 20 CC-109
Length Height






NR = Test was performed but dynamic deflection was not reported



































Table 12. Redirecting, Gating Crash Cushions and Dynamic Deflections 
 
NCHRP 350 MASH 3-30 3-31 3-32 3-33 3-34 3-35 3-36 3-37 3-38 3-39
BEAT-BP Bridge Pier System Road Systems, Inc. TL-3
Varies to adjust 
to pier widths
Variable to adjust to number of piers and pier 
spacing, i.e. 1 pier = 79', 2 pier = 103', 3 pier = 
115', 4 pier = 151'
33" CC-69C
BEAT-SSCC Single Sided 
Crash Cushion
Road Systems, Inc. TL-3 24"
28'-0" standard but available in lengths of 32', 
36', 40', 44'
33" 272** 30* NA CC-69B
Connecticut Impact Attenuating 
System (CIAS)
Generic TL-3 144" 25'-6" 48" NR NR NR NR NR CC-77
Narrow Connecticut Impact 
Attenuating System (NCIAS)
Generic TL-3 36" 24'-0" 48" 155 89 25 9 20 CC-58
QuadTrend
Energy Absorbtion Systems, 
Inc.
TL-3 15" 20'-0" 32" 205 161 236 4 4 CC-49
Thrie-Beam Bullnose Guardrail 
System
Generic TL-3
14'-9" but can 
vary
VARIABLE 50' Minimum 31.6" 273 649 490 CC-68
NR = Test was performed but dynamic deflection was not reported
























CHAPTER 5 TRUCK- AND TRAILER-MOUNTED ATTENUATORS 
A literature search was performed on existing truck- and trailer-mounted 
attenuators (TMAs) to investigate their use in new concepts for safely treating 
intersecting roadways. These situations often occur where there is limited space. 
Therefore, the overall dimensions and dynamic deflections were collected for TMAs to 
determine their suitability for this application. 
TMAs are a special type of crash cushion used to protect construction and 
maintenance personnel in work zones. These devices are essentially portable crash 
cushions, which are directly mounted onto the rear of a large truck or towed behind a 
vehicle as a trailer. The truck prevents vehicles from traversing the work site, while the 
TMA is used to reduce the severity of a rear-end impact. These devices may be used in 
moving operations, such as pavement marking, roadway sweeping, and maintenance 
activities in high-volume, high-speed areas, or at long-term, stationary construction sites 
[1]. 
TMAs are split into the following three classes of protective vehicles in work 
zones: shadow; barrier; and advance warning trucks. A shadow vehicle is a moving truck 
traveling behind a moving operation, protecting the work site personnel from traffic 
approaching from the rear. Barrier vehicles are parked upstream from a work zone and 
are typically left unoccupied. Advance warning trucks are also parked a considerable 
distance upstream from a moving or stationary operation, but they also display an arrow 
panel and other signs, as appropriate. 
The overall dimensions and dynamic deflections of these systems were found 
using the approval letters for End Treatments and Crash Cushions on FHWA’s website 
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and are shown in Table 13 [29]. The data were gathered from the approval letters or one 
of their derivatives from FHWA website. The wide area of protection needed for 
protecting intersecting roadways would likely require multiple TMA devices. None of the 
investigated systems were likely capable of being made wider without significant 
redesign of the device. In addition, the effects of using multiple units next to each other 











Weight 3-50 3-51 3-52 3-53
Alpha 100K Energy Absorption Systems, Inc. 100" 93" 22 1/2" 11"-13" 990 lb - 1200 lb 3.3 3.6 CC-39
MPS-350 Trinity Highway Products 168" 70 11/16" 18 3/8" 12"-14" 1600 lb NR NR CC-34
RAM-100K RENCO 132" 84" 22 1/2" 850 lb 2.1 1.7 CC-67
Safe-Stop 180 Energy Absorption Systems, Inc. 170" 93" 50" 11"-13" 2080 lb 2.2 3.3 3.5 3.1 CC-78
Scorpion TrafFix Devices Inc. 166" 96" 12" 1975 lb N/A N/A N/A N/A CC-65
U-MAD 100K Barrier Systems Inc. 129" 90" 28" 11"-13" 910 lb NR NR CC-64
Scorpion Trailer TrafFix Devices Inc. 157" 96" 36" N/A N/A N/A CC-65
Safe-Stop Trailer TMA Energy Absorption Systems, Inc. 231" 93" 45" 2650 lb NR 4.8 3.6 CC-78
TTMA-100 Gregory, Safety By Design Co 276" 96" 31" 13" 1450 lb 3.077 5.132 N/A N/A
CC-79               
CC-90
U-MAD Trailer 100K Barrier Systems Inc. 129" 90" 40" 915 lb NR NR 1.3
CC-99                         
CC-103
Vorteq Energy Absorption Systems, Inc. 275" 92" 30 1/2" 1310 lb 2.9 4.3 4.9 4.7 CC-104
NR = Test was performed but dynamic deflection was not reported
















CHAPTER 6 NET AND CABLE ATTENUATION SYSTEMS 
A literature search was performed on existing net and cable attenuation systems to 
investigate their use in new concepts for safely treating intersecting roadways. These 
situations often occur where there is limited space. Therefore, the overall dimensions and 
dynamic deflections were collected for existing net and cable attenuation systems to 
determine their suitability for this application. In addition to overall system dimensions, 
their method of operation is also important. It is desirable that new concepts are long-
term solutions to the problem with minimal maintenance required for operation. 
There are several net attenuation systems available from the defense, aerospace, 
and highway safety industries. They shield work zones, capture runaway airplanes, and 
protect entrances to military bases. While there is no highway testing standard for net 
attenuation systems, many systems have been crash tested and received FHWA 
acceptance based on modified testing for crash cushions. Net attenuation systems from 
the security industry are often tested to SD-STD-02.01 [31] or ASTM International 
Designation F 2656-07 [32]. 
SD-STD-02.01 provided a range of specified levels of vehicle impact resistance 
required by the U.S. Department of State (DOS), Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to 
select appropriate perimeter barriers and gates for use at DOS Facilities. This standard 
uses a 15,000-lb (6,800-kg) vehicle with different impact speeds to define performance 






Table 14. SD-STD-02.01 Impact Condition Designations for a 15,000-lb (6,800-kg) 
Vehicle [31] 
 
ASTM F2656-07 provides a range of vehicle impact conditions, designations, and 
penetration performance levels that allow defense agencies to select passive perimeter 
barriers and active entry point barriers that are appropriate for their specific applications. 
This standard supersedes SD-STD-02.01 and attempts to address some of its 
shortcomings, such as lacking a range of vehicle types and tiered protection levels. These 
impact conditions are shown in Table 15.  
Table 15. ASTM F 2656-07 Impact Condition Designations [32] 
 
The dynamic deflection for a system on the anti-ram barrier list is referred to as 
penetration distance. This penetration distance is defined as the distance from the pre-
Nominal Impact 
Speed                  
mph (kph)
Permissible Impact Speed 





50 (80) 47.0-56.9 (75.0+) 1,250 (1,695) K12
40 (65) 38.0-46.9 (60.1-75.0) 800 (1,085) K8
30 (50) 28.0-37.9 (45.0-60.0) 450 (610) K4
Test Vehicle
Nominal Mass                
lb (kg)





40 (65) 131 (179) C40
50 (80) 205 (271) C50
60 (100) 295 (424) C60
40 (65) 273 (375) PU40
50 (80) 426 (568) PU50
60 (100) 613 (887) PU60
30 (50) 451 (656) M30
40 (65) 802 (1110) M40
50 (80) 1250 (1680) M50
30 (50) 1950 (2850) H30
40 (65) 3470 (4810) H40











Truck                       
(M)
Heavy Goods 




impact, inside edge of a barrier to the leading edge of the vehicle cargo bed [32]. These 
penetration ratings are shown in Table 16. 
Table 16. ASTM F 2656-07 Penetration Rating System [32] 
 
Many barriers meeting the ASTM F2656-07 standard can be found on the 
Department of Defense Anti-Ram barrier list [33]. The Anti-Ram barrier list provided 
some cable or net options for capturing vehicles, but it did not include systems with a P4 
designation. Many of the barrier systems on that list are not recommended for safety 
treatments. Though some of the systems had dynamic deflections in the range of what 
was needed for this application, not all of them were suitable for highway installations. 
Passive, active, and mobile performance characteristics refer to how these systems 
function. Passive systems do not move, active systems can be lowered or moved to allow 
vehicles or personnel to pass through them, and mobile systems can be set up in 
temporary locations where entry points need to be controlled. Some systems, such as the 
Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier, had both ASTM F2656-07 and NCHRP Report No. 
350 approval. The overall dimensions and dynamic deflections of these systems were 
found using product manuals [34-42], approval letters for End Treatments and Crash 
Cushions on FHWA’s website [27], and/or the Ant-Ram barrier list. The data were 
gathered from the listed approval letters or one of their derivatives.  These net and cable 
systems are shown in Table 17 . 
Designation Dynamic Penetration Rating
P1 ≤ 3.3 ft (1 m)
P2 3.31 to 23.0 ft (1.01 to 7 m)
P3 23.1 to 98.4 ft (7.01 to 30 m)














Report 350 2-30 2-31 2-40 2-41 3-30 3-31 3-40 3-41
Expeditionary Mobile 
Barrier
Zodiac Aerospace Mobile PU60 TL-3 78' 127' CC-118
RAVEN ESCO Zodiac Aerospace Passive Variable TL-3 58.4' 73.1' CC-27
GRAB-400 FutureNet Security Solutions Active 12'-60' 57 1/8" M40 P1-P2 TL-2 20.7' 27.7' CC-74
DRAGNET Vehicle 
Arresting Barrier
Impact Absorption Passive 15'-100' TL-3 40.0' 70.5' CC-70
STOP-GATE                 
(VT-6802)
B&B Electromatic Mobile 50.5' K4 TL-2 9.5' 12.9' CC-55
Anti-Ram Cable 
Fence
NEU Security Systems Passive 20'-200' 48" M50 P1
Cable Based Restraint 
Barrier
NEU Security Systems Active 24'-50' M50 P2
Gibraltar K12 Cable 
Crash Fence
Gibraltar Materials Passive 20' 48" M50 P1
GRAB-300 FutureNet Security Solutions Active 12'-60' 57 1/8" M50 P2
Quick Connect Barrier 
(QCB)
Barrier 1 Systems Inc. Passive 55' PU40
RSS-2015 Electric 
Cable Trap
RSSI Vehicle Barriers Active 100'-160' 24.8" M40 P2
SW-1200 FutureNet Security Solutions Passive 50'-200' 45" M50 P2
VA-Net-300 Barrier 1 Systems Inc. Active 19'-90' M50 P2
Xtreme Mobile 
Barrier













CHAPTER 7 DESIGN CRITERIA 
7.1 Design Space Requirements 
The Nebraska Department of Roads provided examples of intersections where an 
approved guardrail end terminal and Approach Guardrail Transition (AGT) could not be 
used to shield the bridge rail end adjacent to an intersecting roadway due to lack of space, 
as shown in Figure 11. From discussions with the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), 
some specific site constraints were determined. 
 
Figure 11. Example Intersection [43] 
Typically intersection radii for these locations range between 25 ft (7.6 m) and 50 
ft (15.2 m). The bridge railing end is often located within 25 ft (7.6 m) from the 
intersection with many locations having steep slopes beginning downstream of the bridge 
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rail end. The bridge rail was assumed to be laterally offset 4 ft (1.2 m) away from the 
roadway. Also, the sponsor suggested that a clearzone distance of 30 ft (9.1 m) should be 
assumed for all locations. These design details are shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Site Constraints 
7.2 Impact Conditions Determined By Length of Need 
When developing new ideas to treat these situations, it became apparent that 
different evaluation criteria were needed to compare the new concepts. Previous testing 
performed on short-radius guardrail systems was based on AASHTO bridge protection 
guidelines or modified crash cushion test matrices. The test matrix was adapted to the 
geometry of the guardrail systems, but did not address all of the potential impacts 
possible near intersecting roadways.  
The discrepancy between previous testing of short-radius guardrail systems and 
the actual impact conditions relative to bridges adjacent to intersecting roadways was 
discussed with NDOR sponsors. This discussion led to the determination to treat the 
intersection condition in a similar manner as used for general hazards found within the 
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clear zone distance, as shown in Figure 13. The hazard would extend perpendicular from 
the end of the bridge railing to the maximum clear zone distance, also shown in Figure 
13. The area shielded would be determined with the runout length and LON from the 
RDG [1]. The upstream end of the bridge railing was used to define the beginning of the 
hazard as steep slopes often begin at the end of the bridge railing. The length of need was 
determined using runout lengths suggested in the RDG (4
th
 Ed.) for 60 mph (100 km/h) 
design speeds, as shown in Table 18. The resultant runout length for the system was 300 
ft (91.4 m), assuming the ADT for the primary road would be 10,000 vehicles per day or 
greater. For 1,000 ADT, the runout length for the system would be only 200 ft (61.0 m), 
but for the purpose of this project, assuming a higher ADT was a more conservative 
assumption.  
Another method was used to determine the protection area, which assumed that 
vehicles could not traverse the area upstream from the secondary roadway. For this 
method, a line was drawn tangent to the radius opposite of the safety treatment, and 
through a point to the back of the hazard.  This may be applicable if a guardrail system 
was installed on the road upstream of the intersection. This option decreased the coverage 
area required of new systems, especially systems with very short intersection radii. 
Ultimately, the LON option was chosen because to determine the shielded area, it better 
represented the worst case scenario and would be largely consistent with State DOT 
design practice for shielding roadside hazards. This option does create a larger protected 
area and more difficult to shield. The sponsor felt that shielding that area was justified, 









Figure 13. (a) Approach Guardrail with Variables [1], (b) Intersection Near Bridge with Variables 
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Table 18. Suggested Runout Length (LR) for Barrier Design Given Traffic Volume 
(ADT) [1] 
Design Speed 













mph (km/h) ft (m) ft (m) ft (m) ft (m) 
80 (130) 470 (143) 430 (131) 380 (116) 330 (101) 
70 (110) 360 (110) 330 (101) 290 (88) 250 (76) 
60 (100) 300 (91) 250 (76) 210 (64) 200 (61) 
50 (80) 230 (70) 190 (58) 160 (49) 150 (46) 
40 (60) 160 (49) 130 (40) 110 (34) 100 (30) 
30 (50) 110 (34) 90 (27) 80 (24) 70 (21) 
 
7.3 Line of Sight Considerations 
Intersections are designed so that their geometry and nearby obstacles or features 
do not create navigational problems for motorists that could result in traffic collisions. 
The sight distance, as defined in “Intersection Safety: A Manual for Local Rural Road 
Owners,” is the distance a motorist can see an approaching vehicle before their line of 
sight is blocked by an obstruction near the intersection [44]. The driver of a vehicle 
approaching or leaving an intersection requires an unobstructed view of the intersection 
with sufficient lengths along the intersecting roadway to anticipate and avoid potential 
collisions. 
A barrier’s height is an important consideration when considering new concepts. 
A system that is too tall reduces the sight distance for drivers on the secondary road that 
intend to turn onto the primary roadway. The AASHTO Policy on Geometric Design of 
Highways and Streets advises that roadside features should be less than 3.0 ft (0.91 m) 
above the road [45]. This criterion could be violated if the structure, such as a net, could 
54 
 
be seen through. The area needed for this unobstructed view is called the Clear Sight 
Triangle, as shown in Figure 14. The Intersection Sight Distance (ISD) is measured along 
the major road beginning at a point that coincides with the location of the minor road 
vehicle. The ISD is based on the following assumptions [44]: 
 Stop control of the minor road approaches; 
 Using driver eye and object heights associated with passenger cars; 
 Both minor and major roads are considered at level grade; 
 Considers a left-turn from the minor road as the worst-case scenario (i.e., 
requiring the most sight distance); and 
 The major road is an undivided, two-way, two-lane roadway with no turn 
lanes. 
 
Figure 14. Clear Sight Triangles for 4-Leg Stop-controlled Intersections [44] 
The Stopping Sight Distance (SSD) refers to the distance required for drivers to 
avoid potential collisions. Sight distances that exceed the recommended SSD, as shown 
in Table 19, are desirable. 
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Table 19. Sight Distance at Intersections [44] 
Speed                
mph (km/h) 
Stopping Sight 





Distance                
ft (m) 
25 (40) 155 (47.2) 280 (85.3) 
30 (48) 200 (61) 335 (102.1) 
35 (56) 250 (76.2) 390 (118.9) 
40 (64) 305 (93) 445 (135.6) 
45 (72) 360 (109.7) 500 (152.4) 
50 (80) 425 (129.5) 555 (169.2) 
55 (89) 495 (150.9) 610 (185.9) 
60 (97) 570 (173.7) 665 (202.7) 
65 (105) 645 (196.6) 720 (219.5) 
 
7.4 Preference for Existing Technologies 
 Preference was given to design concepts that utilized existing technologies in 
order to limit new hardware development for this project. An important consideration for 
this project was how well designs could be implemented into new concepts without 
interfering with the operation of another technology.  
7.5 Other Considerations 
Many locations that require a short-radius guardrail system have moderate to 
steep slopes inside the intersection radius. Though there are no specific criteria, it is 
desirable for new concepts to accommodate moderate slopes. These locations are often 
found in wetland areas. Thus, there are environments that limit the use of chemicals to 
control weeds and brush in that area. As such, that the protected area should allow access 
for mowers and other equipment to be used in the protected area. NDOR also indicated 
that it would be preferable if a guardrail system was not required along the secondary 
road.   
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CHAPTER 8 NEW DESIGN CONCEPTS 
New design concepts were developed for treating bridge ends adjacent to 
intersecting roadways as well as to accommodate the design space and impact condition 
requirements. The concepts needed to address the design issues inherent to the current 
short-radius system, while improving impact performance and decreasing the overall 
system footprint. 
A total of fifteen design concepts were identified in the initial brainstorming 
sessions. They include: 
Concept A  – Net Attenuator/End Terminal or Crash Cushion 
Concept B  – Dual Bullnose 
Concept C  –  Bullnose with Sand Barrels 
Concept D – Bullnose 
Concept E – Two End Terminals with Secondary Energy-Absorbing Guardrail 
Concept F – Two Disconnected Guardrails 
Concept G – Cable or Net Attached Behind Two End Terminals 
Concept H – Energy Absorbers Between Impact Panel and Portable Concrete 
Barriers 
Concept I – Energy Absorbers, Rails, and Posts 
Concept J – Rubber Cylinders Between Impact Panel and Restoring Barrier 
Concept K – Sand Barrels with End Terminal or Crash Cushion 
Concept L – TMA(s) Between Two End Terminals 
Concept M – TMA(s)  or Crash Cushion(s) with End Terminal 
Concept N – TMA between End Terminal and Bullnose 
57 
 
Concept O – Bullnose with Net Attenuator  
8.1 Concept A – Net Attenuator/End Terminal or Crash Cushion 
Concept A used a net attenuator to span across the corner of the intersection with 
a TL-3 crashworthy end terminal and transition or a crashworthy crash cushion connected 
to the bridge rail, as shown in Figure 15. The net attenuator would be anchored near the 
secondary roadway and behind the crash cushion or guardrail end terminal. There are 
multiple methods of energy absorption available for net arrestors, including hydraulic 
shocks, fabric ripping, and metal bending.  
One advantage of using a net attenuator is that there is a high probability for 
vehicle capture, redirection, or controlled stopping under a wide range of impact 
conditions such as high impact angles and velocities, due to the net’s ability to capture 
and arrest vehicles at high impact angles and velocities. The net attenuator would seem 
likely to function on a moderate slope as well as eliminate the need for a guardrail system 
along the secondary roadway. 
Many net attenuators are taller than the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum obstruction 
height that was provided as a design criterion. However many nets are see-through and 
would not block the view of an oncoming vehicle or cause any sightline issues. For 
impact events, interaction between the net and the end terminal or crash cushion is 
unknown and would require further investigation. The guardrail end terminal and AGT 
may be too long for most installations. Therefore, crash cushions with shorter system 
lengths and/or an integrated transition may be better suited for this application than 
guardrail end terminals. Concept A would not enclose any part of the protected area and 
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would allow access to mowers and other equipment, thus increasing simplicity and ease 
of maintenance. 
One concern with this design is that a vehicle traveling parallel to the TL-3 traffic 
could pass behind the crash cushion and hit the anchorage of the net and not be captured. 
Thus, placement of the net ends or anchorages may be critical. A net would also need to 
be properly supported such that weather (i.e., snow wind, ice, etc.) or snow plows (i.e., 
thrown snow) would not knock it over. Because the energy absorbers for net attenuators 
are proprietary systems, they may be prohibitively expensive. Depending on the energy 
absorber used, there may be field maintenance or inspections required to ensure their 
long-term performance. Some research and development would be required to integrate a 
net attenuator with an end terminal or crash cushion system.  
Other concerns with this system include a need for further research and 
development before it is ready for highway use. The stopping distances for many net 
attenuators approved for highway use are greater than the available space for this design 
concept. To reduce stopping distances, most energy absorbers anchorages would need to 
develop higher resistive loads. This design met many of the design criteria and was 




Figure 15. Concept A - Net Attenuator/End Terminal or Crash Cushion 
8.2 Concept B – Dual Bullnose 
Concept B used a wide bullnose to both transition into the bridge rail as well as 
protect the corner to the clear zone. Bullnose guardrail systems often allow for more 
dynamic deflection than the design space available; therefore, another attenuation system 
is needed to stop an errant impacting vehicle, especially a pickup truck. Concept B uses a 
smaller, inner bullnose for additional energy absorption, as shown in Figure 16. The 
bullnose guardrail system shown for this system is lower than the 36-in. (914-mm) 
maximum height limit and would not cause any sight-line issues. 
The advantages of this system would be that there is a continuous rail element 
wrapping around the entire system, and a vehicle would not be able to pass in between 
two systems. Bullnose guardrail systems have also been tested under NCHRP Report No. 
350 TL-3 conditions and utilize many non-proprietary components, which could reduce 
the installation cost. Another benefit is that a bullnose uses thrie-beam guardrail elements 
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that could be transitioned directly into the end of the bridge railing. This design also 
eliminated the need for a guardrail system along the secondary roadway.  
The disadvantage of this system is that adapting the bullnose to fit this application 
may be difficult. Currently, bullnose guardrail systems require longer run-out lengths 
than the current design space would allow. Therefore the ‘stroke’ of the bullnose system 
would need to be reduced, requiring an additional form of energy absorption to stop the 
impacting vehicle. Shortening and widening a standard bullnose and an approved bridge 
rail transition into the bridge railing may cause the system to become too stiff to capture 
the small car and pickup truck used under MASH testing conditions. NDOR indicated 
that it would be difficult to grade the area to the end of the clear zone in many locations. 
This concept would require a significant development effort, making it less desirable than 
other options that better utilized existing hardware.  
Installing two different systems was not ideal because of the grading and extra 
hardware that would be required. Other designs that utilized staged energy absorption 
would have more favorable grading requirements, and the hardware that would need to be 
involved would be reduced. Concept B would also enclose two sections of the protected 
area and would not allow mowers and other equipment to easily access the area for 
maintenance. This concept would not likely accommodate a slope in the protected area. 
Though this design had the potential to work, other forms of energy absorption such as a 





Figure 16. Concept B – Dual Bullnose 
8.3 Concept C – Bullnose with Sand Barrels 
Concept C used a wide bullnose to both transition into the bridge rail as well as 
protect the corner to the clear zone. Bullnose guardrail systems often allow for more 
dynamic deflection than the design space available; therefore, another attenuation system 
is needed to stop an impacting vehicle.  For this concept, sand barrels are placed inside 
the wide bullnose to provide a more efficient, staged energy dissipation, as shown in 
Figure 17. The bullnose guardrail system shown for this system is lower than the 36-in. 
(914-mm) maximum height limit and would not cause any sight-line issues. 
The advantages of this system would be that there is a continuous rail element 
wrapping around the entire system, and a vehicle would not be able to pass in between 
two systems. Bullnose guardrail systems have also been tested under NCHRP Report No. 
350 TL-3 conditions and utilize many non-proprietary components, which could reduce 
the installation cost. Another benefit is that a bullnose uses thrie-beam guardrail elements 
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that could be transitioned directly into the end of the bridge railing. This design also 
eliminated the need for a guardrail system along the secondary roadway.  
The disadvantage of this system is that adapting the bullnose to fit this application 
may be difficult. Currently, bullnose guardrail systems require longer run-out lengths 
than the current design space would allow. Therefore the ‘stroke’ of the bullnose system 
would need to be reduced, requiring an additional form of energy absorption to stop the 
impacting vehicle. Shortening and widening a standard bullnose and an approved bridge 
rail transition into the bridge railing may cause the system to become too stiff to capture 
the small car and pickup truck used under MASH testing conditions. NDOR indicated 
that it would be difficult to grade the area to the end of the clear zone in many locations. 
This concept would not likely accommodate a slope in the protected area. Maintenance of 
this system would be difficult, because mowers would need to be lifted over the top of 
the bullnose to maintain the enclosed area.  
Sand barrels are an existing technology, relatively inexpensive, and can be 
installed in an array to provide staged energy absorption. Unfortunately, the 36-in. (914-
mm) maximum height criterion limits the size of sand barrel that can be installed inside 
of a bullnose and still preserve sight-lines. Controlling weeds in between the barrels 
could be difficult, because the use of chemicals to treat weeds may be restricted 
depending on the location. 
Installing two different systems was not ideal because of the grading and extra 
hardware that would be required. Other designs that utilized staged energy absorption 
would have more favorable grading requirements, and the hardware that would need to be 
involved would be reduced. Concept B would also enclose two sections of the protected 
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area and would not allow mowers and other equipment to easily access the area for 
maintenance. This design met much of the design criteria and was chosen by the sponsor 
for further investigation. 
 
 
Figure 17. Concept C – Bullnose with Sand Barrels 
8.4 Concept D – Bullnose 
Concept D used a wide bullnose to both transition into the bridge rail as well as 
protect the corner of the intersection to the clear zone, as shown in Figure 18. One benefit 
of this system would be that there is a continuous rail element wrapping around the entire 
system and the vehicle would not be able to pass through the system. Bullnose guardrail 
systems have also been tested under NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-3 conditions, though 
never at the width and length required for this concept. Another benefit is that a bullnose 
uses thrie-beam guardrail elements that could be transitioned directly into the end of the 
bridge rail. The bullnose guardrail system shown for this system is lower than the 36-in. 
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(914-mm) maximum height limit and would not cause sight-line issues. This concept 
would not likely accommodate a slope in the protected area. This design also eliminated 
the need for a guardrail system along the secondary roadway. Maintenance on this design 
would be comparable to current bullnose guardrail systems. 
The disadvantage of this system is that adapting the bullnose to fit this application 
may be difficult. Currently, bullnose guardrail systems require longer run-out lengths 
than the current design space would allow. Therefore the ‘stroke’ of the bullnose system 
would need to be reduced, requiring an additional form of energy absorption to stop the 
impacting vehicle. Shortening and widening a standard bullnose and an approved bridge 
rail transition into the bridge railing may cause the system to become too stiff to capture 
the small car and pickup truck used under MASH testing conditions. NDOR indicated 
that it would be difficult to grade the area to the end of the clear zone in many locations. 
Maintenance of this system would be difficult, because mowers would need to be lifted 
over the top of the bullnose to maintain the enclosed area. This concept would require a 
significant development effort. This concept would also require more space than most 




Figure 18. Concept D - Bullnose 
8.5 Concept E – Two End Terminals with Secondary Energy-Absorbing Guardrail 
Concept E used two end terminals, one along both the primary and secondary 
roadways, as shown in Figure 19. In between the end terminals, a secondary rail would be 
used to capture a vehicle traversing the corner of the intersection. This secondary 
guardrail would be fed through an energy-absorbing device, perhaps similar to some of 
the end terminal heads. 
Advantages of this system include engaging the vehicle sooner by having the nose 
of the system near the edge of the traveled way. This could reduce the deflection distance 
relative to the roadway and would reduce the footprint of the overall system. The 
guardrail system shown for this system is lower than the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum 
height limit and would not cause any sight-line issues. Maintenance on this design would 
be comparable to current end terminal systems. 
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A disadvantage of this system is that it would require development of a new 
energy absorption device which violates the design criteria of using existing technologies. 
This concept would require a significant development effort, making it less desirable than 
other options that better utilized existing hardware. An end terminal would be required on 
the secondary roadway, which violated the design criteria. This concept would not likely 
accommodate a slope in the protected area. The amount of development work required 
and the need for a terminal on the secondary roadways made this design less desirable 
than some of the other concepts. 
 
Figure 19. Concept E – Two End Terminals with Secondary Energy-Absorbing  
Guardrail 
8.6 Concept F – Two Disconnected Guardrails 
Concept F used two curved guardrail systems that partially wrapped around the 
corner with a transition section off the end of the bridge rail and with weaker posts in the 
corner. One of the major flaws with a single guardrail system is that to add stroke to the 
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system there needs to be a large distance from the end of the bridge rail to provide this. 
With two “stacked” systems, the stroke could be increased without increasing the overall 
footprint of the intersecting roadway treatment, because the second guardrail system 
would be behind the primary system and is located in the region that would capture the 
vehicle. Maintenance on this design would be comparable to current short-radius 
guardrail systems. 
One of the major issues with short-radius designs was that the TL-3 side of the 
short-radius was too long to effectively transition into the bridge rail in the space 
available. Another issue was that the vehicle tended to yaw as the guardrail was pushed 
backward. Having two curved guardrail systems wrapped around one another, as shown 
in Figure 20, would allow the curved sections to pivot about different points and would 
counteract each other, resulting in less vehicle yawing. The guardrail systems shown for 
this system would be lower than the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum height limit and would 
not cause any sight-line issues. 
Though there were some benefits to this system, there would be a significant 
amount of development work required before this system could be feasible. This design 
would also require designing end terminals that could be placed inside the corner of the 
intersection. As the first guardrail is pushed backward, the posts could become tripping 
hazards as they are traversed by the vehicle. This concept would require a significant 





Figure 20. Concept F – Two Disconnected Guardrails 
8.7 Concept G – Cable or Net Attached Behind Two End Terminals 
Like Concept E, Concept G uses an end terminal along the primary and secondary 
roadways. In between the end terminals, a cable system would be used to capture a 
vehicle traversing the corner of the intersection, shown in Figure 21. This cable system 
would be attached to the back of the posts of the end terminal or crash cushion systems. 
This attachment could come in the form of clips similar to a cable guardrail system or 
may need to be something totally new. 
The advantages of this system include engaging the vehicle sooner by having the 
nose of the cable system near the edge of the traveled way. This could reduce the 
deflection distance relative to the roadway and the foot print of the overall system. The 
guardrail system shown for this concept was lower than the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum 
height limit and would not cause any sight-line issues. Maintenance on this design would 
be comparable to current end terminal systems. 
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Some of the disadvantages of this system are that it would require a new energy-
absorbing clip or other device which would increase development time, and it violated 
the design criteria of using existing technologies. Also, an end terminal would be 
required on the secondary roadway, which violated the design criteria. This concept 
would not likely accommodate a slope in the protected area. The amount of development 
work required and the need for a terminal on the secondary roadways made this design 




Figure 21. Concept G – Cable or Net Attached Behind Two End Terminals 
8.8 Concept H – Energy Absorbers Between Impact Panel and Portable Concrete 
Barriers  
Concept H, shown in Figure 22, used many components to capture a vehicle, 
including an impact panel, energy absorbers, and portable concrete barriers (PCB). 
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Concept H would be designed such that impacts on the primary side of the system would 
be redirected and impact in the radius would be captured. 
Advantages of this system include engaging the vehicle sooner by having the nose 
of the impact panel near the edge of the traveled way. This could reduce the deflection 
distance relative to the roadway and the foot print of the overall system. Another 
advantage is that it uses many components, such as portable concrete barriers and 
potentially sand barrels. For energy absorption, one option would be to use sand barrels, 
which are relatively inexpensive and can be installed in an array to provide staged energy 
absorption. 
One of the disadvantages of this system is that it would likely require a concrete 
pad to place the portable concrete barriers on, which would not be feasible in many 
situations. Though sand barrels are an existing technology, the sizes that can be used are 
limited by the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum height criterion needed to preserve sight-lines. 
Controlling weeds in between the barrels would be not be a major issue because of the 
required concrete pad. The amount of construction work required for this concept make it 
less desirable than some of the other concepts, and in some instances it may be easier to 




Figure 22. Concept H – Energy Absorbers Between Impact Panel and Temporary 
Concrete Barriers 
8.9 Concept I – Energy Absorbers, Rails, and Posts 
Concept I, shown in Figure 23, used guardrails with posts and energy absorbers to 
redirect or capture the impacting vehicle. Concept I would be designed such that impacts 
on the primary side of the system would be redirected and impact in the radius would be 
captured. 
Advantages of this system include engaging the vehicle sooner by having the nose 
of the rail element closer to the edge of the traveled way. This could reduce the deflection 
distance relative to the roadway and the foot print of the overall system.  
One of the disadvantages of this system is that it would require development of a 
new energy absorption component that attaches to the posts. This violates the design 
criteria of using existing technologies. This concept would require a significant 
development effort, making it less desirable than other options that better utilized existing 
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hardware. This concept would not likely be able to accommodate a slope. The amount of 
development work required and the need for a terminal on the secondary roadways made 
this design less desirable than some of the other concepts. Maintenance of this system 
would be difficult, because mowers would need to be lifted over the top of the bullnose to 
maintain the enclosed area. This concept would require a significant development effort 
making it less desirable than other options that better utilized existing hardware. 
 
Figure 23. Concept I – Energy Absorbers, Rails, and Posts 
8.10 Concept J – Rubber Cylinders Between Impact Panel and Restoring Barrier 
Concept J, as shown in Figure 24, used rubber cylinders backed by a restoring 
barrier and covered by some form of skin to capture the impacting vehicle.  
Advantages of this system include engaging the vehicle sooner by having the nose 
of the rail element closer to the edge of the traveled way. This could reduce the deflection 
distance relative to the roadway and the foot print of the overall system.  
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The restoring barrier would likely require a concrete pad to be placed in the 
corner, which was not feasible in most situations. Controlling weeds in between the 
barrels could be difficult, because the use of chemicals to treat weeds may be restricted 
depending on the location. Another disadvantage was that it would require development 
of a new energy-absorbing restorable barrier. This violated the design criteria of using 
existing technologies. This concept would require a significant development effort, 
making it less desirable than other options that better utilized existing hardware. The 
amount of development work required and the need for a terminal on the secondary 
roadways made this design less desirable than some of the other concepts. 
 
Figure 24. Concept J – Rubber Cylinders  Between Impact Panel and Restoring  Barrier 
8.11 Concept K – Sand Barrels with End Terminal or Crash Cushion 
Concept K, as shown in Figure 25, would use an end terminal or crash cushion to 
protect the bridge railing with a sand barrel array for capturing vehicles impacting in the 
radius. A large number of sand barrel modules would be required to protect the corner of 
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the intersection. The height of some of the heavier modules can also create sightline 
issues.  
The advantages of this system are that sand barrels are an existing technology, 
relatively inexpensive, and can be installed in an array to provide staged energy 
absorption. Unfortunately the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum height criterion limits the size 
of sand barrel that can be installed inside bullnose systems and still preserve sight-lines. 
Though not the most aesthetically pleasing option, Concept K is one of the few options 
that used only existing technologies. 
A disadvantage of this system is that they would require a flat pad to be placed 
on, which may not always be feasible. Controlling weeds in between the barrels could be 
difficult, because the use of chemicals to treat weeds may be restricted depending on the 
location. NDOR indicated that it would be difficult to grade the area to the end of the 
clear zone in many locations. Given the use of existing technologies, this option would 
likely require less time and money to develop than other options and was chosen by the 




Figure 25. Concept K – Sand Barrels with End Terminal 
8.12 Concept L – TMA(s) Between Two End Terminals 
Concept L, shown in Figure 26, used an end terminal/crash cushion for the bridge 
termination and an end terminal/crash cushion parallel that would redirect vehicles into 
sand barrels or a truck-mounted attenuator. Vehicles would either impact the guardrail 
closest to the traffic side or be redirected into a crash cushion or TMA unit by the offset 
end terminal.  
The advantage of this system is that TMAs and end terminals or crash cushions 
are existing technologies and have been approved for highway use. Maintenance on this 
design would be comparable to current short-radius, end terminal, and crash cushion 
systems. 
One disadvantage of this system is that it would require multiple proprietary 
systems that could be expensive to implement. Another disadvantage was that the effects 
of a vehicle impacting multiple different systems were unknown and would require some 
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development and investigative work. This concept would not likely accommodate a slope 
in the protected area. Most importantly, the system would not shield the entire region that 
needed to be protected. For situations where the clear distance was much less, this could 
be a viable option. However, the amount of development work required for this concept 
made it less desirable than some of the other concepts. 
 
Figure 26. Concept L – TMA(s) Between Two End Terminals 
8.13 Concept M - TMA(s)  or Crash Cushion(s) with End Terminal 
Concept M, shown in Figure 27, used two end terminals or crash cushions with a 
Truck-or Trailer-Mounted Attenuator (TMA or TTMA) mounted in between the two 
systems, as shown in Figure 27. This concept was desirable because of its potential use of 
currently existing hardware.  
The advantage of this system is that TMAs and end terminals or crash cushions 
are existing technologies and have been approved for highway use. Maintenance on this 
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design would be comparable to current short-radius, end terminal, and crash cushion 
systems. 
One disadvantage of this system is that it would require multiple proprietary 
systems that could be expensive to implement. Another disadvantage is that this system 
would require multiple TMA systems to effectively protect the entire area, which could 
be prohibitively expensive. Impacts involving multiple TMAs would require further 
research and testing. This concept would not likely accommodate a slope in the protected 
area. The amount of development work required made this design less desirable than 
some of the other concepts. 
 
Figure 27. Concept M - TMA(s)  or Crash Cushion(s) with End Terminal 
8.14 Concept N – TMA between End Terminal and Bullnose 
Concept N, shown in Figure 28, is a variation of Concept L and uses an end 
terminal, TMA or TTMA, and a standard bullnose. With Concept L not being wide 
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enough to protect the entire hazard, this concept attempted to increase the width by using 
a bullnose system instead of an end terminal.  
The advantage of this system is that TMAs, end terminals or crash cushions, and 
bullnose guardrail system are existing technologies and have been approved for highway 
use. Maintenance on this design would be comparable to current short-radius, end 
terminal, and crash cushion systems. 
One major disadvantage of this system was that it would require multiple systems 
that could be expensive to implement. Impacts involving multiple TMAs would require 
further research and testing. Though the nose of the bullnose was narrow and close in size 
to approved systems, approved systems are much longer than what is shown. The amount 
of development work required made this design less desirable than some of the other 
concepts. 
 
Figure 28. Concept N – TMA between End Terminal and Bullnose 
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8.15 Concept O – Bullnose with Net Attenuator 
Concept O used a net attenuator enclosed by a wide bullnose to aid in capturing 
heavier vehicles that require extra energy absorption, as shown in Figure 29. Bullnose 
guardrail systems often allow for more dynamic deflection than the design space 
available; therefore, another attenuation system was needed to stop an impacting vehicle. 
For this concept, a net attenuator such as the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier could be 
used to provide extra energy absorption. The bullnose guardrail system shown for this 
system is lower than the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum height limit and would not cause any 
sight-line issues. 
The advantages of this system, would be that there is a continuous rail element 
wrapping around the entire system and a vehicle would not be able to pass in between 
two systems. Bullnose guardrail systems have also been tested under NCHRP Report No. 
350 TL-3 conditions and utilize many non-proprietary components, which could reduce 
the installation cost. Another benefit is that a bullnose uses thrie-beam guardrail elements 
that could be transitioned directly into the end of the bridge railing. This design also 
eliminated the need for a guardrail system along the secondary roadway. One advantage 
to using a net attenuator inside the bullnose is that there is a high probability of capture or 
controlled stopping under a wide range of impact conditions. This design also eliminated 
the need for a guardrail system along the secondary roadway. Many net attenuators are 
taller than the 36-in. (914-mm) maximum height guideline in the design criteria. Because 
the net and bullnose would not block the view of an oncoming vehicle, this would not 
cause a sightline issue. 
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A disadvantage of this system was that adapting the bullnose to fit this application 
would be difficult. Run-out lengths for bullnose guardrail systems are too long, so a 
secondary absorption method was needed. Shortening and widening a standard bullnose 
that could safely transition into the bridge railing may cause the system to become too 
stiff to capture the small car and pickup truck used under MASH testing conditions. 
NDOR indicated that it would be difficult to grade the area all the way to the end of the 
clear zone in a real world application. This concept would not likely accommodate a 
slope in the protected area, because both sides of the bullnose would need to be at the 
same level. Maintenance of this system would be difficult, because mowers would need 
to be lifted over the top of the bullnose to maintain the enclosed area. 
Interaction between the net and bullnose during impacts with both systems is 
unknown and would require further investigation. Because the energy absorbers are 
proprietary systems, they could also be prohibitively expensive to acquire. Depending on 
the energy absorber used, there may maintenance required to ensure their performance in 
the field. Some development work would be required to integrate a net attenuator and end 
terminal or crash cushion system. This design met much of the design criteria and was 








CHAPTER 9 RANKING AND SELECTION OF DESIGN CONCEPTS 
MwRSF and the sponsor of this project, the Nebraska Department of Roads, met 
to narrow down the list to three feasible concepts. Four main criteria were considered 
when ranking the design concepts: safety performance, maintenance and repair costs, 
development effort, and installation cost. From these discussions, the designs were 
ranked most to least feasible. This information is shown in Table 20. During these 
discussions, three concepts were considered for further investigation into their feasibility: 
Concepts A, K, and C/O. Concepts C and O, which both used a secondary form of energy 
absorption enclosed by a bullnose, were later considered as one option. The other 
concepts were rejected for the following reasons: 
 Concepts B, D, E, F, G, H, I, and H required a significant development 
effort, making them less desirable than other options better utilizing 
existing components.  
 Concept B was not pursued because the sand barrels and net attenuator 
used in Concepts C and O, respectively, were seen as more practical 
devices to provide secondary energy absorption. 
 Concept D does not have enough space to safely stop an impacting 
vehicle. 
 Concept F would require a significant amount of development work. 
There is no guarantee that this system will capture the vehicle. The posts 
could become tripping hazards as well. 
 Concepts L, M, and N had low safety performance because they did not 
protect the entire hazard. These concepts also utilized multiple different 
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systems that have never been tested together. The repair cost was seen as 
high for these systems, because a vehicle could impact more than one 
system. 
 Concepts H, I, and J could possibly work as well, but they would require a 
significant amount of development work before they would be ready for a 
real-world installation.  
 
 The net attenuator/end terminal, sand barrels/end terminal, and bullnose with 
secondary energy absorption were the highest-ranking concepts and were chosen to move 





















1 A Net Attenuator High High Medium Medium
2 K Sand Barrels with End Terminal Medium-Low Medium-Low Low Low
3 O Bullnose with Net Arrestor High Low Medium Medium-Low
4 C Wide Bullnose with Sand barrels High Medium-Low Medium Medium-Low
5 B Dual Wide Bullnose High Low Medium Medium-Low
6 D Wide Bullnose High Low Medium Low
7 E Two End Terminals with Secondary EA Guardrail High-Medium Low High-Medium Medium
8 F Two Disconnected Guardrails High-Medium Low High-Medium Medium-Low
9 G Cable/Net Attached to Back of Posts with Clips High-Medium Low High-Medium Medium
10 H Energy Absorbers Between Impact Panel and Portable Concrete Barriers Medium Medium High High-Medium
11 I Energy Absorbers, Rails, and Posts Medium High-Medium High High-Medium
12 J Impact Panel ->Rubber Cylinders->Restoring Barriers Medium Medium High High-Medium
13 L TMA between Two End Terminals Low Low Medium-Low High-Medium
14 M TMA/CCs and End Terminal Low Low High High









CHAPTER 10 QUASI-STATIC TAPE COMPONENT TEST SETUP AND 
CONDITIONS 
10.1 Purpose 
To pursue the development of Concept A, the performance of several components 
of the net attenuator needed to be tested. Impact Absorption, Inc., the manufacturer of the 
Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier, provided a net attenuator system for testing purposes. 
The kinetic energy of a vehicle impacting this net attenuator was absorbed by bending 
steel straps back and forth through a series of pins housed in a stainless steel canister, 
herein referred to as an energy absorber. To evaluate the net’s potential for Concept A, 
the force level needed to be determined to estimate the energy absorbed and the 
corresponding stopping distance of an impacting vehicle. 
The total energy absorbed and stopping distance of the net attenuator was directly 
related to the force required to pull the steel strap through the pins. According to the 
manufacturer of the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier, Impact Absorption Inc., the force 
levels were expected to be slightly less than 4,000 lb (17.8 kN). All quasi-static tests were 
conducted at the MwRSF Proving Grounds in Lincoln, Nebraska. 
10.2 Scope 
Two quasi-static pull tests were conducted on the Dragnet energy absorber. The 
device was fixed at one end and pulled by a winch. The energy absorber and connection 
hardware were proprietary components and thus, no material specifications, mill 






10.3 Equipment and Instrumentation 
Equipment and instrumentation utilized to collect and record data during the 
quasi-static tests included force load cells, high-speed and standard-speed digital video 
cameras, and still cameras. The energy absorber, as shown in Figure 30, was mounted to 
an anchored vehicle and pulled with a winch rated to 18,000 lbs (80 kN). Two 50k load 
cells were used to measure the force to pull the tape. These load cells were not preloaded. 
10.3.1 Test Jig 
Chains were used to attach the load cells and energy absorbers to the anchored 
bogie vehicle, as shown in Figures 30 and 31. The front of the vehicle attached to the 
winch was also tied to the ground via a chain and bollard. 
 
















10.3.2 Digital Photography 
One AOS VITcam high-speed digital video camera and one GoPro digital video 
camera were used to document each test. The AOS high-speed camera had a frame rate of 
125 frames per second and the GoPro digital video camera had a frame rate of 120 frames 
per second. Both cameras were placed laterally from the test setup, with a view 
perpendicular to the direction of tape pullout. A Nikon D3100 digital still camera was 
used to document pre- and post-test conditions for all tests.  
10.3.3 Load Cells 
Two load cells were used in line with the energy absorber. The load cells were 
manufactured by Transducer Techniques and conformed to model no. TLL-50K with a 
load range up to 50,000 lb (222.4 kN). During testing, output voltage signals were sent 
from the load cells to a Keithly Metrabyte DAS-1802HC data acquisition board, acquired 
with Test Point software, and stored permanently on a personal computer. The data 
collection rate for the load cells was 10,000 samples per second (10,000 Hz). 
10.4 Data Processing 
The electronic transducer data obtained in dynamic testing was filtered using the 
SAE Class 60 Butterworth filter conforming to the SAE J211/1 specifications [49]. The 
force transducer signal was extracted from the bulk of the data signals. A force vs. time 




CHAPTER 11 QUASI-STATIC TAPE COMPONENT TESTING RESULTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Results 
A series of two component tests were conducted to evaluate the force required to 
feed steel tape from the Dragnet energy absorbers. When the pulling force was initially 
applied to the energy absorbers, a noticeable peak in the force vs. time graph was 
achieved. The force readings taken from these tests were averaged so that they could be 
used for future simulations and analytical estimations of the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting 
Barrier. Further details on the individual tests are provided in subsequent sections. 
11.1.1 Test No. IRAS-1 
In test no. IRAS-1, the energy absorber tape was pulled for a total of 141 in. 
(3581 mm) at an average velocity of 2.49 in/s (63.2 mm/s) by the winch. Though this 
velocity is much lower than the velocity during an impact scenario, it was the maximum 
velocity that could be achieved by the winch. As shown in Figure 32, the average force 
measured by the load cells was 3.812 kip and 3.814 kip (16.96 kN and 16.97 kN). Shown 
in Figure 33 is the twisted steel tape from the energy absorber, caused by the winch cable 
coiling as it was reeled in. During this test, initial slack in the system may have resulted 






























IRAS-1 Tension Force vs. Time





Figure 33. Energy Absorber Component Testing, Test No. IRAS-1 
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11.1.2 Test No. IRAS-2  
In test no. IRAS-2, the energy absorber tape was pulled for a total of 144 in. 
(3658 mm) at an average velocity of 2.07 in/s (52.6 mm/s) by the winch. Though this 
velocity is much lower than the velocity during an impact scenario, it was the maximum 
velocity that could be achieved by the winch. As shown in Figure 34, the average force 
measured by the load cells was 3.893 kip and 3.889 kip (17.32 kN and 17.30 kN). Shown 
in Figure 35 is the twisted steel tape from the energy absorber, caused by the winch cable 
coiling as it was reeled in.  
 


























IRAS-2 Tension Force vs. Time









The force to pull the tape out of the energy absorbers remained relatively constant 
during both tests. As a result, the average force level of the energy absorbers for test nos. 
IRAS-1 and IRAS-2 was 3.81 kip and 3.89 kip (17.0 kN and 17.3 kN), respectively. 
Though the first test had high peak force during the beginning of the test, the force 
required to unreel the tape was relatively constant for both tests, as shown in Figure 36. 
The second test had a much smoother pull, and thus, the resistive force was relatively 
constant throughout.  
 

























IRAS-1 and 2 Comparisons






CHAPTER 12 NET ATTENUATOR COMPONENT TESTING SETUP AND 
CONDITIONS 
12.1 Purpose 
Dynamic bogie tests were conducted on the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier. A 
standard Dragnet system uses one energy absorber per side anchored to the ground and 
produces stopping distances of 40.03 ft and 70.54 ft (12.2 m and 21.5 m) for NCHRP 
Report No. 350 test nos. 3-30 and 3-31 [46]. The short distance between the end of the 
bridge railing and the beginning of the intersection requires the deflection of the standard 
net attenuator to be reduced. Impact Absorption, Inc. provided twenty-four energy 
absorbers for testing purposes and a net designed to use three standard energy absorbers 
per side. The average force measured in test no.  IRAS-2 was 3,890 lb (17.3 kN), so three 
energy absorbers should have a combined resistive force of about 11,700 lb (52.0 kN) per 
side. The dynamic tests would demonstrate the potential capture and deceleration of 
vehicles using the Dragnet system at higher resistive forces and provide baseline data for 
further analytical and simulation work. All dynamic tests were conducted at the MwRSF 
Proving Grounds in Lincoln, Nebraska. 
12.2 Scope 
Four bogie tests were conducted on the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier with a 
total of six energy absorbers rated at 4,000 lb (17.8 kN) each. Three different target 
impact conditions were selected. All tests had a target impact velocity of 60.0 mph (96.6 
km/h). Test condition 1 had an impact at an angle of 90 degrees in the center of the net, 
that would serve as a baseline test for comparison with analytical and simulation 






center of the net by 12 ft (3,658 mm) to test whether the net could accommodate impacts 
very close to end of the net. Test condition 3 was to impact at an angle of 60 degrees, and 
also offset by 12 ft (3,658 mm). This test was the worst case scenario because the impact 
occurs very  chosen because it would likely be the most difficult test for the net attenuator 
to capture the vehicle. matrix is shown in Table 21. Material specifications, mill 
certifications, and certificates of conformity for the anchor plates are shown in Appendix 
A. 






Speed      
mph (km/h) 
Offset From 
Center of Net 
in. (mm) 
1 90 60.0 (96.6) 0 
2 90 60.0 (96.6) 144 (3,658) 
3 60 60.0 (96.6) 144 (3,658) 
 
12.3 Equipment and Instrumentation 
Equipment and instrumentation utilized to collect and record data during the 
dynamic bogie tests included a bogie, accelerometers, pressure tape switches, high-speed 
and standard-speed digital video cameras, and still cameras.  
12.3.1 Vehicle Tow and Guidance System 
A reverse cable tow system with a 1:2 mechanical advantage was used to propel 
the test vehicle. The distance traveled and the speed of the tow vehicle were one-half that 
of the test vehicle. The test vehicle was released from the tow cable before impact with 
the barrier system. A digital speedometer on the tow vehicle increased the accuracy of the 






A vehicle guidance system developed by Hinch [47] was used to steer the test 
vehicle. A guide flag, attached to the left-front wheel and the guide cable, was sheared off 
before impact with the barrier system. The ⅜-in. (10-mm) diameter guide cable was 
tensioned to approximately 3,500 lb (15.6 kN) and was supported both laterally and 
vertically every 100 ft (30.5 m) by hinged stanchions. The hinged stanchions stood 
upright while holding up the guide cable, but as the vehicle was towed down the line, the 
guide flag struck and knocked each stanchion to the ground. 
12.3.2 Bogie 
A rigid frame bogie was used to impact the posts. A flat-front, detachable impact 
head was used in the testing. The bogie head was constructed of three 6-in. x 8-in. (152-
mm x 203-mm) wood posts mounted horizontally to the front of the bogie with a 12-
gauge (2.7-mm) sheet metal wrapping around the posts. The impact head was bolted to 
the bogie vehicle, creating a rigid frame with a flat impact face. The bogie with the 
impact head is shown in Figure 37. The weight of the bogie with the addition of the 
mountable impact head was 5,090 lb (2,309 kg) for test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2. The 
weight of the bogie for test nos. IRA-3 and IRA-4 was 5,259 lb (2,385 kg), which also 








Figure 37. Rigid-Frame Bogie on Guidance Track 
A pickup truck with a reverse cable tow system was used to propel the bogie to a 
target impact speed of 60.0 mph (96.6 km/h). When the bogie approached the end of the 
guidance system, it was released from the tow cable, allowing it to be free-rolling when it 
impacted the post. A remote braking system was installed on the bogie, allowing it to be 
brought safely to rest after the test if the net did not capture the vehicle.  
12.3.3 Accelerometers 
Three environmental shock and vibration sensor/recorder systems were used to 
measure the accelerations in the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions. All of the 
accelerometers were mounted near the centers of gravity of the test vehicles. The 
electronic accelerometer data obtained in dynamic testing was filtered using the SAE 
Class 60 and the SAE Class 180 Butterworth filters conforming to the SAE J211/1 
specifications [48].  
The first accelerometer system was a two-arm piezoresistive accelerometer 
system manufactured by Endevco of San Juan Capistrano, California. Three 






accelerations independently at a sample rate of 10,000 Hz. The accelerometers were 
configured and controlled using a system developed and manufactured by Diversified 
Technical Systems, Inc. (DTS) of Seal Beach, California. More specifically, data were 
collected using a DTS Sensor Input Module (SIM), Model TDAS3-SIM-16M. The SIM 
was configured with 16 MB SRAM and eight sensor input channels with 250 kB 
SRAM/channel. The SIM was mounted on a TDAS3-R4 module rack. The module rack 
was configured with isolated power/event/communications, 10BaseT Ethernet and RS232 
communication, and an internal backup battery. Both the SIM and module rack were 
crashworthy. The “DTS TDAS Control” computer software program and a customized 
Microsoft Excel worksheet were used to analyze and plot the accelerometer data. 
The second system, SLICE 6DX, was a modular data acquisition system 
manufactured by DTS. The acceleration sensors were mounted inside the body of the 
custom-built SLICE 6DX event data recorder and recorded data at 10,000 Hz to the 
onboard microprocessor. The SLICE 6DX was configured with 7 GB of non-volatile 
flash memory, a range of ±500 g’s, a sample rate of 10,000 Hz, and a 1,650 Hz (CFC 
1000) anti-aliasing filter. The “SLICEWare” computer software program and a 
customized Microsoft Excel worksheet were used to analyze and plot the accelerometer 
data.  
The third system, Model EDR-3, was a triaxial piezoresistive accelerometer 
system manufactured by Instrumented Sensor Technology, Inc. (IST) of Okemos, 
Michigan. The EDR-3 was configured with 256 kB of RAM, a range of ±200 g’s, a 







computer software program and a customized Microsoft Excel worksheet were used to 
analyze and plot the accelerometer data. 
Test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2 used DTS, DTS-SLICE, and EDR-3 accelerometers. 
For test nos. IRA-3 and IRA-4, two DTS-SLICE units were used in lieu of a DTS or 
EDR-3 accelerometer.  
12.3.4 Rate Transducers 
An angle rate sensor, the ARS-1500, with a range of 1,500 degrees/sec in each of 
the three directions (roll, pitch, and yaw) was used to measure the rates of rotation of the 
test vehicles. The angular-rate sensor was mounted on an aluminum block inside the test 
vehicle near the center of gravity and recorded data at 10,000 Hz to the SIM. The raw 
data measurements were then downloaded, converted to the proper Euler angles for 
analysis, and plotted. The “DTS TDAS Control” computer software program and a 
customized Microsoft Excel worksheet were used to analyze and plot the angular-rate 
sensor data. 
A second angular-rate sensor system, the SLICE MICRO Triax ARS, with a range 
of 1,500 degrees/sec in each of the three directions (roll, pitch, and yaw) was used to 
measure the rates of rotation of the test vehicles. The angular-rate sensors were mounted 
inside the body of the custom-built SLICE 6DX event data recorder and recorded data at 
10,000 Hz to the onboard microprocessor. The raw data measurements were then 
downloaded, converted to the proper Euler angles for analysis, and plotted. The 
“SLICEWare” computer software program and a customized Microsoft Excel worksheet 
were used to analyze and plot the angular-rate sensor data. For test nos. IRA-3 and IRA-







12.3.5 Speed Trap 
For test nos. IRA-1 through IRA-4, a retroreflective optical sensor was used to 
determine the speed of the vehicle before impact. There were five targets spaced at 18-in. 
(457-mm) intervals along the side of the vehicle. Each target triggered an electronic 
timing signal to the data-acquisition system later used to calculate the vehicle speed.  
12.3.6 Digital Photography 
One AOS S-VIT 1531 high-speed digital video camera, three AOS X-PRI high-
speed digital video cameras, two JVC standard-speed digital video cameras, and three 
GoPro Hero 3 digital video cameras were used to film test no. IRA-1. One AOS S-VIT 
1531 high-speed digital video camera, two AOS X-PRI high-speed digital video cameras, 
and four GoPro Hero 3 digital video cameras were used to film test no. IRA-2. One AOS 
S-VIT 1531 high-speed digital video camera, two AOS X-PRI high-speed digital video 
cameras, one JVC standard-speed digital video cameras, and four GoPro Hero 3 digital 
video cameras were used to film test no. IRA-3. One AOS S-VIT 1531 high-speed digital 
video camera, two AOS X-PRI high-speed digital video cameras, one JVC standard-
speed digital video cameras, and four GoPro Hero 3 digital video cameras were used to 
film test no. IRA-4. Camera details, camera operating speeds, lens information, and 
schematics of the camera locations relative to the system for test nos. IRA-1 through 
IRA-4 are shown in Figures 38 through 41. 
The high-speed videos were analyzed using ImageExpress MotionPlus and 
RedLake MotionScope software programs. Actual camera speed and camera divergence 







Canon EOS 30D digital still cameras were used to document pre- and post-test conditions 
for all tests. 
12.4 Data Processing 
The electronic accelerometer data obtained in dynamic testing were filtered using 
the SAE Class 60 Butterworth filter conforming to the SAE J211/1 specifications [49]. 
The pertinent acceleration signal was extracted from the bulk of the data signals. The 
processed acceleration data were then multiplied by the mass of the bogie to get the 
impact force using Newton’s Second Law. Next, the acceleration trace was integrated to 
find the change in velocity versus time. Initial velocity of the bogie, calculated from the 
pressure tape switch data, was then used to determine the bogie velocity, and the 
calculated velocity trace was integrated to find the bogie’s displacement. The trajectory 
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 5 AOS X-PRI 500 Kowa 8mm - 
6 AOS X-PRI 500 Computar 12.5mm Fixed - 
7 AOS X-PRI 500 Nikon fixed 20mm - 










3 JVC – GZ-MC27u (Everio) 29.97   
4 JVC – GZ-MG27u (Everio) 29.97   
1 GoPro Hero 3 120   
2 GoPro Hero 3 120   
3 GoPro Hero 3 120   
 
 






 No. Type 
Operating Speed 
(frames/sec) 













 5 AOS X-PRI 500 Kowa 8mm - 
6 AOS X-PRI 500 Nikon fixed 28mm - 









 1 GoPro Hero 3 120   
2 GoPro Hero 3 120   
3 GoPro Hero 3 120   
4 GoPro Hero 3 120   
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 5 AOS X-PRI 500 Kowa 8mm - 
6 AOS X-PRI 500 Nikon fixed 28mm - 










4 JVC – GZ-MG27u (Everio) 29.97   
1 GoPro Hero 3 120   
2 GoPro Hero 3 120   
3 GoPro Hero 3 120   
4 GoPro Hero 3 120   
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 5 AOS X-PRI 500 Kowa 8mm - 
6 AOS X-PRI 500 Nikon fixed 28mm - 










4 JVC – GZ-MG27u (Everio) 29.97   
1 GoPro Hero 3 120   
2 GoPro Hero 3 120   
3 GoPro Hero 3 120   
4 GoPro Hero 3 120   
 
Figure 41. Camera Locations, Speeds, and Lens Settings, Test No. IRA-4 
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CHAPTER 13 DESIGN DETAILS - TEST NOS. IRA-1 AND IRA-2 
The net attenuation system for test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2 consisted of a modified 
Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier with three major components: a net, energy absorbers, 
and an anchorage system. The barrier system test installation was composed of six 
standard Dragnet energy absorbers with a modified net and anchorage system, as shown 
in Figures 42 through 60. Photographs of the test installation are shown in Figures 61 and 
64. Material specifications, mill certifications, and certificates of conformity for the 
system materials are shown in Appendix A. 
The 40-ft (12.2-m) wide net consisted of five horizontal 3/8-in. (10-mm) diameter 
steel cables with two steel plates at each end tying them together. Vertical steel plates 
were used to keep the cables from spreading apart and were attached with 1/4-in. (6-mm) 
bolts. A solid aluminum stand was used to support the center of the net with two hollow 
aluminum posts supporting the net between the center post and end of the net. The ends 
of the net rested on wooden blocks with 42-in. (1,067-mm) long, 1½-in. by 1½-in. (38-
mm by 38-mm) wooden posts used to prop it up vertically. The supports for the ends of 
the nets would not be suitable for long-term installations but were acceptable for testing 
purposes. Turnbuckles, eye nuts, and BCT Cable Anchors were used to connect the net 
assembly to the energy absorbers. 
The energy absorbers contained a series of pins around which steel tape was bent 
back and forth as it was pulled through a stainless steel case. Each end of the net was 
attached to one end of the steel tape extending from each of the three energy absorbers on 
both sides. The anchorage system consisted of a 1-in. (25-mm) anchor hoop welded to a 
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¾-in. (19-mm) steel plate. Four ¾-in. (19-mm) diameter, 6 in. (152-mm) tapcon screws 

































































































































































Figure 64. Test Installation, Test No. IRA-2
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CHAPTER 14 NET ATTENUATOR COMPONENT TEST NO. IRA-1 
14.1 Test No. IRA-1 
The 5,090-lb (2,309-kg) bogie vehicle impacted the net arrestor at a speed of 60.4 
mph (97.2 km/h) in the center of the net at an angle of 90 degrees. Sequential 
photographs are shown in Figures 65 through 70. Documentary photographs of the crash 
test are shown in Figures 71 and 72. 
14.2 Weather Conditions 
Test no. IRA-1 was conducted on December 12, 2013 at approximately 3:00 p.m. 
The weather conditions, as per the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(station 14939/LNK), were reported and are shown in Table 22. 
Table 22. Weather Conditions, Test No. IRA-1 
Temperature 32° F 
Humidity 64% 
Wind Speed 9 mph 
Wind Direction 200° from True North 
Sky Conditions Clear 
Visibility 10 Statute Miles 
Pavement Surface Dry  
Previous 3-Day Precipitation  0 in. 
Previous 7-Day Precipitation  0.20 in. 
 
14.3 Test Description 
Initial vehicle impact was to occur in the center of the net, as shown in Figure 73. 
Though the actual point of impact could not be determined from examining the post-test 
damage of the system, analysis of the crash test videos showed that the bogie did appear 
to impact in the center of the net. The vehicle had a maximum dynamic deflection of 44.2 
ft (13.5 m) downstream from the point of impact and a lateral movement of 1.3 ft (0.4 m). 
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The maximum dynamic deflection was determined using accelerometer traces to 
calculate the planar trajectory. The deflection could not be verified with overhead video 
analysis because of skewed cameras. The innermost energy absorber on the left side of 
the system failed 120 ms after impact occurred. Near the end of the test, the vehicle 
yawed to the right, as a result of the failed energy absorber. The vehicle trajectory and 
final position are shown in Figure 74. 
14.4 System Damage 
Damage to the net attenuator was minimal, as shown in Figures 75 through 77. 
The innermost energy absorber on the left side of the system failed 120 ms after impact 
occurred. The failure was likely caused by excessive whipping that occurred with both 
inside energy absorbers of the system. As shown in Figures 67 and 70, the 1-in. (25-mm) 
shackle that connected the energy absorbers to the assembly initially moved upstream and 
towards the center of the net. This motion caused the innermost energy absorbers to 
compress and rotate away from impact. As the innermost energy absorber on the left side 
was pulled tight, the steel tape ruptured at the connection between the tape and the 
turnbuckles, as shown in Figure 76. Though the inside energy absorbers on both sides of 
the net exhibited the same motion, only the left absorber had a failure. One factor that 
could have influenced this failure was the direction the tape was wrapped around the 
bracket. The amount of tape pulled from each energy absorber is shown in Table 23. A 











Outside 20.71 6.31 
Middle 23.21 7.07 
Inside 23.54 7.18 
Left 
Outside 30.23 9.21 
Middle 32.04 9.77 
Inside 0.50 0.15 
 
The net assembly deformed around the bogie vehicle. Both hollow aluminum 
posts supporting the net fractured at the bottom mounting bolt hole that attaches to the 
bottom cable, approximately 8 in. (203 mm) above the ground, as shown in Figure 77. 
The solid aluminum center post was also bent at the same location. The end plates, 
cables, and vertical cable spreaders had minimal damage and were able to be reused. 
14.5 Vehicle Damage 
The damage to the bogie vehicle was minimal, as shown in Figure 77. The 
damage to the vehicle was isolated to the top and bottom of the bogie impact head. 
Denting and scraping were observed on the top and bottom of the bogie impact head. 
14.6 Occupant Risk 
The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec 
occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions 
are shown in Table 24. Note that the OIVs and ORAs were within the suggested limits 
provided in MASH, though the velocity was slightly less than a MASH TL-3 test and the 
mass of the bogie vehicle was slightly higher than the MASH 2270P vehicle. The 
calculated THIV, PHD, and ASI values are also shown in Table 24. The recorded data 
from the accelerometers and the rate transducers are shown graphically in Appendix B. 
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Table 24. Summary of OIV, ORA, THIV, PHD, and ASI Values, Test No. IRA-1 
Evaluation Criteria 
Transducer MASH 
Limits EDR-3 DTS SLICE 
OIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
Longitudinal 17.16 (5.23) 18.24 (5.56) 18.47 (5.63) ≤ 40 (12.2) 
Lateral 0.10 (0.03) 0.07 (0.02) 0.69 (0.21) ≤40 (12.2) 
ORA 
g’s 
Longitudinal 3.08 4.00 3.86 ≤ 20.49 





Roll NA 1.82 -3.36 ≤75 
Pitch NA -0.42 1.25 ≤75 
Yaw NA 46.41 47.66 not required 
THIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
NA 18.31 (5.58) 18.5 (5.64) not required 
PHD 
g’s 
NA 4.42 4.10 not required 
ASI 0.26 0.36 0.33 not required 
 
14.7 Discussion 
The analysis of the test results for test no. IRA-1 showed that the net attenuator 
adequately captured the 5,090-lb (2,309-kg) bogie vehicle and brought it to rest. There 
were neither detached elements nor fragments from the net which showed potential for 
undue hazard to other traffic. One of the energy absorber straps fractured at the beginning 
of the test, resulting in asymmetric loading on the test vehicle. This asymmetric loading 
caused the vehicle to yaw to the right. The test vehicle did not penetrate or ride over the 
barrier and remained upright during and after the collision.  
The occupant risk values for the bogie vehicle were assumed to be equivalent for 
the 2270P truck. Estimations for the 1100C and 1500A MASH vehicles were calculated 
136 
 
using the Occupant Risk Estimation procedure discussed in Appendix G of MASH [3]. 
The procedure consisted of integrating the CFC 180-filtered, longitudinal acceleration 
trace from test no. IRA-1 to obtain the force-deflection characteristics of the net 
attenuator. The force-deflection data was then applied to the 1100C and 1500A vehicles 
to obtain the OIV and ORA estimates shown in Table 25. Note that the OIV and ORA 
estimates for both vehicles were below MASH limits and higher-force energy absorbers 
could be used without issue for small cars. Further details of these estimations are located 
in Appendix B. 
Table 25. 1100C and 1500A Displacement, OIV, and ORA Estimations, Test No. IRA-1 
Vehicle 
Mass Velocity 






lb (kg) mph (km/h) ft/s (m/s) g's ft (m) 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 25.69 (7.83) 7.69 25.9 (7.9) 




































































































































































































































Figure 77. System Damage, Test No. IRA-1
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CHAPTER 15 NET ATTENUATOR COMPONENT TEST NO. IRA-2  
15.1 Test No. IRA-2 
The 5,090-lb (2,309-kg) bogie vehicle impacted the net arrestor at a speed of 59.9 
mph (96.4 km/h) and an angle of 90 degrees, 12 ft (3.7 m) offset to the right from the 
center of the net. All components of the net were reused from the previous test except for 
the vertical posts that support the net, which were replaced with lightweight steel 
shelving posts. The energy absorbers from the previous test were also replaced with 
unused units.  Sequential photographs are shown in Figures 78 through 82.  
15.2 Weather Conditions 
Test no. IRA-2 was conducted on December 13, 2013 at approximately 3:00 p.m. 
The weather conditions, as per the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(station 14939/LNK), were reported and are shown in Table 26. 
Table 26. Weather Conditions, Test No. IRA-2 
Temperature 28° F 
Humidity 78% 
Wind Speed 10 mph 
Wind Direction 40° from True North 
Sky Conditions Clear 
Visibility 6 Statute Miles 
Pavement Surface Dry  
Previous 3-Day Precipitation  0 in. 
Previous 7-Day Precipitation  0 in. 
 
15.3 Test Description 
Initial vehicle impact was to occur in the 12-ft (3.7-m) offset to the right from the 
center of the net, as shown in Figure 83. Though the actual point of impact could not be 
determined from examining the post-test damage of the system, analysis of the crash test 
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videos showed that the bogie did appear to impact the intended location. The vehicle had 
a maximum dynamic deflection of 41.0 ft (12.5 m) downstream from the point of impact 
and a lateral movement of 0.43 ft (0.13 m). The maximum dynamic deflection was 
determined using accelerometer traces to calculate the planar trajectory. The deflection 
could not be verified with overhead video analysis because of skewed cameras. The 
innermost energy absorber on the left side of the system failed 150 ms after impact 
occurred. Near the end of the test, the vehicle yawed to the right. The vehicle trajectory 
and final position are shown in Figure 84. 
15.4 System Damage 
Damage to the net attenuator was minimal, as shown in Figures 85 through 87. 
The innermost energy absorber on the left side of the system failed 150 ms after impact 
occurred. The failure was likely caused by excessive whipping that occurred with both 
inside energy absorbers of the system. As shown in Figures 80 and 82, the 1-in. (25-mm) 
shackle that connected the energy absorbers to the assembly initially moved upstream and 
towards the center of the net. This motion caused the innermost energy absorbers to 
compress and rotate away from impact. As the innermost energy absorber on the left side 
was pulled tight, the steel tape ruptured at the connection between the tape and the 
turnbuckles, as shown in Figure 86. Though both the inside energy absorbers on both 
sides of the net exhibited the same motion, only the left absorber had a failure. One factor 
that could have influenced this failure was the direction the tape was wrapped around the 
bracket. One of the 7/16-in. (11-mm) bolts that attached the ends of the net to the energy 
absorbers fractured in shear. The amount of tape pulled from each energy absorber is 
shown in Table 27. 
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Outside 25.52 7.78 
Middle 28.58 8.71 
Inside 29.63 9.03 
Left 
Outside 23.50 7.16 
Middle 25.06 7.64 
Inside 0.50 0.15 
 
The net assembly deformed around the bogie vehicle. Both of the light-weight 
steel posts supporting the net fractured at the bottom mounting bolt hole used to attach 
the bottom cable, approximately 8 in. (203 mm) above the ground, as shown in Figures 
85 through 87. The solid aluminum center post was also bent at the same location. The 
steel post on the right side of the system fractured at the center cable location where it 
was folded over the top of the bogie head. The end plates, cables, and vertical cable 
spreaders had minimal damage and were able to be reused. 
15.5 Vehicle Damage 
The damage to the vehicle was minimal, as shown in Figure 87. The damage to 
the vehicle was isolated to the top and bottom of the bogie impact head, where denting 
and scraping were observed. 
15.6 Occupant Risk 
The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec 
occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions 
are shown in Table 28. Note that the OIVs and ORAs were within the suggested limits 
provided in MASH, though the velocity was slightly less than a MASH TL-3 test and the 
mass of the bogie vehicle was slightly higher than the MASH 2270P vehicle. The 
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calculated THIV, PHD, and ASI values are also shown in Table 28. The recorded data 
from the accelerometers and the rate transducers are shown graphically in Appendix C. 
Table 28. Summary of OIV, ORA, THIV, PHD, and ASI Values, Test No. IRA-2 
Evaluation Criteria 
Transducer MASH 
Limits EDR-3 DTS SLICE 
OIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
Longitudinal 17.76 (5.41) 17.98 (5.48) 18.49 (5.63) ≤ 40 (12.2) 
Lateral 0.89 (0.27) 1.64 (0.50) 0.48 (0.15) ≤40 (12.2) 
ORA 
g’s 
Longitudinal 3.53 3.79 3.99 ≤ 20.49 





Roll NA 2.81 -6.42 ≤75 
Pitch NA -1.203 2.34 ≤75 
Yaw NA 59.66 61.12 not required 
THIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
NA 18.11 (5.52) 18.53 (5.65) not required 
PHD 
g’s 
NA 3.99 4.14 not required 
ASI 0.33 0.37 0.37 not required 
 
15.7 Discussion 
The analysis of the test results for test no. IRA-2 showed that the net attenuator 
adequately captured the 5,090-lb (2,309-kg) bogie vehicle and brought it to rest. There 
were neither detached elements nor fragments from the net which showed potential for 
undue hazard to other traffic. One of the energy absorber straps fractured at the beginning 
of the test, resulting in asymmetric loading on the test vehicle. This asymmetric loading 
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caused the vehicle to yaw to the right. The test vehicle did not penetrate or ride over the 
barrier and remained upright during and after the collision.  
The occupant risk values for the bogie vehicle were assumed to be equivalent for 
the 2270P truck. Estimations for the 1100C and 1500A MASH vehicles were calculated 
using the Occupant Risk Estimation procedure discussed in Appendix G of MASH [3]. 
The procedure consisted of integrating the CFC 180-filtered, longitudinal acceleration 
trace to obtain the force-deflection characteristics of the net attenuator. The force-
deflection data was then applied to the 1100C and 1500A vehicles to obtain the OIV and 
ORA estimates shown in Table 29. Note that the OIV and ORA estimates for both 
vehicles were below MASH limits and higher-force energy absorbers could be used 
without issue for small cars. Further details of these estimations are located in Appendix 
C. 










lb (kg) mph (km/h) ft/s (m/s) g's ft (m) 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 26.75 (8.15) 8.33 23.1 (7.0) 











































































































































































Figure 87. System and Vehicle Damage, Test No. IRA-2 
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CHAPTER 16 DESIGN DETAILS - TEST NOS. IRA-3 AND IRA-4 
The net attenuation system for test nos. IRA-3 and IRA-4 consisted of the same 
modified Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier with a different energy absorber orientation. 
During Test Nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2, the inside energy absorbers were compressed 
immediately after impact, as shown in Figure 82. As the bogie traveled farther into the 
system, the energy absorbers became taut and began to feed the steel tape. This resulted 
in a whipping action that caused the inside energy absorbers on the left side of the system 
to rupture after impact. 
The anchorage system was modified to help reduce the likelihood that inner 
energy absorbers would compress when the bogie impacted the net. As shown in Figures 
88 through 106, the angle between the energy absorbers was reduced from 45 degrees to 
22.5 degrees. With this change, the inside and middle energy absorbers were moved more 
in-line with the net and farther from the center. Photographs of the test installation are 
shown in Figures 107 and 110.  
Most of the components from previous tests were reused for test nos. IRA-3 and 
IRA-4. Unused energy absorbers were used for each test. The hollow aluminum posts 
that support the net were repaired with light-weight steel shelving to splice between the 
fractured halves of the posts.  In test no. IRA-2, one of the 7/16-in. (11-mm) bolts that 
attached the ends of the net to the energy absorbers fractured. For test nos. IRA-3 and 
IRA-4 the 7/16 in. (11-mm) fasteners were increased to 1/2-in. (13-mm) diameter. 
Material specifications, mill certifications, and certificates of conformity for the system 


























































































































































Figure 110. Test Installation, Test No. IRA-4
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CHAPTER 17 NET ATTENUATOR COMPONENT TEST NO. IRA-3  
17.1 Test No. IRA-3 
The 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie vehicle impacted the net arrestor at a speed of 58.0 
mph (93.3 km/h) and an angle of 60 degrees, 12 ft (3.7 m) offset to the right from the 
center of the net. All components of the net were reused from test no. IRA-2 except for 
the vertical posts that support the net, which were replaced with lightweight steel 
shelving posts. The 7/16-in. (11-mm) diameter fasteners that attached the ends of the net 
to the energy absorbers were replaced with 1/2-in. (13-mm) diameter fasteners. The 
energy absorbers from the previous test were also replaced with unused units. Sequential 
photographs are shown in Figures 111 through 114. Documentary photographs of the 
crash test are shown in Figure 115. 
17.2 Weather Conditions 
Test no. IRA-3 was conducted on February 3, 2014 at approximately 11:00 a.m. 
The weather conditions, as per the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(station 14939/LNK), were reported and are shown in Table 30. 
Table 30. Weather Conditions, Test No. IRA-3 
Temperature 29° F 
Humidity 51% 
Wind Speed 14 mph 
Wind Direction 210° from True North 
Sky Conditions Overcast 80% 
Visibility 10 Statute Miles 
Pavement Surface Dry  
Previous 3-Day Precipitation  0.02 in. 




17.3 Test Description 
Initial vehicle impact was to occur in the center of the net, as shown in Figure 
116. Though the actual point of impact could not be determined from examining the post-
test damage of the system, analysis of the crash test videos showed that the bogie did 
appear to impact the intended location. The vehicle had a maximum dynamic deflection 
of 33.0 ft (10.1 m) downstream from the point of impact with a lateral movement of 18.0 
ft (5.5 m), resulting in a total displacement of 37.6 ft (11.5 m). The maximum dynamic 
deflection was determined using accelerometer traces to calculate the planar trajectory. 
The deflection could not be verified with overhead video analysis because of skewed 
cameras. The vehicle yawed slightly to the left during the test. The vehicle trajectory and 
final position are shown in Figure 117. 
17.4 System Damage 
Damage to the net attenuator was minimal, as shown in Figures 118 and 119. The 
innermost energy absorbers did not experience the excessive whipping that occurred in 
test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2, and all energy absorbers functioned as designed. The amount 
of tape pulled from each energy absorber is shown in Table 23. 





Outside 22.60 6.89 
Middle 21.08 6.43 
Inside 18.79 5.73 
Left 
Outside 23.33 7.11 
Middle 24.00 7.32 





The net assembly deformed around the bogie vehicle. The lightweight steel post 
on the right side of the system fractured at the bottom mounting bolt for the bottom cable, 
approximately 8 in. (203 mm) above the ground and at the center cable location where it 
was folded over the top of the bogie head, as shown in Figure 118. The cables and 
vertical cable spreaders had minimal damage and were able to be reused.  
17.5 Vehicle Damage 
The damage to the vehicle was minimal, as shown in Figure 119. The damage to 
the vehicle was isolated to the top and bottom of the impact head, where denting and 
scraping were observed. 
17.6 Occupant Risk 
The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec 
occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions 
are shown in Table 32. Summary of OIV, ORA, THIV, PHD, and ASI Values, Test No. 
IRA-3. Note that the OIVs and ORAs were within the suggested limits provided in 
MASH, though the velocity was slightly less than a MASH TL-3 test and the mass of the 
bogie vehicle was slightly higher than the MASH 2270P vehicle. The calculated THIV, 
PHD, and ASI values are also shown in Table 32. The recorded data from the 








Table 32. Summary of OIV, ORA, THIV, PHD, and ASI Values, Test No. IRA-3 
Evaluation Criteria 
Transducer MASH 
Limits DTS SLICE-1 DTS SLICE-2 
OIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
Longitudinal 19.24 (5.86) 19.31 (5.89) ≤ 40 (12.2) 
Lateral 0.20 (0.06) 0.16 (0.05) ≤40 (12.2) 
ORA 
g’s 
Longitudinal 4.64 4.68 ≤ 20.49 





Roll 1.22 1.74 ≤75 
Pitch -0.71 1.01 ≤75 
Yaw 8.02 7.12 not required 
THIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
18.43 (5.62) 18.58 (5.66) not required 
PHD 
g’s 
4.93 5.03 not required 
ASI 0.38 0.38 not required 
 
17.7 Discussion 
The analysis of the test results for test no. IRA-3 showed that the net attenuator 
adequately captured the 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie vehicle and brought it to rest. There 
were neither detached elements nor fragments from the net which showed potential for 
undue hazard to other traffic. The test vehicle did not penetrate or ride over the barrier 
and remained upright during and after the collision.  
The occupant risk values for the bogie vehicle were assumed to be equivalent for 
the 2270P truck. Estimations for the 1100C and 1500A MASH vehicles were calculated 
using the Occupant Risk Estimation procedure discussed in Appendix G of MASH [3]. 
The procedure consisted of integrating the CFC 180-filtered, longitudinal acceleration 
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trace to obtain the force-deflection characteristics of the net attenuator. The force-
deflection data was then applied to the 1100C and 1500A vehicles to obtain the OIV and 
ORA estimates shown in Table 33. Note that the OIV and ORA estimates for both 
vehicles were below MASH limits and higher-force energy absorbers could be used 
without issue for small cars. Further details of these estimations are located in Appendix 
D. 
Table 33. 1100C and 1500A Displacement, OIV, and ORA Estimations, Test No. IRA-3 
Vehicle 





lb (kg) mph (km/h) ft/s (m/s) g's ft (m) 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 26.09 (7.95) 8.97 24.4 (7.4) 
1500A 3,307 (1,500) 62.14 (100.00) 23.18 (7.07) 7.72 30.0 (9.2) 
 
The test represented one of the worst case scenarios, where a vehicle impacts very 
near the end of the net. This test proved that a vehicle could be safely captured very close 
to the end of the net. If the forces from the energy absorbers were increased, it would be 
expected that the lateral forces on the vehicle from the net would also increase and could 
potentially cause the vehicle to yaw more.   
By changing the anchorage location of the energy absorbers, the innermost energy 
absorber was no longer perpendicular to the net and was not compressed as much as in 
test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2. It is therefore recommended that future installations should 
also anchor the energy absorbers as close to parallel with the net as practical, also 
considering that extra clearance is needed to allow the energy absorbers to rotate without 
interference in angled impacts where the energy absorbers need to go beyond 






























































































































































Figure 119. System and Vehicle Damage – Fractured Support Post, Test No. IRA-3 
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CHAPTER 18 NET ATTENUATOR COMPONENT TEST NO. IRA-4  
18.1 Test No. IRA-4 
The 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie vehicle impacted the net arrestor at a speed of 59.5 
mph (95.8 km/h) in the center of the net at an angle of 90 degrees. All components of the 
net were reused from test no. IRA-3 except for one of the vertical posts that support the 
net, which was replaced with a lightweight steel shelving post. The energy absorbers 
from the previous test were also replaced with unused units. Sequential photographs are 
shown in Figures 120 through 123. Documentary photographs of the crash test are shown 
in Figure 124.  
18.2 Weather Conditions 
Test no. IRA-4 was conducted on February 3, 2014 at approximately 2:00 p.m. 
The weather conditions, as per the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(station 14939/LNK), were reported and are shown in Table 34. 
Table 34. Weather Conditions, Test No. IRA-4 
Temperature 29° F 
Humidity 49% 
Wind Speed 7 mph 
Wind Direction 190° from True North 
Sky Conditions Overcast 75% 
Visibility 10 Statute Miles 
Pavement Surface Dry  
Previous 3-Day Precipitation  0.02 in. 
Previous 7-Day Precipitation  0.05 in. 
 
18.3 Test Description 
Initial vehicle impact was to occur in the center of the net, as shown in Figure 
125. The actual point of impact could not be determined from examining the post-test 
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damage of the system, but analysis of the crash test videos showed that the bogie did 
appear to impact a few inches left of the center of the net. As the vehicle was travelling 
down the bogie track, the bogie began bouncing down the tack, bending it as shown in 
Figure 127. Though the vehicle was bouncing down the track, the effect on the vehicle’s 
velocity and impact angle was negligible. The vehicle had a maximum dynamic 
deflection of 42.2 ft (12.9 m) downstream from the point of impact with a lateral 
movement of 1.82 ft (0.55 m). The maximum dynamic deflection was calculated using 
the planar trajectory spreadsheets. The deflection could not be verified with overhead 
video analysis because of skewed cameras. The test vehicle yawed slightly to the right. 
The vehicle trajectory and final position are shown in Figure 126. 
18.4 System Damage 
Damage to the net attenuator was minimal, as shown in Figures 127 through 130. 
The outermost energy absorber on the right side of the system failed 720 ms after impact 
occurred. The failure occurred when the net went slack and then was suddenly loaded 
again. The amount of tape pulled from each energy absorber is shown in Table 35. 





Outside 19.94 6.08 
Middle 22.29 6.79 
Inside 23.25 7.09 
Left 
Outside 23.21 7.07 
Middle 24.81 7.56 




The net assembly deformed around the bogie vehicle. Both hollow aluminum 
posts supporting the net fractured at the bottom mounting bolt for the bottom cable, 
approximately 8 in. (203 mm) above the ground, as shown in Figures 127 through 130. 
The cables and vertical cable spreaders had minimal damage and were capable of being 
reused. 
18.5 Vehicle Damage 
The damage to the vehicle was minimal, as shown in Figure 126. The damage to 
the vehicle was isolated to the top and bottom of the impact head, where denting and 
scraping were observed. 
18.6 Occupant Risk 
The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec 
occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions 
are shown in Table 36. Note that the OIVs and ORAs were within the suggested limits 
provided in MASH, though the velocity was slightly less than a MASH TL-3 test and the 
mass of the bogie vehicle was slightly higher than the MASH 2270P vehicle. The 
calculated THIV, PHD, and ASI values are also shown in Table 36. The recorded data 
from the accelerometers and the rate transducers are shown graphically in Appendix E. 
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Table 36. Summary of OIV, ORA, THIV, PHD, and ASI Values, Test No. IRA-4 
Evaluation Criteria 
Transducer MASH 
Limits DTS SLICE-1 DTS SLICE-2 
OIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
Longitudinal 18.34 (5.59) 18.47 (5.63) ≤ 40 (12.2) 
Lateral 1.71 (0.52) 1.88 (0.57) ≤40 (12.2) 
ORA 
g’s 
Longitudinal 4.88 4.98 ≤ 20.49 





Roll 1.22 1.74 ≤75 
Pitch -0.71 1.01 ≤75 
Yaw 8.02 7.12 not required 
THIV 
ft/s (m/s) 
18.43 (5.62) 18.58 (5.66) not required 
PHD 
g’s 
4.93 5.03 not required 
ASI 0.37 0.38 not required 
 
18.7 Discussion 
The analysis of the test results for test no. IRA-4 showed that the net attenuator 
adequately captured the 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie vehicle and brought it to rest. There 
were neither detached elements nor fragments from the net which showed potential for 
undue hazard to other traffic. The test vehicle did not penetrate or ride over the barrier 
and remained upright during and after the collision.  
The occupant risk values for the bogie vehicle were assumed to be equivalent for 
the 2270P truck. Estimations for the 1100C and 1500A MASH vehicles were calculated 
using the Occupant Risk Estimation procedure discussed in Appendix G of MASH [3]. 
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The procedure consisted of integrating the CFC 180-filtered, longitudinal acceleration 
trace to obtain the force-deflection characteristics of the net attenuator. The force-
deflection data was then applied to the 1100C and 1500A vehicles to obtain the OIV and 
ORA estimates shown in Table 33. Note that the OIV and ORA estimates for both 
vehicles were below MASH limits and higher-force energy absorbers could be used 
without issue for small cars. Further details of these estimations are located in Appendix 
E. 
Table 37. 1100C and 1500A Displacement, OIV, and ORA Estimations, Test No. IRA-4 
Vehicle 





lb (kg) mph (km/h) ft/s (m/s) g's ft (m) 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 26.23 (8.00) 7.83 26.9 (8.2) 
1500A 3,307 (1,500) 62.14 (100.00) 22.81 (6.95) 6.28 32.7 (10.0) 
 
 
This test had the same target impact conditions as IRA-1 and would serve as a 
baseline to validate simulations and analytical estimates. By changing the anchorage 
location of the energy absorbers, the innermost energy absorber was no longer 
perpendicular to the net and was not compressed as much as in test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-
2. It is therefore recommended that future installations should also anchor the energy 
absorbers as close to parallel with the net as practical, also considering that extra 
clearance is needed to allow the energy absorbers to rotate without interference in angled 











































































































































































Figure 130. System Damage, Test No. IRA-4 
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CHAPTER 19 EVALUATION OF NET ATTENUATOR PERFORMANCE 
Testing on the modified Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier showed that it could 
be a viable option for use in Concept A. The bogie vehicle was successfully captured in 
test nos. IRA-1 through IRA-4. There were neither detached elements nor fragments from 
the net which showed potential for undue hazard to other traffic. The test vehicles were 
captured by the net without any issues and remained upright during and after the 
collisions. Even though the net is taller than the 36-in. (914-mm) height criterion, the net 
can easily be seen through and would not cause sight-line issues. 
The Dragnet net attenuator system used existing technologies and most of its 
components were reusable. The anchorage systems could be placed near the primary and 
secondary road where the ground is level, and, though the area in front of the net needs to 
be flat, this concept could likely accommodate a moderate slope behind it. Some 
development work would be required to integrate a net attenuator and end terminal or 
crash cushion system. New posts that can be embedded in the ground are needed because 
most installations will not have a concrete or asphalt pad for the posts to rest on. Mowing 
and landscaping with this concept would be simpler than other concepts because no parts 
of the protected area would be enclosed.  
The stopping distances ranged from 37.6 ft (11.5 m) in test no. IRA-3 to 44.2 ft 
(13.5 m) in test no. IRA-4. A stopping distance of 30 ft (9.1 m) was desired for Concept 
A, but the net could be modified to accommodate this. Higher-capacity energy absorbers 
would result in higher occupant risk values but shorter stopping distances. After analysis, 
the occupant risk values and estimations showed that this was feasible because all of the 
occupant risk values, shown in Tables 38 and 39, were below the MASH limits. Though 
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the stopping distance could be reduced to 30 ft (9.1 m) or less, this system might still 
require more space than what is available at smaller locations. 
Table 38. Occupant Risk Summary, Test Nos. IRA-1 Through IRA-4 
Test No. Vehicle 
Mass Velocity OIV ORA 
lb (kg) mph (km/h) ft/s (m/s) g's 
IRA-1 Bogie 5,090 (2,309) 60.39 (97.19) 18.24 (5.56) 4.00 
IRA-2 Bogie 5,090 (2,309) 59.86 (96.34) 17.98 (5.48) 3.79 
IRA-3 Bogie 5,259 (2,385) 58.03 (93.39) 19.24 (5.86) 4.64 
IRA-4 Bogie 5,259 (2,385) 59.46 (95.69) 18.34 (5.59) 4.88 
Table 39. Occupant Risk Estimation Summary, Test Nos. IRA-1 Through IRA-4 






lb (kg) mph (km/h) ft/s (m/s) g's 
IRA-1 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 25.69 (7.83) 7.69 
1500A 3,307 (1,500) 62.14 (100.00) 22.91 (6.98) 5.36 
IRA-2 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 26.75 (8.15) 8.33 
1500A 3,307 (1,500) 62.14 (100.00) 23.18 (7.06) 5.78 
IRA-3 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 26.09 (7.95) 8.97 
1500A 3,307 (1,500) 62.14 (100.00) 23.18 (7.07) 7.72 
IRA-4 
1100C 2,425 (1,100) 62.14 (100.00) 26.23 (8.00) 7.83 
1500A 3,307 (1,500) 62.14 (100.00) 22.81 (6.95) 6.28 
 
During test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2, the innermost energy absorber on the left side 
of the systems failed 120 ms and 150 ms after impact occurred, respectively. The failures 
were likely caused by excessive whipping that occurred with both inside energy 
absorbers of the system. As shown in Figures 67 and 70, the 1-in. (25-mm) shackle that 
connected the energy absorbers to the assembly initially moved upstream and towards the 
center of the net. This motion caused the innermost energy absorbers to compress and 
rotate away from impact. As the innermost energy absorber on the left side was pulled 
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tight, the steel tape ruptured at the connection between the tape and the turnbuckles, as 
shown in Figure 76. Though the inner energy absorbers on both sides of the net exhibited 
the same motion, only the left absorbers had a failure. One factor that could have 
influenced this failure was the direction the tape was wrapped around the bracket.  
The solution to this whipping action was to reduce the angle between the energy 
absorbers and the net from 0, 45, and 90 degrees to 0, 22.5, and 45 degrees. This moved 
the energy absorbers closer together and had the added benefit of reducing the pad area 
needed for the installation of each side. This issue could be eliminated altogether if one 
energy absorber on each side of the system was used instead of multiple units. One 
energy absorber on each side of the net would require a smaller anchorage footprint, and 
there would not be a risk that the energy absorbers would cross over each other in high-
angle impacts such as test no. IRA-3. To allow the energy absorbers to rotate without 
interacting with one another, the outermost energy absorber needs to be installed in-line 
with the net, with all other energy absorbers installed on the impact side of the net for this 
application.  
During test no. IRA-4, the outermost energy absorber on the right side of the 
system failed 720 ms after impact occurred. This failure was likely caused by the net 
going slack momentarily and then being immediately loaded again, or a combination of 
both. One possible solution to this problem could be to make sure that the energy 
absorbers are not attached to the net at a single point, as they were during test nos. IRA-1 
through IRA-4. One possible reason for the net going slack is that the energy absorbers 
tip over on their sides as they rotate about the anchorage point. This provides an edge that 
sticks into the ground as they rotate about the anchor hoop. Instead of sliding across the 
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ground, they tend to skip over the pavement. This skipping could cause momentary losses 
in tension. Uneven loading could magnify the effects of stress concentrations that 
occurred when the turnbuckles were close together toward the end of the test. One benefit 
of having the energy absorbers spaced farther apart is that the turnbuckles that attached 
the energy absorbers to the net would be farther apart and less likely to interact with one 
another.  
Testing on the Dragnet net attenuator system showed that it would be a viable 
design concept. In all of the tests, the net successfully captured the vehicle and would 
likely be able to accommodate moderate slopes behind the system. The stopping distance 
was greater than desired but could likely be decreased without adverse effects to 
occupant safety. Some development was still required with this system but most of the 





CHAPTER 20 DEVELOPMENT OF NET ATTENUATOR MODEL 
20.1 Methodology 
A finite element model of the Dragnet net attenuator system evaluated in test nos. 
IRA-1 through IRA-4 was developed to further investigate its performance for treatment 
of bridge rails adjacent to intersecting roadways. These simulations were performed using 
LS-DYNA to serve as a comparison to physical component testing and analytical 
methods. LS-DYNA is a transient, nonlinear finite element analysis code that has been 
widely used in analysis and design of roadside safety hardware. A finite element model 
could be used to investigate different energy absorber capacities and for future 
development of Concept A. The development of a simulation model of a Dragnet Vehicle 
Arresting Barrier and some of its components are detailed herein. This model was 
developed to represent test no. IRA-4, as shown in Figure 131. 
 
Figure 131. Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier, Test No. IRA-4 
20.2 Bogie Model 
A heavy bogie model, shown in Figure 132, was used as the impacting vehicle 
during the development of the net attenuator model. The steel frame of the bogie model 
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was rigid and had the same mass and material properties as the bogie used in test no. 
IRA-4. The bogie head geometry was identical to the bogie head used in test nos. IRA-1 
through IRA-4 and was tied rigidly to the bogie frame. Dimensions of the bogie head are 
shown in Figure 57. Nodal masses were added to the rigid frame to match the test weight 
of 5,259 lb (2,385 kg). 
 
Figure 132. Bogie Finite Element Model 
20.3 Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier Model 
20.3.1 Energy Absorbers 
Ideally, the energy absorbers would be modeled with the actual geometry of the 
energy absorbers used in static and dynamic component testing. Simulating the energy 
absorption mechanism, cyclic plastic bending, would result in a more complex model 
requiring material properties that were unavailable and additional time to validate the 
model. Updating the overall simulation to investigate different energy absorber forces 
would likely be difficult and time-consuming as well. Instead of modeling the energy 
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absorption mechanism, a simplified component that provided the same resistive force as 
the energy absorbers could be used instead. 
To accomplish this, a discrete element using a general non-linear spring material 
with a simplified force-deflection curve for each of the six energy absorbers was used. 
This method was beneficial because it could be easily modified to investigate other 
energy absorber force levels, would be more efficient in regards to simulation time, and 
could accurately represent the function of the energy absorbers. 
The average tensile force measured in test no. IRAS-2 was used because the 
loading from that test was more consistent than in test no. IRAS-1. The simulation was 
performed with an energy absorber force of 3,920 lb (17.4 kN) instead of the value of 
3,890 lb (17.3 kN) from test no. IRAS-2. This resulted in a 0.77 percent increase in 
energy absorber force, though this would have a negligible effect on the stopping distance 
or occupant risk values. The force of the energy absorber, shown in Figure 133, was 
increased from 0 to 3,920 lb (17.4 kN) over the first 3.94 in. (100 mm) of extension and 
then remained constant for the rest of the displacement. Though overcoming the initial 
static friction would likely result in higher forces initially, this was neglected, because the 





Figure 133. Force vs. Deflection of Energy Absorbers 
20.3.2 Cable Net 
The five horizontal 3/8-in. (10-mm) diameter cables used in the net for the 
physical test were modeled using beam elements. Previously, MwRSF had developed an 
advanced material model for use with cable guardrails [50]. This model used a material 
allowing user-defined axial force-strain, moment curvature, and torque-twist rate curves 
and Belytschko-Schwer beam element formulation. The cable was modeled using 0.500-
in. (12.7-mm) long single beam elements along the length of the rope. Because the exact 
wire rope to be used during testing was unknown when the model was developed, the 
parameters from the 3/4-in. (19-mm) cable used in the original cable model were scaled 
to the 3/8-in. (10-mm) diameter cable used in the net. An automatic node to surface 
contact with a soft option equal to 1 was used to control the interaction between the 







































Force-Deflection of Energy Absorber
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20.3.3 Cable Spreaders 
Nineteen pairs of cable spreaders are attached on the front and back of the cables 
on 23-in. (584-mm) centers. They prevent the cables from separating during an impact 
and aid in clamping the front of the vehicle. A piecewise linear plasticity material model 
was used with fully-integrated Belytschko-Tsay shell elements that had the same 
geometry, mass, and material properties of the vertical spreaders used during testing. In 
test no. IRA-4, the cable spreaders were attached to the cables via bolts and nuts above 
and below each cable. For simulation purposes, attachment of the spreaders to the wire 
rope was accomplished using Constrained Nodal Rigid Bodies (CNRB). Four nodes on 
each cable spreader and one node from the cable made up each connection, of which 
there are five connections per pair of cable spreaders. This differed from the actual 
attachment, as shown in Figure 134.  
 
Figure 134. Connection of Cable Spreaders: (A) Actual, (B) Simulation 
Using the nodal rigid body effectively splits the cable into individual segments 
between each rigid attachment. This prevents the spreaders from sliding or twisting 
independent of the cable. With the components tied together, instead of the cable twisting 
inside of the spreaders, the entire connection was twisted. Modeling the clamping force 
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from the bolts and allowing the spreaders to slide along the cable would be a better 
method of attachment, because that better represents the behavior of the test no. IRA-4. 
The contact between the cables and cable spreaders may have been difficult to replicate 
and unstable in the simulation model. Although the connection had issues, it was not 
likely to cause large errors in the final displacement of the net, because most of the 
kinetic energy of the test should be dissipated by the energy absorbers.  
20.3.4 Net End Conditions 
For the actual test, the net end plates are resting on top of a wooden block and 
propped upright by a stick. In the simulation the net was just sitting in space and 
unsupported. This was reasonable because the stands only hold up the net before it is 
impacted and are not structurally significant. Instead of using two net end plates to 
sandwich the ends of the horizontal wire ropes as in the test, one layer of rigid shell 
elements with an equivalent mass and section modulus was used. The ends of the net 
cables were attached to nodes along the edges of the net endplates. The 3/4-in. (19-mm) 
diameter cable that connects the energy absorbers to the net end plates used the same 
element formulation and material model as the cables comprising the net, but the cable 
properties were adjusted for the increased size. For each side all three nonlinear discrete 
elements of the energy absorbers and the net end cable were attached to one node in the 
approximate position of their connection in the actual test. In test nos. IRA-1 through 
IRA-4, the energy absorbers and end cable were attached using a shackle and eye nuts, as 
shown in Figure 135. Though the modeled and actual connections differed, it would not 
have a significant impact on the maximum displacement of the bogie. The final model is 




 (A) (B) 
Figure 135. Energy Absorber and Net Connection: (A) Actual, (B) Simulation 
 
Figure 136. Final Model Setup 
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CHAPTER 21 SIMULATION OF TEST NOS. IRA-3 AND IRA-4 
21.1 Correlation Between Baseline Model and Test No. IRA-4     
The baseline model of the net attenuator was simulated using the conditions in 
test no. IRA-4. This test was chosen as the baseline because the 90 degree impact into the 
center of the net was a simpler configuration than the offset and angled impacts in test 
nos. IRA-2 and IRA-3. Test no. IRA-1 was not used because one of the energy absorbers 
failed during testing. The baseline simulation used a 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie model 
with an initial velocity of 59.46 mph (95.69 km/h) and an angle of 90 degrees. The bogie 
vehicle impacted the center of the net, as shown in Figure 137. In addition to a visual 
analysis, the velocity profiles, maximum net deflections, and occupant risk values were 
used to evaluate the baseline simulations. 
 
Figure 137. Simulation of Test No. IRA-4 
The results of the simulation were compared with the results from test no. IRA-4. 
Test no. IRA-4 also consisted of a 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie vehicle impacting at a speed 
of 59.46 mph (95.69 km/h) and an angle of 90 degrees. The net attenuator in this test 
safely captured the bogie vehicle and had a maximum dynamic deflection of 42.2 ft (12.9 
m) downstream from the point of impact. 
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Comparison of the baseline model with the bogie crash test found that the 
baseline model provided good correlation with the bogie test and was appropriate for use 
in evaluation of the dynamic deflection of the Dragnet net attenuator system. 
21.1.1 Graphical Comparison 
Sequential images of test no. IRA-4, along with the corresponding baseline 
simulation, are presented in Figures 138 and 139, respectively. The IRA-4 baseline model 
accurately captured the vehicle and system behavior exhibited in the bogie crash test. The 
vehicle in the simulation did have a slightly higher maximum displacement of 44.29 ft 
(13.50 m) compared with 42.2 ft (12.90 m) in test no. IRA-4. In test no. IRA-4, the bogie 
vehicle impacted the net attenuator at a slight angle and offset to the left of center of the 
net. This caused the bogie vehicle to yaw slightly to the right. The bogie vehicle in the 


































Figure 139. Test No. IRA-4 and LS-DYNA Simulation Sequentials 
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21.1.2 Velocity Profiles 
Velocity profiles from onboard transducers were compared between the bogie in 
the baseline simulations and test no. IRA-4, as shown in Figure 140. The longitudinal 
velocity of the simulation closely matched the bogie test. The simulation over-predicted 
the stopping distance, resulting in a stopping time of 885 ms versus 847 ms in test no. 
IRA-4. In both the test and the simulation, the bogie vehicles rolled backwards after 
reaching their maximum dynamic deflection. 
 
Figure 140. Velocity Profile Comparisons Between Baseline Simulation and Test No. 
IRA-4 
21.1.3 Occupant Risk 
The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec 
occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions 
are shown in Table 40. Note that the OIVs and ORAs were within the suggested limits 
235 
 
provided in MASH, though the velocity was slightly less than a MASH TL-3 test, and the 
mass of the bogie vehicle was slightly higher than the MASH 2270P vehicle. The 
occupant impact velocity between the simulation and the physical crash test was 
comparable; however, the ORA was under-predicted by 19.9 percent. Further details of 
these estimations are located in Appendix F. 













Longitudinal 17.67 (5.39) 18.34 (5.59) 18.47 (5.63) ≤ 40 (12.2) 
Lateral 0.01 (0.002) 1.71 (0.52) 1.88 (0.57) ≤40 (12.2) 
ORA 
g’s 
Longitudinal 3.91 4.88 4.98 ≤ 20.49 
Lateral 0.08 1.15 1.31 ≤ 20.49 
 
21.1.4 Discussion of Test No. IRA-4 
Several metrics, including a visual analysis and comparisons between velocity 
profiles, maximum net attenuator deflections, and occupant risk values, were used to 
evaluate the baseline net attenuator model. It was determined that the baseline simulation 
produced results that were comparable with bogie crash test no. IRA-4. There were no 
vehicle instabilities associated with either the baseline simulation or test no. IRA-4. The 
maximum deflections and occupant impact velocity were comparable between the 
simulation and the physical crash test, though there was less correlation with the occupant 
ridedown accelerations. During the physical component test, the bogie impacted the net 
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slightly off-center with a slight angle which could have had a minor effect on the 
stopping distance and occupant risk values. 
 
21.2 Correlation Between Baseline Model and Test No. IRA-3 
The baseline model of the net attenuator was modified to investigate test no. IRA-
3. The net was offset 12 ft (3.7 m) to the left from the center of the net and rotated 30 
degrees. The same 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie model and 59.46 mph (95.69 km/h) impact 
velocity from the baseline simulation were used. The velocity of the bogie in the 
simulation was 2.5 percent higher than the 58.0 mph (93.3 km/h) impact velocity of test 
no. IRA-3, but this would have a negligible effect on the overall system performance. 
The bogie vehicle and net model are shown in Figure 141. In addition to a visual analysis, 
the velocity profiles, maximum net deflections, and occupant risk values were used to 
evaluate this simulation. 
 
Figure 141. Simulation of Test No. IRA-3 
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The net attenuator in test no. IRA-3 safely captured the bogie vehicle and had a 
maximum dynamic deflection of 37.6 ft (12.9 m) downstream from the point of impact. 
Comparison of the angled simulation model with test no. IRA-3 found that the angled 
model did not provide a good correlation with the bogie test and was would require future 
work before the model could be used to evaluate the dynamic deflection of angled 
impacts into the Dragnet net attenuator system. 
21.2.1 Graphical Comparison 
Sequential images of test no. IRA-3, along with the corresponding baseline 
simulation, are presented in Figures 142 and 143, respectively. The bogie vehicle was 
captured in test no. IRA-3 but not in the angled simulation. As shown in the sequential 
images, the bogie vehicle began to yaw to the left as it contacted the net. Even though all 
of the energy absorbers had the same force vs. deflection characteristics, the difference in 
angle between the left and right energy absorbers and the direction of travel caused an 
imbalance in the lateral forces on the vehicle. This imbalance caused the vehicle to yaw 
to the left in the direction of the higher lateral forces. The maximum deflection measured 
in the simulation from the front of the bogie as it rotated out of the system wass 40.2 ft 
































Figure 143. Test No. IRA-3 and LS-DYNA Simulation Sequentials 
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21.2.2 Velocity Profiles 
Resultant velocity profiles from onboard transducers were compared between the 
bogie in the baseline simulations and test no. IRA-3, as shown in Figure 144. The 
resultant velocity of the simulation was higher than the bogie test. The vehicle in test no. 
IRA-3 was stopped in 780 ms before it began to roll backwards. In both the simulation, 
the bogie vehicle was sliding sideways when the simulation ended after 1000 ms. 
 
Figure 144. Velocity Profile Comparisons Between Baseline Simulation and Test No. 
IRA-3 
21.2.3 Occupant Risk 
The calculated occupant impact velocities (OIVs) and maximum 0.010-sec 
occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) in both the longitudinal and lateral directions 
are shown in Table 41. Note that the OIVs and ORAs were within the suggested limits 
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provided in MASH, though the velocity was slightly less than a MASH TL-3 test, and the 
mass of the bogie vehicle was slightly higher than the MASH 2270P vehicle. The 
occupant impact velocity between the simulation and the physical crash test was 
comparable; however, the ORA was under-predicted by 16.5 percent. If the vehicle 
model in the simulation had a shorter stopping distance the ORA would be increased. 
Further details of these estimations are located in Appendix F. 













Longitudinal 18.57 (5.66) 19.24 (5.86) 19.31 (5.89) ≤ 40 (12.2) 
Lateral 0.95 (0.29) 0.20 (0.06) 0.16 (0.05) ≤40 (12.2) 
ORA 
g’s 
Longitudinal 3.98 4.64 4.68 ≤ 20.49 
Lateral 0.66 1.87 2.00 ≤ 20.49 
 
21.2.4 Discussion of Test No. IRA-3 
Several metrics, including a visual analysis and comparisons between velocity 
profiles, maximum net attenuator deflections, and occupant risk values, were used to 
evaluate the baseline net attenuator model. It was determined that the angled simulation 
did not adequately capture the behavior of the vehicle in test no. IRA-3. The bogie 
vehicle in the simulation yawed to the left as it hit the net. The coefficient of friction 
between the tires and the ground was low, which allowed the vehicle to yaw without 
much resistance. There was very little sliding between the net and the bogie head. The 
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model did not produce results that were comparable with the bogie crash test no. IRA-3. 
There were no vehicle instabilities in test no. IRA-3 but the vehicle did rotate out of the 
system in the simulation.  
21.3 Discussion 
The simulations of the net attenuator system indicated successful performance 
with the 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) bogie vehicle. However, there were modeling assumptions 
and physical test details that resulted in discrepancies between the simulation and the 
bogie test. Using constrained nodal rigid bodies for the cable-to-spreader attachment is 
different than the physical crash test. In the physical crash test, the vertical spreaders 
deformed and slid along the cable when the bogie impacted the net. In the simulation 
model, the vertical spreaders could not slide. Though this may be insignificant in terms of 
the final displacement for a central impact, this did have an influence in the capturing of a 
vehicle in an angled test. With a better vertical spreader and cable modeling connection, 
the baseline and angled simulations could be used in future testing to investigate the 
performance of the system when there is a slope behind the net. The connection may be 
as simple as using beam elements with the characteristics of the bolts used in the physical 
component testing. 
The average force level from test no. IRAS-2 to prescribe a constant force from 
the nonlinear discrete element proved to be an acceptable assumption given the close 
correlation with the maximum displacements of the system. In future simulations, a 
parameter study could be performed to determine the maximum allowable energy 
absorber force for a given net width. If new energy absorbers were developed, average 
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force levels from quasi-static testing could be used to estimate the maximum dynamic 
deflection. 
There were multiple instances in this model where shared nodes were used to 
connect rigid components instead of modeling the physical components such as shackles 
or eye nuts. Thus, the model presented here was only suitable for impacts into the net 
where the vehicle would not interact with these connections. The influence of these 
connections could become more important with impacts closer to the sides of the net.  
This model would be useful for future investigations into the net attenuator 
concept. Future simulations could involve slopes, higher energy forces, and more 





CHAPTER 22 NET ATTENUATOR ANALYSIS 
An analytical method to estimate the Dragnet net attenuator system performance 
was developed to further investigate the net attenuator system’s performance with 
different energy absorber load capacities. This method could be used to estimate the 
maximum dynamic deflection of the system using different vehicles, net widths, and 
energy absorber forces.  
22.1 Methodology 
In 1969, TTI completed testing on the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting System, with 
energy absorbers similar in operation to those used in test nos. IRAS-1 and 2 and IRA-1 
through 4 [51]. Equations were developed to help select an appropriate energy absorber 
tension force and length of tape required for a given vehicle mass and speed. The 
equations were derived for the simplified case of an angular or perpendicular impact into 
the center of the net. For treatment of bridge rail ends near intersecting roadways, many 
different impact scenarios are possible. Therefore it was desirable to rederive those 
equations, such that any impact location or angle could be investigated. 
The maximum dynamic deflection was estimated using an energy balance of the 
initial kinetic energy of the vehicle and the work done on the vehicle by the resistive 
force of the energy absorbers. Though the energy absorber force was assumed to be 
constant, the force on the vehicle is a function of the distance traveled in the system. 
The following assumptions were used: 
 All of the kinetic energy is absorbed by the energy absorbers, 
 The energy absorbers provide a constant resistive force, 
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 The vehicle is assumed to travel in a straight line following the initial 
trajectory, 
 The effective length of the net is considered as the distance between the 
anchorage points, 
 No sliding occurs between the front of the vehicle and the net, and 
 No stretching occurs in the net. 
A general overhead view of the system is shown in Figure 136. 
  
Figure 145. Net Attenuator Analytical Method and FBD setup 
In Figure 145: 
 L = Effective length of net (a + b) (ft) 
 T = Energy absorber constant tension force (lb) 
 Θ = Angle of impact from perpendicular (deg) 
 R1 = Length of tape pulled from right energy absorber (ft) 
 R2 = Length of tape pulled from left energy absorber (ft) 
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 X = Travel distance of vehicle after engaging net (ft) 
 FR1 = Force component from the right energy absorber acting 
opposite of vehicle trajectory (lb) 
 FR2 = Force component from the left energy absorber acting 
opposite of vehicle trajectory (lb) 
 Ft = (FR1 + FR2) Total force acting opposite of vehicle 
trajectory (lb) 
 W = Weight of vehicle (lb) 
 v = Initial velocity of vehicle (ft/s) 
 g = Acceleration due to gravity (32.174 ft/s
2
) 
 G = Acceleration on vehicle (g’s) 
 KE = Kinetic energy of the vehicle (ft-lb) 
The force on the vehicle is a function of the vehicle’s position in the system. 
Distances a and b are determined from the initial impact point in the system. To 
determine the amount of tape pulled out of each energy absorber, R1 and R2, the 
Pythagorean Theorem is used: 
 (𝑅1 + 𝑎)
2 = (𝑎 + 𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)2 + (𝑋 ∙ cos𝛩)2 (1) 
 (𝑅2 + 𝑏)
2 = (𝑏 − 𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)2 + (𝑋 ∙ cos𝛩)2 (2) 
Then R1 and R2 can then be calculated: 
 𝑅1 = (𝑎
2 + 𝑋2 + 2𝑎𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
1
2 − 𝑎 (3) 
 
𝑅2 = (𝑏
2 + 𝑋2 − 2𝑏𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
1
2 − 𝑏          (𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑋
> 2𝑏 ∙ sin𝛩) 
(4) 
 𝑅2 = 0          (𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑋 ≤ 2𝑏 ∙ sin𝛩) (5) 
𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑒: (2𝑏 ∙ sin𝛩) 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 
For X in terms of R1 or R2: 
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 𝑋 = (𝑎2 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛2 𝛩 + 𝑅1
2 + 2𝑏𝑅1)
1
2 − a ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩 (6) 




= 𝑇(𝑅1𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑅2𝑚𝑎𝑥)     For Θ ≠  0 (7) 
Forces FR1 and FR2 are the components of the energy absorber tension force T that 
are parallel to the vehicle’s path and resist the movement. The forces that are 
perpendicular to the vehicle’s path are neglected, and the trajectory is a straight-line. In 
actual impact, unbalanced lateral forces would tend to cause the vehicle to yaw. 
 𝐹𝑅1 = 𝑇 (
𝑋 + a ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩
𝑅1 + 𝑎
) =
𝑇(𝑋 + a ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)




 𝐹𝑅2 = 𝑇 (
𝑋 − b ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩
𝑅2 + 𝑏
) =
𝑇(𝑋 − b ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)




The total force on the vehicle can then be found by combining these component 
forces, as shown in Figure 146: 
 
Figure 146. Free-Body-Diagram of the Vehicle 




𝐹𝑇(𝑋) = 𝑇 (
(𝑋 + a ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)




(𝑋 − b ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)




𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑋 > 2b ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩 
(11) 
 
𝐹𝑇(𝑋) = 𝑇 (
(𝑋 + a ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
(𝑎2 + 𝑋2 + 2𝑎𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
1
2
)          
 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑋 ≤ 2b ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩 
(12) 









= 𝑇 ∫ (
𝑋 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩






+  𝑇 ∫ (
𝑋 − 𝑏 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩







 (𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑋 > 2𝑏 ∙ sin𝛩) 
Integration of the Equation 14 by parts requires the following: 
𝑢 = (𝑎2 + 𝑋2 + 𝑎𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩) 
𝑣 = (𝑏2 + 𝑋2 − 𝑏𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩) 
𝑑𝑢 = (2𝑋 + 2𝑎 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)𝑑𝑥 



































= 𝑇((𝑎2 + 𝑋2 + 2𝑎𝑋 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
1
2  | 0




= 𝑇 ((𝑎2 + 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥
2 + 2𝑎𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ sin 𝛩)
1
2 + (𝑏2 + 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥
2 − 2𝑏𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ sin 𝛩)
1






= 𝑇 ((𝑎2 + 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥
2 + 2𝑎𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
1
2
+ (𝑏2 + 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥
2 − 2𝑏𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
1
2 − 𝑎 − 𝑏) 
(14) 





= 𝑇 ((𝑎2 + 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥
2 + 2𝑎𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)
1
2 − 𝑎) (15) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑋 ≤ 2b ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩 
Note that the expression for total energy obtained by integrating FT dx is equal to 
T × (R1+R2). The theoretical stopping distance (X) can then be determined algebraically 
by solving for (Xmax). Equations (14) and (15), when solved for X, yield the stopping 





2𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ) − 16𝑎𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ)
+ 64𝑏2𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ) + 16𝑏𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ))2
− 4(64𝑎2𝑏𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 + 16𝑎2𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2
+ 64𝑎𝑏2𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 + 48𝑎𝑏𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2 + 8𝑎𝑔𝑇𝑣6𝑊3
+ 16𝑏2𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2 + 8𝑏𝑔𝑇𝑣6𝑊3 + 𝑣8𝑊4)(−32𝑎2𝑔4𝑇4
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(2Θ) − 32𝑎2𝑔4𝑇4 − 64𝑎𝑏𝑔4𝑇4 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(2Θ)
− 64𝑎𝑏𝑔4𝑇4 − 64𝑎𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 − 32𝑏2𝑔4𝑇4 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(2Θ)
− 32𝑏2𝑔4𝑇4 − 64𝑏𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 − 16𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2))
+ 64𝑎2𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ) + 16𝑎𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ)
− 64𝑏2𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊 ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ) − 16𝑏𝑔2𝑇2𝑣4𝑊2
∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(Θ))/(2(−32𝑎2𝑔4𝑇4 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(2Θ) − 32𝑎2𝑔4𝑇4
− 64𝑎𝑏𝑔4𝑇4 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(2Θ) − 64𝑎𝑏𝑔4𝑇4 − 64𝑎𝑔3𝑇3𝑣2𝑊






− 16𝑔2𝑇2(𝑣4(−𝑊2) − 4𝑎𝑔𝑇𝑣2𝑊)) − 8𝑎𝑔2𝑇2
∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛩)) /(8𝑔2𝑇2) 
(17) 
(When only one energy absorber is engaged during an angled impact) 
The theoretical maximum G-force on the vehicle for a given energy absorber 
force (T) occurs when both energy absorbers are directly opposing the motion of the 
vehicle. The deceleration of the vehicle can approach this maximum when L is small 
relative to the stopping distance: 





The deceleration of the vehicle at any distance X is then: 
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(𝑋 + a ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)




(𝑋 − b ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝛩)




22.2 Comparison of Original and New Analytical Technique 
Previous test data was used to verify the new equations for calculating the 
deceleration of the vehicle and the stopping distance. Six full-scale crash tests were 
performed by TTI [51] during the initial test of the Dragnet system. Two tests were 
conducted on the “DRAGNET Work ZoNet”, to obtain NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-3 
approval [46]. The original equations found in the report published by TTI [51] and a 
Dragnet product manual [52] could not calculate the stopping distance and deceleration 
of the vehicle directly from equations. A comparison of the actual test data, original 
calculations, and new equations is shown in Table 42. Shown below is are the simplified 
equations for calculating the stopping distance with a perpendicular impact into the center 
of the net and the deceleration of the vehicle for a perpendicular impact that could be 
offset from the center. 






+ 𝐿) (21) 




















Inputs for Analytical Equations Deflection Deceleration 
Θ T L W v  
Actual                  
ft (m) 
Original3            
ft (m) 
New5                           
ft (m) 
Actual     
g's 
Original4           
g's 
New5           
g's 
Impact Angle                           
Deg. 
Tape Force          
kip (kN) 
Net Width          
ft (m) 
Weight            
lb (kg) 
Velocity      
ft/s (m/s) 
51 
4A 0 25.0 (111.2) 33.0 (10.1) 
1460          
(662) 
61.6             
(18.8) 
8.4        
(2.6) 
7.73           
(2.36) 
7.73          
(2.36) 
16 14.53 14.53 
4B 0 25.0 (111.2) 33.0 (10.1) 
4300          
(1950) 
88.0             
(26.8) 
18.4        
(5.6) 
21.18           
(6.46) 
21.18          
(6.46) 
16 9.17 9.17 
4C 30 25.0 (111.2) 33.0 (10.1) 
1620          
(735) 
70.4             
(21.5) 
12.9        
(3.9) 
7.6 2           
(2.32) 
10.45          
(3.18) 
13 N/A 14.61 
4D 30 25.0 (111.2) 33.0 (10.1) 
4520          
(2050) 
79.2             
(24.1) 
22.0        
(6.7) 
20.2 2          
(6.2) 
20.30          
(6.19) 
8 N/A 8.52 
4E 0 12.5 (55.6) 33.0 (10.1) 
3760          
(1706) 
82.1             
(25.0) 
26.0        
(7.9) 
27.73           
(8.45) 
27.73          
(8.45) 
7 5.71 5.71 
4F 1 30 12.5 (55.6) 33.0 (10.1) 
3880          
(1760) 
90.9             
(27.7) 
29.0        
(8.8) 
29.5 2          
(9.0) 
33.36          
(10.17) 
5 N/A 5.85 
46 
01-7629-001 0 4.5 (20.0) 38.0 (11.6) 
4410          
(2000) 
85.5             
(26.1) 
70.5        
(21.5) 
72.31           
(22.04) 
72.31          
(22.04) 
2.4 1.99 1.99 
01-7629-002 0 4.5 (20.0) 38.0 (11.6) 
1810          
(821) 
94.0             
(28.7) 
40.0        
(12.2) 
42.60           
(12.98) 
42.60          
(12.98) 
3.9 4.64 4.64 
1. Test vehicle was not stopped by the net attenuator [51] 
2. Not calculated, reference text measured from graph [51] 
3. Calculated using Equation 21 unless otherwise noted (1969 method [51]) 
4. Calculated using Equation 22 unless otherwise noted (method found in product manual [52]) 
5. Calculated using Equations 17 and 21 presented in this document 
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The new equations were able to calculate stopping distances and decelerations in 
all cases whereas previously, no equations were available for certain impact conditions. 
The new general equations provided the same values as the previous equations, except 
that they can accommodate a wide range of impact conditions. Both methods had good 
correlation with the test data and were suitable for making estimates for higher force 
energy absorbers. 
22.3 Analysis of Test Nos. IRA-3 and IRA-4 
The equations used were incorporated into an Excel spreadsheet program to 
calculate the maximum deflection and deceleration for impacts at any angle or location 
within the system. The analytical method could be used to determine closely the dynamic 
deflection, and peak decelerations could be predicted. Data from test nos. IRA-3 and 
IRA-4 were used because all six energy absorbers functioned properly. The deceleration 
on the vehicle increases the farther the vehicle travels into the system; therefore, the 
maximum ORA value occurred at the end of the event. Occupant impact velocity was not 
considered for this analysis, because the forces on the vehicle were initially much lower 
than end terminal or crash cushion systems and the test was not likely to violate the limits 
in MASH [3]. 
The effective length of the net was considered as the distance between anchorage 
points of the middle energy absorbers on the left and right side of the net attenuator as 
shown in Figure 147. The effective widths of version 1 (test nos. IRA-1 and IRA-2) and 
version 2 (test nos. IRA-3 and IRA-4) of the system were 55 ft - 4 9/16 in. (16.9 m) and 
55 ft - 10 5/8-in. (17.0 m), respectively. Version 1 would be able to accommodate a wider 
range of angled impacts without the energy absorbers crossing over one another, but 
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during component testing, some of the innermost energy absorbers’ tapes were rupturing. 
Version 2 alleviated these problems by decreasing the angle between the net and the 
energy absorbers, reducing the range of impact angles but increasing reliability. The 
inner- and outermost energy absorbers would contribute the most and least, respectively, 
to the force applied to the vehicle when all energy absorbers are engaged. The middle 
energy absorber was assumed to be the average of both. This does not exactly represent 
the conditions of test, however. The relative contribution of each energy absorber would 
change as deflection increased, and would be a consideration for future studies.  
 
Figure 147. Effective Length of Versions 1 and 2 
22.3.1 Analysis of Test No. IRA-3 
The analytical model was compared against accelerometer data from test no. IRA-
3. Shown in Table 43 are the input parameters used in analytical solution of test no. IRA-



















































Figure 148. Analytical Solution for Test No. IRA-3 
The analytical method calculated a maximum deflection of 50.5 ft (15.4 m), 
compared to 37.6 ft (11.5 m) in test no. IRA-3. The calculated ORA in the longitudinal 
direction for the analytical solution, simulation, and test no. IRA-3 were 4.13 g’s, 4.02 
g’s, and 4.64 g’s, respectively. A comparison of the accelerations of the analytical model 
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and physical crash test are shown in Figure 149. The analytical solution under-predicted 
the accelerations on the vehicle and over-predicted the stopping distances. It should be 
noted that the vehicle was not captured in the angled simulation and had begun to yaw 
out of the system when the simulation ended. 
 
Figure 149. Analytical Model, Angled Simulation, and Test No. IRA-3 Accelerations  
The discrepancies between the analytical model and the physical crash test are 
likely due to some of the assumptions of the analytical solution. When the vehicle 
impacted the net, it was assumed that the net would not slide along the front of the 
vehicle. The implications of this were that during an angled impact, one end of the net 
would be slack until the vehicle had traveled a sufficient distance into the system for the 

























head enough until both energy absorbers were engaged. With both energy absorbers 
engaged sooner in the event, the increased force on the vehicle caused higher deceleration 
values and a shorter stopping distance. The analytical method made poor estimates of the 
stopping distance and the accelerations on the vehicle. The estimated stopping distance 
was 34 percent greater than the physical crash test. The calculated peak acceleration was 
only 11 percent less than that of the actual test, but because the acceleration calculation a 
function of the stopping distance X, the acceleration calculated cannot be considered a 
good estimate. 
22.3.2 Analysis of Test No. IRA-4 
The analytical model was compared against full-scale crash test no. IRA-4. 
Shown in Table 44 are the input parameters used in analytical solution of test no. IRA-4 
with a graphical representation of the results shown in Figure 150. 
















































Figure 150. Analytical Solution for Test No. IRA-4 
The analytical model calculated a maximum deflection of 46.6 ft (14.2 m), 
compared to 42.2 ft. (12.9 m) and 44.29 ft (13.50 m) for the physical crash test and 
simulation, respectively. The calculated ORA in the longitudinal direction for the 
analytical model, test no. IRA-4, and baseline simulation were 3.84 g’s, 4.88 g’s, and 
3.91 g’s, respectively. A comparison of the accelerations of the analytical model, 
simulation, and physical crash test is shown in Figure 151. For this central, perpendicular 
impact, there was much better correlation between the analytical method, physical 
component test, and simulation. The analytical method provided a conservative estimate 
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of the maximum dynamic deflection and under-predicted the peak decelerations of test 
no. IRA-4. 
 
Figure 151. Analytical Model, Baseline Simulation, and Test No. IRA-4 Accelerations 
22.4 Discussion  
This analysis assumed the vehicle was a point mass and no consideration was 
given for the vehicles geometry. Accounting for the width of the net would result in 
higher component forces on the vehicle, causing higher deceleration values and shorter 
stopping distances. Assuming a vehicle width would add considerable complexity to the 
equations presented in this report. For the scenarios considered in this report, the width of 
the net was much greater than the width of the vehicle and the effects would be minimal, 

























A consequence of assuming that the net would not slide along the front of the 
bogie is that in angled impacts, the vehicle will be closer to one of the energy absorbers 
than at impact, causing one energy absorber to be slack and not contributing to the force 
on the vehicle until the vehicle is farther into the system. In an actual system, the net 
would likely slide along the face of the vehicle until both energy absorbers were engaged. 
This was not considered in this analysis but would be necessary if the equations are going 
to be used to estimate the stopping distance and deceleration of a vehicle in an angled and 
offset impact. 
The estimate for the central, perpendicular impact in test no. IRA-4 was 
conservative for maximum dynamic deflection of the net and under-predicted the ORA 
value. The estimate for the offset, angled impact in test no. IRA-3 was off by 34 percent. 
The deceleration calculated with the analytical method using test no. IRA-3 parameters 
was only 11 percent less than that of the physical crash test. Because the calculated 
acceleration is a function of X, the acceleration likely would have been much lower had 
the vehicle not traveled as far into the system.  
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CHAPTER 23 ANALYSIS OF INERTIA BARRIER IMPACTS 
Sand barrels, sometimes referred to as inertia barriers or modules, are used in 
conjunction with an end terminal or crash cushion in Concept K. To evaluate Concept K 
and develop potential configurations, a plan was needed to analyze large arrays of sand 
barrels. The large area that needed to be protected, in addition to multiple potential 
impact locations and angles, required the development of non-standard sand barrel array 
configurations. While the Roadside Design Guide provided a methodology for analyzing 
inertia barrier impacts, guidelines for partial barrel impacts or multiple barrel interactions 
prevalent in large arrays were not discussed [1]. 
23.1 Inertia Barrier Analysis for Head-On Impacts 
The Roadside Design Guide [1] outlines a method for analyzing head-on impacts 
where sand barrels are used to protect a narrow concrete barrier end or other hazard. 
Shown in Figure 152 is a typical situation where a vehicle impacts the nose of an array 
with all of the barrels inside the path of the vehicle. As the vehicle travels through the 
system, each new barrel contacted is considered a distinct impact event. When multiple 
barrels are contacted at the same time, the mass of the barrels is combined to form the 
same impact event.  
 
Figure 152. Typical Sand Barrel System [1] 
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Although other factors influence energy dissipation during an impact, simple 
momentum transfer is used as the basis for predicting a system’s performance. This 
analysis is discussed in the RDG and reproduced here [1]. Using the conservation of 
momentum principle: 
Where: 
 Mv = Mass of vehicle (lb) 
 M1 = Mass of sand in first contacted barrel (lb) 
 Mn = Mass of sand in the nth impacted container(s) 
 V0 = Original impact velocity (ft/s) 
 V1 = Velocity after the first impact (ft/s) 
 Vn = Velocity after the nth impact (ft/s) 
 
 𝑀𝑉𝑉0 = 𝑀𝑉𝑉1 + 𝑀1𝑉1 (23) 





The combined momentum of the vehicle and the sand after impact is assumed to 
be effectively equal to the momentum of the vehicle just before impact. This implies that 
after the front of the vehicle has passed over the original location of the module, the sand 
has been completely dispersed and no longer contributes to absorbing the kinetic energy. 
Applying this in a sequential manner for each row of sand barrels impacted, the vehicle’s 





For each row of sand barrels impacted, the deceleration distance is equal to the 
diameter of the barrel. The frangible plastic of the barrel breaks apart as it is struck by the 
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vehicle. Frequently, the maximum deceleration in g’s is desired for an estimate of the 
occupant risk from ridedown decelerations. The 1977 AASHTO Guide for Selecting, 
Locating, and Designing Traffic Barriers suggests a 12-g maximum average acceleration 
for crash cushions [53]. This limit is considered common practice for designing sand 
barrel systems and was used in lieu of the MASH ridedown acceleration limit of 20.49 
g’s [3]. Average acceleration is used in this analysis, because it is assumed that the 
velocity of the vehicle is immediately reduced after an impact with a barrel. This sudden 
drop in velocity would result in infinite, nonphysical accelerations that could not be used 
for assessing occupant risk. The average acceleration, a, and time between each impact 
event, t, can be calculated: 
Where: 
 ln = Deceleration distance for nth impact (ft) 
 an = Deceleration rate for nth impact (ft/s
2
) 
 g = Acceleration of gravity (32.174 ft/s
2
) 
 Gn = Deceleration rate for nth impact (G’s) 
















Other important criteria to consider are the theoretical Occupant Impact Velocity 
(OIV) and Occupant Ridedown Acceleration (ORA). These represent the hypothetical 
velocity and acceleration of an unbelted occupant upon impact with an interior surface. 
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These values were estimated using the procedure outlined in MASH and the velocities 
and accelerations described above [3].  
Theoretically, a vehicle will not be stopped using the conservation of momentum. 
For this reason, common practice is to design systems such that the velocity is reduced to 
below 10 mph (16 km/h) after the last module has been impacted. Manufacturers often 
recommend placing another row of heavy barrels beyond the point at which the vehicle’s 
velocity is reduced to less than 10 mph (16 km/h), though this is not required [1]. In non-
standard barrel configurations or angled impacts, some of the modules may only be 
partially impacted. A procedure for this scenario was not outlined in the RDG. 
23.2 Analyzing Inertia Barrier Impacts - General Form 
This section describes a method developed for analyzing more complex sand 
barrel arrays that accounts for barrels that are partially impacted by the vehicle and 
adjusts for a wide array of impact conditions. The method uses the same basic principles 
described previously, but advances the method by considering the discrete contributions 
of the mass of each impacted or partially impacted barrel. 
Consider the large sand barrel array shown in Figure 153. A 2270P vehicle, 
represented as a rectangle, impacting the barrels is assumed to have a constant trajectory. 
Though the shape for many commercially available modules varies, this analysis 
considered them to be perfect cylinders with a diameter of 36 in. (914 mm) and spaced 6 




Figure 153. Large Sand Barrel Array 
The contribution of each impacted barrel needs to be found. Because sand barrels 
are made of frangible plastic, the vehicle breaks apart the barrel and decelerates through 
the sand, independent of the barrel. For this reason, only the mass inside of the vehicle’s 
path is assumed to contribute to energy dissipation, as shown in Figure 154. 
 
Figure 154. Effective Masses of Each Impacted Barrel 
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Each impact with a barrel is considered a unique event, as shown in Figure 155. 
The deceleration distance for each event is equal to either the distance between impact 
events, or the length of contact with the barrel, whichever is less. Here “length of 
contact” refers to the distance the vehicle interacts with the barrel. As shown in Figure 
156, when the center of a module is inside the vehicle’s path (A and B), the length of 
contact is equal to the diameter of the barrel. If the center of the module is outside of the 
path, then the length of contact is equal to the chord length of the split module (C). 
 
Figure 155. Impact Order and Deceleration Distance 
 
Figure 156. Length of Contact Description 
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The mass for impact event n is all of the mass that is located between impact n 
and impact n+1, as shown in Figure 157. Thus, not all of a barrel’s mass would 
necessarily contribute to energy absorption during the same impact event.  
 
Figure 157. Mass Distribution Between Impact Events 
23.2.1 Mass Distribution 
Multiple methods for distributing mass between the impact events were 
considered. The mass of each barrel that is inside the path of the vehicle can be 
determined algebraically for all barrels that are impacted or partially impacted. Between 
each impact event there may be one or more barrels that are contributing to absorbing 
energy. The barrels are split between each impact event. The mass of each barrel segment 
can be determined using the area of each barrel segment, dividing it by the total area of 
the barrel that lies inside the vehicle’s path, and then multiplying it by the mass of the 
barrel that lies inside the path. 
The first step of determining the mass at each impact event is to determine how 




 D = Diameter of sand barrel (ft) 
 XT = Total area of sand barrel (ft
2
) 
 X = Area of sand barrel inside of path (ft
2
) 








 Kb = Area segment defined by diameter equal to length of 
contact and a width  
 h = Distance from path to center of sand barrel (ft) 
 c = Chord length of partially impacted sand barrel (ft) 
 b = Distance of bisection from circle edge (ft) 
 Ln = Distance from front of vehicle to impact point on barrel 
(ft) 
 𝑀𝑋𝑇   = Total mass of sand barrel X (lb) 
 𝑀𝑋   = Mass of sand barrel X contributing to energy absorption 
(lb) 
 𝑀𝑛 = Mass at impact event n (lb) 
  
 
Figure 158. Details of Partially Impacted Sand Barrel 







The distance from the path to the center h can be used to determine the area of a 










− ℎ2 (30) 











− ℎ2 (31) 
And the chord length c is: 
 𝑐 = √
𝐷2
4
− ℎ2 (32) 
The effective mass of the impacted sand barrel is thus: 
  Full impact: 𝑀𝑋 = 𝑀𝑋𝑇 (33) 








The mass calculations of the first seven impacts of the large sand barrel array 
example are shown in Figure 159 and in the following equations. For this example, barrel 
A corresponded with impact event no. 1, barrel B with impact event no. 2, and so on. 
Mass MA was the mass of barrel A inside the vehicle’s path, MB, the mass of barrel B 
inside the vehicle’s path, and so on. Mass M1 was the sum of all sand barrel masses 
located between impact event no. 1 and 2, M2, the sum of all sand barrel masses between 




Figure 159. Mass Distribution Between Impact Events 
























)𝑀𝐶  (39) 


























)𝑀𝐸  (42) 
23.2.1.1 Ideal Mass Distribution 
Ideally, the exact area for each split barrel segment would be calculated 
algebraically. For large sand barrel arrays this results in many calculations. A more 
efficient method for calculating the area would be to use a CAD program to find all of the 
bisected areas. Whether the areas of the barrel segments are calculated algebraically or 
271 
 
with CAD, the mass of each barrel segment can be determined using the area of each 
barrel segment, dividing it by the total area of the barrel that lies inside the vehicle’s path, 
and then multiplying it by the mass of the barrel that lies inside the path. Two different 
cases are geometrically represented in Figure 160, where segment area X1 and X2 are 
divided by area X to provide a ratio. The first case is where the individual sections are 
only split once. The scenario in case 2 is for when a section is taken out of the middle of 
the circle. Both of the cases shown in Figure 160 have a portion of the barrel that is 





Figure 160. Ideal Mass Distribution 
23.2.1.2 Mass Distribution by Linear Approximation 
Though the exact area for each split barrel can be calculated for each instance 
algebraically or by using a drafting program, this task is often time consuming. Instead of 
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trying to calculate each individual area, a simpler method is to assume that the effective 
mass of each barrel is evenly distributed along the length of contact l with the barrel. 
Knowing the center position of the barrel relative to the impact events allows the 
masses to be split among the different impact events. Shown in Figure 161 is a geometric 
representation of how this approximation works. The hatched areas for Cases 1 and 2 
represent a section of a barrel that is contributing to the mass at some impact event. In 
Case 1, the width of the first barrel section is divided by the overall length of contact to 
calculate the mass ratio. In Case 2, the width of the middle barrel segment is divided by 
the overall length of contact. Overall length of contact is used because for situations 
where the center of the barrel is outside the path of the vehicle, the length of contact is 
less than the diameter of the barrel. 
If the vehicle passes through the entire barrel before the next barrel is struck: 
 
𝐿𝑛+1 − 𝐿𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛
𝑙𝑛
(𝑀𝑛) (43) 





The mass from previous barrels n-u are included in the same fashion if: 
 (𝐿𝑛−𝑢 + 𝑙𝑛−𝑢) ≥ 𝐿𝑁 (45) 




Figure 161. Linear Mass Distribution Approximation 
Using this approximation method will overestimate the mass for small sections 
near the edge of the circle, resulting in larger than expected velocity drops. These drops 
can occur over relatively small deceleration distances, which can create spikes in the 
average acceleration which exceed the 12-g limit. 
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23.2.1.3 Mass Distribution by Partial Areas Approximation 
The linear approximation method was an effective first step but had potential for 
unrealistic spikes in acceleration. Therefore a more refined method was needed. The mass 
ratio can be approximated using the center position of the barrel relative to the impact 
events. Using the same logic conditions as the linear method, the mass ratio of each cut 
section is estimated by dividing the area of the cut section by the area of a circle with a 
diameter equal to the deceleration distance ln of the barrel, geometrically shown in Figure 
162.  
The hatched areas for Cases 1 and 2 represent a section of a barrel that is 
contributing to the mass at some impact event. In Case 1, the width of the first barrel 
section and the length of contact were used to calculate the area Kb1. This area is then 
divided by the area of a circle equal to the length of contact of Xl and multiplied by the 
mass of the barrel inside the path of the vehicle. In Case 2, a section out of the middle of 
the barrel was needed. First area X2 is calculated by subtracting the areas to the left and 
right of the middle section. This area is then divided by the area of a circle equal to the 
length of contact of Xl and multiplied by the mass of the barrel inside the path of the 
vehicle. The overall length of contact is used, because for situations where the center of 
the barrel is outside the path of the vehicle, the length of contact is less than the diameter 
of the barrel. 




















For Case 2: 
 𝑀𝑋2 =
𝑋𝑙 − 𝐾𝑏1 − 𝐾𝑏2
𝑋𝑙
· 𝑀𝑛 (48) 
 
Figure 162. Partial Areas Mass Distribution Approximation 
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23.2.2 Comparison of Mass Distribution Methods 
The large sand barrel array shown in Figure 153 had a variety of fully and 
partially impacted barrels and was used to compare the different mass distribution 
techniques, as shown in Table 45. The areas of the segmented barrels were calculated 
using a 2D CAD program to determine the ideal mass distribution program while the 
linear approximation and partial areas approximation were incorporated into a 
spreadsheet program. All three techniques had the same total impacted mass; however, 
the partial areas distribution had an average absolute error of only 1.85 percent versus the 
linear method that had an average absolute error of 17.12 percent. All three techniques 




Table 45. Mass Distribution Method Comparison 
 
A barrel can be split by both the path of the vehicle and other impact events. To 
calculate the actual area of each split segment, there are many possible distribution 
scenarios that must be considered because the barrel can be segmented based on two 
axes. Both the linear and partial areas methods calculate the mass distribution using one 
axis, drastically reducing the number of distribution scenarios and effort required to 
calculate the mass distribution. The partial areas method provided a close approximation 
to the ideal distribution with an absolute error of less than 1.85 percent. 
23.2.3 Spreadsheet Procedure 
Using the general form for analyzing inertia barrier impacts with large sand barrel 
arrays would be time consuming if done with hand calculations. A more practical way to 
lb kg lb kg Absolute Error lb kg Absolute Error
1 36.09 16.37 42.07 19.08 16.57% 33.51 15.20 7.15%
2 308.72 140.03 291.89 132.40 5.45% 311.30 141.20 0.84%
3 57.73 26.18 79.22 35.93 37.23% 57.73 26.18 0.00%
4 316.39 143.51 297.69 135.03 5.91% 318.48 144.46 0.66%
5 4.70 2.13 5.06 2.30 7.71% 4.39 1.99 6.60%
6 61.58 27.93 79.79 36.19 29.55% 59.74 27.10 2.99%
7 218.39 99.06 194.39 88.17 10.99% 218.72 99.21 0.15%
8 68.35 31.00 85.89 38.96 25.65% 70.54 31.99 3.19%
9 191.19 86.72 198.52 90.05 3.83% 187.70 85.14 1.83%
10 346.16 157.01 309.66 140.46 10.54% 346.01 156.95 0.04%
11 167.29 75.88 208.25 94.46 24.48% 160.04 72.59 4.33%
12 1038.62 471.11 984.83 446.71 5.18% 1047.05 474.93 0.81%
13 347.84 157.78 458.80 208.11 31.90% 346.63 157.23 0.35%
14 2324.60 1054.42 2184.49 990.87 6.03% 2331.07 1057.36 0.28%
15 259.88 117.88 406.60 184.43 56.46% 254.62 115.49 2.03%
16 144.96 65.75 139.80 63.41 3.56% 144.93 65.74 0.02%
17 1634.56 741.42 1468.60 666.14 10.15% 1641.16 744.42 0.40%
18 370.01 167.83 464.96 210.90 25.66% 384.55 174.43 3.93%
19 851.04 386.03 932.83 423.12 9.61% 825.85 374.60 2.96%
20 1971.16 894.10 1749.61 793.61 11.24% 1968.74 893.01 0.12%
21 628.02 284.86 786.23 356.63 25.19% 611.09 277.19 2.69%
22 2702.00 1225.61 2561.00 1161.65 5.22% 2726.77 1236.84 0.92%
23 465.49 211.14 584.62 265.18 25.59% 464.16 210.54 0.29%
Total Mass: 14514.78 6583.79 14514.78 6583.79 14514.78 6583.79
Average Error: 17.12% 1.85%
Impact Event
Ideal Linear Approximation Partial Areas Approximation
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apply this method is to implement it into a spreadsheet program. The sand barrel layout 
can be described in two-dimensional (2D) Cartesian coordinates with an (x,y) pair 
describing the center position of each module with some mass. In addition to locating the 
modules in 2D space, a vehicle and path are also needed. For the vehicle, four nodes are 
used to represent the corners of a vehicle model, as shown in Figure 163.  
 
Figure 163. Simple Vehicle Model and Sand Barrel 
In Figure 163: 
 𝑣𝑛⃗⃗⃗⃗  = Direction vector through center of vehicle  
 𝑟𝑛⃗⃗  ⃗ = Vector from center of barrel to point A1 on the front of 
the vehicle 
 dn = Distance from center of barrel to front of vehicle 
  
Using this model, the distance dn, from the front of the vehicle to the center of a 
barrel can be used to determine the impact order. To find the distance from the vehicle to 
each barrel, a direction vector v⃗ , passing through the center of the sand barrel and 
perpendicular to the front of the vehicle, is created by the line between points A1 and A2 
and is constructed: 
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Next, a vector is drawn from Mn to point A1: 




Finally, the length of the projection of  r  on to v⃗  yields the distance from the 
center of the nth sand barrel to the front of the vehicle, dn : 
  𝑑𝑛 =
(𝑥1 − 𝑥0)(𝑦2 − 𝑦1) + (𝑦1 − 𝑦0)(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)
√(𝑦2 − 𝑦1)2 + (𝑥2 − 𝑥1)2
  (51) 
This process can then be used to find the distance to all of the modules in the 
system. The distance Ln, to the front of the vehicle is: 




When the center of a sand barrel is inside the path of the vehicle, the chord length 
is: 
 𝑐 = 𝐷 (53) 
Similarly, the module’s distance from the left and right sides of the vehicle’s path 
can be determined using (A4, A1, Mn) and (A3, A2, Mn), respectively. Calculating the 
distances from the left and right sides of the vehicle path would allow logic conditions to 
determine whether or not a module is in the path of the vehicle and if the barrel was fully 
impacted or partially impacted. 
23.2.4 Large Sand Barrel Array Example Calculations 
The large sand barrel array shown in Figure 153 was used as a representative 
system to evaluate the spreadsheet procedure described in the previous section. With this 
program, each of the 36 in. (914 mm) diameter sand barrels had a unique mass and (x, y) 
coordinate, as shown in Figure 164. Sand barrel masses were limited to standard sizes of 
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200 lb (91 kg), 400 lb (182 kg), 700 lb (318 kg), 1,400 lb (636), and 2,100 lb (955 kg) 
[1]. The partial areas mass distribution method was used in this program because it 
provided a good approximation of the mass distribution and was much simpler to 
implement than trying to calculate each individual mass.  
Using the equations defined previously, the position of the vehicle relative to the 
barrels was used to determine the impact event order and the relative mass contribution of 
each barrel that was impacted. The impact event order and mass, as well as velocity 
calculation, average deceleration, and occupant impact velocity calculations are presented 
in Table 42 and graphically shown in Figure 165. 
The duration of each event and velocities were used to determine the theoretical 
occupant impact time of 0.15 seconds. The OIV was 24.5 ft/s (7.5 m/s), which was below 
the 40 ft/s (12.2 m/s) limit in MASH [3]. The ORA was 7.97 g’s, which was below the 12 
g average deceleration limit for sand barrel analysis. As shown in Table 42, when the 
vehicle’s velocity was reduced to below 14.67 ft/s (4.5 m/s), the vehicle would be 
allowed to impact a rigid barrier [1]. In this analysis, the vehicle was considered to be 
stopped after the velocity was reduced to less than 14.67 ft/s (4.5 m/s).  
This analysis verified that the partial areas approximation and occupant risk 
calculations could be implemented into a spreadsheet program. This spreadsheet program 
could then be used to investigate many different layouts and impact conditions to 




















Velocity Deceleration Impact Average Event 
 
OIV OD 
Order Per Impact Vn-1 Vn Distance Distance Deceleration Time 
 
  
  (lbs) (ft/s) (ft/s) (ft) (ft) (g's) (sec) (ft/s) (in.) 




    
 
0.000 0.000 
1 33.51 91.13 90.53 3.00 0.78 2.1832 0.0086 0.607 0.063 
2 311.30 90.53 85.22 3.00 2.60 5.5818 0.0295 5.913 2.159 
3 57.73 85.22 84.25 3.00 0.78 3.2654 0.0093 6.885 2.924 
4 318.48 84.25 79.20 3.00 2.52 5.0913 0.0308 11.930 7.333 
5 4.39 79.20 79.13 1.59 0.08 2.1597 0.0010 12.000 7.477 
6 59.74 79.13 78.20 3.00 0.78 2.9122 0.0100 12.934 9.025 
7 218.72 78.20 74.92 3.00 1.86 4.1995 0.0243 16.212 13.744 
8 70.54 74.92 73.88 2.91 0.74 3.2610 0.0099 17.254 15.801 
9 187.70 73.88 71.21 3.00 1.02 5.9307 0.0140 19.927 19.151 
10 346.01 71.21 66.60 2.54 1.58 6.2470 0.0229 24.536* 25.902 
11 160.04 66.60 64.53 3.00 0.78 5.3656 0.0120 26.601 29.722 
12 1047.05 64.53 53.36 3.00 2.60 7.8851 0.0440 37.775 49.687 
13 346.63 53.36 49.90 3.00 0.78 7.0760 0.0152 41.235 57.206 
14 2331.07 49.90 34.03 3.00 2.60 7.9714 0.0619 57.101 99.597 
15 254.62 34.03 32.38 3.00 0.49 3.4993 0.0146 58.750 109.923 
16 144.93 32.38 31.47 0.46 0.30 3.0370 0.0093 59.663 116.607 
17 1641.16 31.47 23.69 3.00 1.93 3.4601 0.0699 67.440 173.144 
18 384.55 23.69 22.00 2.77 0.67 1.7955 0.0293 69.132 197.444 
19 825.85 22.00 18.88 3.00 0.91 2.1879 0.0443 72.251 235.859 
20 1968.74 18.88 13.55** 2.76 1.69 1.5905 0.1042 77.586 332.917 
21 611.09 13.55 12.07** 3.00 0.78 0.7489 0.0612 79.061 391.015 
22 2726.77 12.07 7.81** 3.00 2.18 0.6027 0.2197 83.322 610.713 
23 464.16 7.81 7.15** 0.20 0.20 0.7730 0.0267 83.985 637.607 
* Occupant Impact Velocity 






Figure 165. Inertia Barrier Example Displacement, Velocity, and Average Acceleration 
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CHAPTER 24 COMBINED END TERMINAL AND SAND BARREL 
IMPACTS 
An analytical method for considering combined sand barrel and end terminal or 
crash cushion impacts was developed to further investigate the feasibility of Concept K. 
Many end terminals and crash cushions are designed such that their occupant risk values 
are close to the limits defined in MASH in order to reduce their overall size. Concept K 
would require sand barrels and an end terminal or crash cushion to be placed very near 
one another, creating the potential that both systems would be engaged at the same time. 
If both systems were impacted simultaneously, the occupant risk limits may be exceeded. 
The large sand barrel array example from the previous chapter is shown in Figure 166, 
offset from an end terminal by 2 ft (610 mm). In this arrangement, the end terminal and 
only one row of sand barrels could be impacted. 
 
Figure 166. Combined Crash Cushion and Sand Barrel Impact 
24.1 Analysis 
In an impact with an energy-absorbing guardrail end terminal, the acceleration of 
the impact head, followed by the deformation of the rail element as the head is pushed 
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down the rail, dissipates the majority of the energy. During the initial impact, the vehicle 
contacts and accelerates the terminal head, fracturing the first post, and releasing the 
tension in the rail. As the vehicle and terminal head reach the same velocity, the terminal 
head is driven down the guardrail, dissipating energy through rail deformation and/or 
post fracture. The vehicle either comes to rest in contact with the end terminal or has a 
post-impact trajectory with possible subsequent impacts.  
A technique used for accident reconstruction of end terminal impacts, first 
developed by Coon, was modified for this application to include the effect of sand barrels 
adjacent to the terminal [54]. In this technique, the conservation of momentum theory is 
used for the initial impact with the terminal head. The collision can be considered 
perfectly plastic, with the head traveling with the vehicle after it is struck. For high-speed 
frontal impacts, the coefficient of restitution is relatively low. This implies that almost all 
of the kinetic energy is transformed into crush energy, and that there is little elasticity to a 
frontal vehicle impact. Since the coefficient of restitution is relatively small, conservation 
of momentum is used, and the elastic restoration of vehicle crush during impact with the 
terminal head may be neglected.  
The average force levels provided by several end terminals are shown in Table 47. 
The ranges of force levels were determined in Coon’s work through reconstruction of 
full-scale crash testing and, when available, the examination of corresponding 
accelerometer traces. Since the forces from the post fractures and acceleration of the 




Table 47. Average End Terminal Forces [54] 
End Terminal 
Head Mass        
lb (kg) 








29 (129) [Stage 2] 
BEST-350 275 (125) 
18.7 (83.4) to 22.5 
(100) 
ET-2000 268 (122) 12 (53.4) to 12.3 
(54.5) ET-2000 PLUS 175 (79) 
FLEAT-350, MT 120 (54.5) 13.5 (60.2) to 15 (67) 
REGENT 46 (21) N/A 
SKT-350 172 (78) 




18 (80.1) [Stage 1] 
WY-BET (MB) 35 (155) [Stage 2] 
 
Shown in Figure 167 is an example of a vehicle impacting both a row of sand 
barrels and an end terminal. In this scenario, the vehicle strikes multiple sand barrels 
before striking the end terminal. Impacts with the sand barrels result in an immediate 
drop in velocity. After the end terminal is struck, the inertia of the end terminal head and 
the resistive force of the end terminal head as it moves along the rail cause an additional 
change in velocity. To account for both sand barrel impacts and end terminal forces, the 
velocity needs to be calculated after each impact Vn and at the instant before the next 
impact Vn
’




Figure 167. Combined Sand Barrel and End Terminal Impact 
For the example shown in Figure 167, sand barrel impacts upstream from the end 
terminal could be treated using the same conservation of momentum procedure discussed 
in the previous chapter. After rearranging the conservation of momentum equations, they 
could be applied in a sequential manner for each sand barrel impacted upstream from the 
end terminal. When the vehicle impacts the end terminal, there is an initial drop in 
velocity when the head is accelerated from rest. Upon impact, the masses of the vehicle 
and the end terminal head are combined and the velocity of the end terminal head and 
vehicle can be solved using the conservation of momentum. When the end terminal is 
struck and the head is driven down the guardrail, conservation of energy is implemented. 
The deformation force levels of the guardrail end terminals are considered constant for 
this analysis. The amount of time between impact event n and n+1 is calculated using the 
initial velocity and the distance between impacts x. The width of the vehicle was not 
considered for this analysis because it was assumed that the end terminal and one row of 
sand barrels would be fully impacted. Assuming that there was no gap between the 





 Mv = Mass of vehicle (lb) 
 Mn = Mass of sand in the nth impacted barrel (s) 
 Mh = Mass of end terminal head (lb) 
 Vn = Vehicle velocity after nth impact (ft/s) 
 Vn
’
 = Vehicle velocity the instant before impact n+1 (ft/s) 




 aet = Acceleration due to end terminal force 
aT = Combined end terminal acceleration and average 
acceleration from sand barrels 
 g = Acceleration of gravity (32.174 ft/s
2
) 
 G = Deceleration (g’s) 
 t = Time of event (s) 
 F = Average resistive force of end terminal system (lbf) 
 xn = Longitudinal position within the system (ft) 
 
If a vehicle impacts sand barrels before the end terminal is impacted, than the 
equations for calculating the velocity drop after each impact and the average deceleration 







 the instant before impact n+1 is the same as Vn: 
 𝑉𝑛
′ = 𝑉𝑛 (55) 



















If the next impact is with another sand barrel, than the previous four equations are 
used again. If the end terminal is impacted, the following equations are to be used. 
Assuming the end terminal head is stuck to the vehicle after it is impacted and adds to the 
overall mass: 
 𝑉𝑛 =
(𝑀𝑣 + 𝑀ℎ) · 𝑉′𝑛−1
𝑀𝑣 + 𝑀ℎ + 𝑀𝑛
 (59) 
Between the impact events, the velocity is reduced by the resistive force of the 
end terminal: 
 𝑉𝑛
′ = 𝑉𝑛 + 𝑎𝑒𝑡 · 𝑡𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑛+1 (60) 













 𝑎𝑇 = 𝑎𝑛 + 𝑎𝑒𝑡 (63) 
The duration of the impact event is: 
 
𝑡𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑛+1 =










24.2 Example Calculation 
These equations were then used to calculate the stopping distance and 
deceleration of the impacting vehicle. The BEAT-SSCC was selected for the guardrail 
end terminal for this analysis because it was had a stiffness transition incorporated into 
the design and was much shorter than the other end terminals investigated. For simplicity, 
the first two barrels of the array are struck before the end terminal head and third barrel 
are struck at the same time as shown in Figure 168. An 1100C vehicle weighing 2,425 lb 
(1,100 kg) traveling at 62.14 mph (100 km/h) was considered in this example to 
investigate whether would be any occupant risk concerns with placing the barrels near the 
end terminal. Tables 48 through 50 contain the input parameters, locations and masses of 
the components, and the calculations performed. 
 












g 32.174 ft/s^2 
Mv 2425 lb 
F_Stage1 20000 lb 







X_max 8.5806 ft 
 




(lb) x (ft) 
3 head 130 6 
7 Stage2 0 17 
1 1 200 0 
2 2 200 3 
3 3 200 6 
4 4 200 9 
5 5 400 12 
6 6 700 15 
8 7 1400 18 
9 8 1400 21 







Table 50. Combined Sand Barrel and End Terminal Impact Calculations 
 
In the example, the 2,425 lb (1,100 kg) vehicle is stopped after the impact with 
fifth barrel. As shown in Table 50, the maximum combined deceleration for the example 
was 14.89 g’s, which exceeded the 12 g limit that was used for sand barrel impacts. To 
reduce the decelerations to acceptable levels for smaller vehicles, the first row of sand 
barrels would likely have to be offset downstream of the guardrail end terminal head. 
24.3 Limitations of Procedure 
The reconstruction procedure is based on an ideally functioning energy-absorbing 
end terminal [54]. In cases where the guardrail catches or jams in the feed chute, force 
levels will be significantly higher than in the initial impact phase, including additional 
vehicle crush. Catching in the feed chute will also induce energy dissipation in 
downstream guardrail posts and in the guardrail beam itself. Because of these additional 
energy losses, this procedure is limited to cases where the guardrail feeds freely through 
the chute of the impact head. However, as an analytical tool, this analysis was sufficient. 
 
n
M                
lb
x                
ft
x'                
ft
Vn                
ft/s
Vn'                
ft/s
t (n to n')                
s
a_avg                
g's
a_et                
g's
a_tot                
g's
91.19
1 200.00 0.0 3.0 84.24 84.24 0.03561 6.31334 0.00000 6.31334
2 200.00 3.0 6.0 77.82 77.82 0.03855 5.38795 0.00000 5.38795
3 330.00 6.0 9.0 68.50 56.40 0.04804 7.06523 7.82754 14.89277
4 200.00 9.0 12.0 52.31 35.00 0.06872 2.30562 7.82754 10.13316
5 400.00 12.0 15.0 30.26 0.00 0.12015 1.60148 7.82754 9.42902
6 700.00 15.0 17.0 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
7 0.00 17.0 18.0 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
8 1400.00 18.0 21.0 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
9 1400.00 21.0 24.0 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
10 1400.00 24.0 27.0 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
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CHAPTER 25 BULLNOSE ANALYTICAL MODEL 
25.1 Bullnose with Secondary Energy Absorption 
To use a bullnose system to capture a vehicle in the limited space near 
intersecting roadways, a secondary energy absorption method needs to be implemented to 
safely decelerate a vehicle in the available space. Typical bullnose systems are too long 
to install in the available space for most locations. Therefore, additional energy 
absorption is needed to reduce the length of the bullnose system. For secondary energy 
absorption, a net attenuator or sand barrels could be configured inside the area enclosed 
by the bullnose, as shown in Figure 169.  
 
Figure 169. Bullnose with Secondary Energy Absorber 
The analysis of Concepts C and O can be performed using similar methods to the 
combined sand barrel and energy-absorbing terminal analysis described previously. 
Bullnoses were not covered in the scope of the accident reconstruction effort performed 
by Coon et al. [54]. Thus, the average force of a bullnose had to be determined using 







Figure 170. USPBN-4 Bullnose Dimensions [24] 
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Post Bullnose system, shown in Figure 170, which could be applicable for this analysis 
[24]. 
In this test, a 4,429-lb (2009-kg) truck impacted the bullnose median barrier at a 
speed of 64.5 mph (103.8 km/h) and an angle of 0 degrees. The impact point was located 
with the center of the vehicle aligned with the center of the bullnose [24]. The maximum 
dynamic deflection in the test was 56 ft-1 in. (17.1 m) downstream from the point of 
impact. This system was much narrower than the bullnose needed for Concepts C and O. 
As the bullnose width increased, it was expected that the average crush force would 
decrease, resulting in an overall increase in stopping distance. 
25.2 Calculating Average Resistive Force of Bullnose 
The average force on the vehicle could be determined using two different methods 
using the accelerometer data shown in Figure 171. The first method was to calculate the 
force by multiplying the mass of the vehicle with its acceleration at each time step. Then 
average force could be calculated by summing the forces and dividing by the duration of 
the event multiplied by the sampling rate. For test no. USPBN-4, the sampling rate was 
10,000 samples per second. 
Where: 
 m = mass of the vehicle (lb) 
 tn = Time at sample n (s) 
 an = Acceleration measured at time n (g’s) 
 Fn = Resistive force on vehicle at time n (lb) 
 Favg = Average resistive force on the vehicle 





(10,000 𝐻𝑧) ⋅ 𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
 (66) 
Using this method, the average crushing force was 8,449 lb (37.6 kN), based on 
the CFC 60-filtered longitudinal acceleration.  
 
Figure 171. Longitudinal Acceleration Test No. USPBN-4 
The other method used to determine the average crushing force was to calculate 
the area underneath the force vs. deflection curve, shown in Figure 172, based on the 
longitudinal CFC 60-filtered longitudinal acceleration. The area under the force vs. 
deflection curve, or work, was calculated using the midpoint rule. The final summation of 











































 xn = displacement calculated at tn  (g’s) 
 Vn = Velocity of the vehicle at time tn (lb) 

























































Using this method, the average crushing force was 10,957 lbf (48.7 kN), based on 
the CFC60-filtered longitudinal acceleration. In order to select which method to use to 
find the average crush force, the following equation was used: 
Where: 
 xfinal = Total displacement of the bogie vehicle (ft) 
 W = Weight of vehicle (lb) 
 g = Gravitational constant (32.174 ft/s
2
) 







The test vehicle had a weight of 4,429 lb (2,009 kg) and an initial velocity of 64.5 
mph (103.8 km/h). Forces calculated from the accelerometer resulted in a crush force of 
8,449 lb (37.6 kN), yielding an estimated final deflection of 72.84 ft (22.20 m) with the 
equation above. The force calculated from the energy equations was 10,957 lbf (48.7 
kN), which yielded an estimated final deflection was 56.17 ft (17.12 m) which was very 
close to the actual dynamic deflection of 56.08 ft (17.09 m). Because of the close 
comparison with the actual and estimated deflection using the force from the energy 
equation, this force was used for analysis. 
25.3 Combined Bullnose and Sand Barrel System 
The procedure for analyzing the combined bullnose and sand barrel concept was 
the same as that used for treating end terminal and sand barrel impacts. For this analysis, 
however, there would be no situations where the vehicle would impact sand barrels 




25.4 Bullnose and Net Attenuator System 
The combined bullnose and net arrestor concept used a similar procedure for 
treating end terminal and sand barrel impacts. For this analysis, however, there would be 
no situations where the vehicle would impact sand barrels before engaging the front of 
the vehicle; however, the vehicle would impact the nose of the system before the net 
arrestor was struck. The equations from the previous chapters were simplified for this 
analysis. Head-on impacts at 0 degrees were assumed for this situation. 
Table 51 summarizes the equations used, where: 
 anet = acceleration from the net (g’s) 
 L = Width of the net (ft) 
 T = Tension force from energy absorbers (lbf) 
 Table 51. Calculation Procedure for Combined Bullnose and Sand Barrel Impacts 
Only Bullnose Impact Bullnose and Net Arrestor  





(𝑀𝑣 + 𝑀ℎ) · 𝑉′𝑛−1
𝑀𝑣 + 𝑀ℎ + 𝑀𝑛
 (72) 
𝑉𝑛
′ = 𝑉𝑛 + 𝑎𝑒𝑡 · 𝑡𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑛+1 𝑉𝑛








𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 = (
𝑇
𝑊





+ (𝑥𝑛)2 (74) 
𝑎𝑇 = 𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑇 = 𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎𝑒𝑡 (75) 
𝑡𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑛+1
=


















25.5 Limitations of procedure 
The reconstruction procedure is based on ideally functioning energy-absorbing 
end terminals or crash cushions [54]. Force levels could be significantly higher in angled 
impacts at the nose or impacts that are offset more to one side. For this analysis, only 
impacts to the center of the nose and parallel to the system were considered. However, as 
an analytical tool for this effort, this approach should be sufficient to determine the 
feasibility of the concept. 
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CHAPTER 26 POTENTIAL SYSTEM LAYOUTS 
This chapter presents potential layouts for the net attenuator, inertia barrier, and 
bullnose concepts. The analysis techniques presented earlier were used to provide the 
general dimensions required for each system. A summary of the design, operational, and 
constructability concerns can be found in Figure 50. 
26.1 Concept A – Net Attenuator/End Terminal or Crash Cushion 
26.1.1 Estimating Net Sizes 
The width of the required net attenuator was determined by examining the 
smallest available space for a new attenuation system. Narrower net installations will 
cause higher decelerations than wider nets and are therefore the worst case for impacts. 
For the scenario shown in Figure 173, a net of about 35 ft (10.7 m) was needed to cover 
the distance between the end terminal and the edge of the 30 ft (9.1 m) clear zone. After 
discussions with the manufacturer of the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier, it was 
believed that the number of energy absorbers could be reduced to one or two energy 
absorbers on each side of the net.  
 
Figure 173. Potential Layout for Net Attenuator 
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Placement of the energy absorbers and anchorage systems is critical to the overall 
performance of the safety treatment. The energy absorbers and anchorages should be 
placed as close as practical to the end terminal or crash cushion without adversely 
affecting the operation of either system. The redirection point of the end terminal or crash 
cushion is an important consideration. Many end terminal systems have a redirection 
point downstream from the third post location. To prevent a vehicle impacting between 
the end terminal head and the redirection point of the system and going around the net 
without engaging it, the net must be anchored downstream of the redirection point. 
Moving the net anchorages downstream from the corner of the intersection can increase 
the amount of area required to stop a vehicle. For this reason, non-gating, redirective 
crash cushion systems would be advantageous, because they would limit the amount one 
system could interfere with another when multiple safety treatments are used at the same 
site location. 
26.1.2 Deflections 
The analytical method was used to estimate the Dragnet net attenuator system 
performance with different energy absorber load capacities. This investigation was 
limited to central, perpendicular impacts into the net because of the poor correlation of 
the offset, angled impact estimation. With an impact velocity of 62.14 mph (100.0 km/h), 
the stopping distance and max deceleration could be estimated for the 1100C and 2270P 
MASH vehicles, as shown in Table 52. All impacts were perpendicular to the center of a 
35-ft (10.7-m) wide net. The goal would be to stop the 2270P vehicle in as short of a 
distance as possible, without causing ORA concerns with the lighter 1100C vehicle. OIV 
was not considered for this analysis, because the forces on the vehicle are initially much 
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lower than end terminal or crash cushion systems, and the test was not likely to violate 
the limits in MASH [3]. The analytical method tended to overestimate the deflection of 
the system and underestimate the occupant ridedown acceleration. 
Table 52. 1100C and 2270P Estimations with Analytical Solution 
Vehicle 
Designation 




Force            
kip (kN) 








4.5 (20.0) 49.3 (15.0) 3.50 
9.0 (40.0) 30.2 (9.2) 6.42 
18.0 (80.1) 19.5 (5.9) 11.05 




4.5 (20.0) 87.5 (26.6) 1.77 
9.0 (40.0) 50.4 (15.4) 3.40 
18.0 (80.1) 30.8 (9.4) 6.26 
25.0 (111.2) 24.9 (7.6) 8.18 
 
For all cases, the estimated maximum decelerations were less than the MASH-
allowable limit of 20.49 g’s. To reduce the stopping distance to under 30 ft (9.1 m), the 
system requires at least an 18.0-kip (80.1-kN) combined energy absorber force on each 
side of the system. Though none of the theoretical maximum decelerations approached 
20.1 g’s, energy absorber forces should be limited to prevent other issues such as 
excessive vehicle yawing in angled impacts. This analysis did not account for any 
deformation of the vehicle and assumed that the energy absorber force remained constant 
throughout the impact. Even with favorable anchorage locations, the vehicle could still 
travel into the original hazard area. 
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26.1.3 Grading In Protected Region 
Assuming that the deflections for the net attenuator system can be reduced to 30 ft 
(9.1 m), the grading requirements for the potential net layout are shown in Figure 174. 
The ground leading up to the net system and surrounding the end terminal or crash 
cushion would need to be 10:1 slope or flatter. Immediately behind the net, an 8:1 to 6:1 
longitudinal or lateral slope could potentially be accommodated, although this would 
require physical component testing to confirm. The net and anchorage system should be 
placed as close as practical to the slope break point. This would allow the energy 
absorbers to rotate freely as the impacting vehicles traverse the area below the anchorage 
points. Beyond the intended stopping area of the system, 4 ft (1.2 m) of 2:1 slope before a 
1:1 slope may be permitted or 4 ft (1.2 m) of 3:1 slope before a vertical drop. This 
grading data would require full-scale crash testing to confirm. 
 
Figure 174. Potential Layout for Net Attenuator System 
26.1.4 Discussion 
To reduce net attenuator deflections to below 30 ft (9.1 m), the combined force of 
the energy absorbers on each side of the system should be greater than or equal to 18 kip 
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(80.1 kN). The maximum deflections estimated for the 1100C and 2270P vehicle were 
19.5 ft (5.9 m) and 30.8 ft (9.4 m), respectively. The values calculated using the 
analytical method can be considered as upper limits for the maximum deflection, because 
the analytical solution considers that only the energy absorbers are dissipating the kinetic 
energy of the impacting vehicle. In reality, friction forces and system and vehicle 
deformation would absorb some of the energy as well. As the resistive force of the energy 
absorbers increases, it is likely that vehicles impacting at an angle will experience greater 
instabilities. For this reason, when the Dragnet was first tested in 1969, the authors 
suggested that the resistive force not exceed 12,500 lb (55.6 kN). The authors of that 
report also opined that an energy absorber tension force of 8,000 lbf (35.6 kN) or less 
would have acceptable stopping characteristics with energy absorbers mounted flush with 
the ground [51]. 
The height of the net is also an important factor in the performance of the system, 
as noted in the original testing performed on the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier [51]. 
The authors noted that the net should be approximately 4 ft (1.2 m) tall because a 3-ft 
(0.91-m) tall net failed to completely capture the front of the vehicle. If the net is not tall 
enough, it will not grab the front of the vehicle and could be pulled underneath it, 
allowing the vehicle to override the system.  
One challenge that must be overcome is the possibility that a vehicle could pass in 
between the net and the end terminal. Anchoring the energy absorbers near the end 
terminal may interfere with the function of the end terminal. Retesting the end terminal 
system may be required if the energy absorbers could potentially interfere with the end 
terminal’s installation. This concept would also require collaboration with end terminal 
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and crash cushion manufacturers. Non-gating, redirective crash cushion or end terminal 
systems are desired in this situation to limit the interference between the systems. The 
performance of this system indicates that it would be a suitable candidate for further 
development. 
26.2 Concept K – Sand Barrels with End Terminal or Crash Cushion 
The general inertia barrier analysis and the combined barrel and end terminal 
impact analysis were used to develop potential barrier layouts. Many sand barrel systems 
often use a row of sand barrels beyond the point where the velocity of the vehicle is 
reduced to less than 10 mph (16 km/hr). Typically these systems have some backup 
structure behind them that will stop the vehicle. An extra backup structure would be 
difficult to construct due to grading issues, so an extra row of heavy sand barrels was 
used instead. The sand barrels would also need to be placed such that a vehicle would not 
impact multiple rows of sand barrels in addition to impacting the end terminal. 
26.2.1 Potential Layouts 
For both of the potential sand barrel and end terminal layouts, the BEAT-SSCC 
was used for the end terminal, because it was one of the shortest available end terminal 
designs and it incorporated a tested transition to the bridge rail. The combined sand barrel 
and end terminal impact analysis indicated that the row of barrels placed immediately 
behind the end terminal should be offset by several feet. The two rows closest to the 
primary roadway had barrels that were 1,400 lb (635 kg) or lighter because the 2,100-lb 
(953-kg) sand barrels available from most manufacturers were tall enough to cause sight-
line issues. Offsetting the sand barrels and limiting their mass increased the overall 
footprint of the array. An analysis of the combined sand barrel and end terminal impacts 
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can be found in Appendix G. In addition to the combined impact analysis, four different 
impacts were investigated: 
1) 15 degree impact upstream from the end terminal head, 
2) 15 degree impact into the center of the array, 
3) 0 degree impact into the first two rows of barrels, 
4) 5 degree impact in-line with the LON. 
These four impact conditions evaluated the sand barrel array at the extents of the 
system as well as the central regions. Test condition 1 was an impact to the array just 
upstream of the end terminal head and would investigate the total length the sand barrel 
array would need to be. Test condition 2 investigated the system in roughly the center of 
the array at 15 degrees. Test condition 3 investigated whether the barrels in the two rows 
closest to the primary road could stop a vehicle if the end terminal was not impacted. Test 
condition 4 was a shallow-angle impact into the barrels protecting the outer extent of the 
hazard. Many different impacts are possible with these systems, but these tests could 
investigate the overall performance of the array. Impacts to the end terminal upstream of 
the terminal head were not investigated in this report but would be necessary for further 
development. Additionally, the combined end terminal and sand barrel impact analysis 
can be found in Appendix G. 
26.2.1.1 Barrel Layout with Standard Spacing 
The first potential layout assumed a standard 6-in. (152-mm) distance between the 
barrels, as shown in Figure 175. Many different configurations and barrel masses were 
tried in order to reduce the overall foot-print and number of barrels in the system. In 
addition to the combined sand barrel and end terminal analysis, the four impact scenarios 
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shown in Figure 176 were considered with both the 1100C and 2270P MASH vehicles at 
62.14 mph (100 km/h).  
 
Figure 175. Standard Spacing Sand Barrel Array 
 
Figure 176. Impact Scenarios for Standard Spacing Sand Barrel Array 
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This design had acceptable performance but the 65 barrels needed to make it work 
seemed excessive. Instead of using 6-in. (152-mm) spacing between adjacent barrels, 
increased spacing with heavier barrels may allow fewer barrels to protect the same area.  
26.2.1.2 Barrel Layout with Mixed Spacing 
To reduce the number of barrels required for this system, larger barrels can be 
spaced farther apart. The mixed layout had 6-in. to 18-in. (152-mm to 457-mm) spacing 
between the barrels, as shown in Figure 177. Gaps larger than 18 in. between the barrels 
may cause issues with small vehicles because they may past mostly in between two 
lighter barrels and then hit a heavier barrel at a greater speed, raising ORA and OIV 
concerns.  
 
Figure 177. Potential Sand Barrel Layout with Mixed Spacing 
Using a mixed spacing version reduced the number of barrels from 65 to 50. An 
advantage to having more space between the barrels is that it would be easier to maintain 
the area in between the barrels. In addition to maintenance concerns, having more space 
in between the barrels meant that barrels directly adjacent to the impacted barrels would 
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be less likely to contribute to energy absorption in an actual impact, because sand would 
have more space to disperse. This mixed spacing did, however, increase the overall 
footprint of the system. In this way it may be necessary to space the barrels near the edge 
of the array closer to each other with the middle barrels spaced farther apart, with heavier 
weights relative to the 6-in. (152-mm) spaced array. In addition to the combined sand 
barrel and end terminal analysis, four impact scenarios were considered for this 
configuration with both the 1100C and 2270P MASH vehicles at 62.14 mph (100 km/h). 
A full analysis of this system can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Figure 178. Potential Sand Barrel Layout with Mixed Spacing 
26.2.2 Grading Requirements 
Using these potential layouts, the grading requirements for the standard and 
mixed spacing systems could be found, as shown in Figures 179 and 180. The system 
with mixed spacing had a slightly larger foot-print but reduced the number of barrels 
required from 65 to 50. Both systems required more space than was available for the 
smallest installation locations. These sand barrels and end terminal or crash cushions 
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require 10:1 slopes or flatter. Beyond the foot print of the sand barrels, the grading would 
need to have 4 ft (1.2 m) of 3:1 slope before any steeper slopes can be considered. 
 
Figure 179. Sand Barrel Grading Requirements for Standard-Spacing Systems 
 
Figure 180. Sand Barrel Grading Requirements for Mixed-Spacing Systems 
26.2.3 Discussion 
A general inertia barrier analysis was used to help determine an array of sand 
barrels that could safely treat the hazards present at intersecting roadways with an end 
terminal or crash cushion used to shield the bridge railing. An array using standard 
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spacing of 6 in. (152 mm) could require 65 barrels. Spreading the barrels out with heavier 
masses would allow fewer barrels to be used to shield the same area. Using a spacing of 6 
in. to 18 in. (152 mm to 457 mm) proved to provide acceptable performance while also 
reducing the number of barrels to 50. The BEAT-SSCC was used for the end terminal 
and sand barrel analysis, but there could be multiple non-gating, redirective crash cushion 
or end terminal systems that would have acceptable performance. The combined sand 
barrel and end terminal impact analysis indicated that the row of barrels placed 
immediately behind the end terminal should be offset by several feet. This concept would 
not be recommended for further development because of the amount of grading that 
would be required and due to the excessive amount of sand barrels that would be required 
to safely treat the hazard. 
26.3 Concept C and O – Bullnose with Secondary Energy Absorption 
Both bullnoses considered for this concept were approximately 42 ft (12.8 m) 
long and 24 ft – 5 in. (7.4 m) wide. The bullnose was assumed to have an average crush 
force of 10,960 lb (48.8 kN). The analysis was also performed with an average crush 
force of 8,220 lb (36.6 kN) in order to determine an array that would be acceptable if the 
crush force of a wider array was much weaker than previously tested systems.  
26.3.1 Concept O – Bullnose with Net Arrestor 
A bullnose with the net attenuator inside it is shown in Figure 181. The net 
attenuator was assumed to be 17 ft (5.2 m) wide and placed 21 ft – 1 1/4 in. (6.4 m) 
behind the nose of the bullnose. This location was chosen because it was at the 
redirection point of the potential bullnose, and any structures placed beyond that point 
would be less likely to interfere with the stroke of the bullnose system. A total energy 
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absorber force of 13,500 lb (60.1 kN) was assumed at each end of the net. This would 
likely be accomplished by using three energy absorbers vertically mounted to a post. An 
analysis of the combined sand barrel and end terminal impacts can be found in Appendix 
G. 
 
Figure 181. Bullnose with Net Attenuator 
26.3.2 Concept C – Bullnose with Sand Barrels 
A bullnose with sand barrels inside it is shown in Figure 182. A 3x4 array of sand 
barrels placed 21 ft – 1 ¼ in. (6.4 m) behind the nose of the bullnose was considered for 
this concept. This location was chosen because it was at the redirection point of the 
potential bullnose, and any structures placed beyond that point would be less likely to 
interfere with the stroke of the bullnose system. The sand barrels could provide a tripping 
hazard if they were placed close to the nose of the bridge rail. For this analysis, it was 
assumed that two rows of barrels would be engaged simultaneously. An analysis of the 




Figure 182. Bullnose with Sand Barrels 
26.3.3 Grading Requirements 
The grading requirements, shown in Figure 183, were identical for both bullnose 
and secondary energy-absorption concepts. Both systems required slightly more space 
than was available for the smallest installation locations. The area occupied inside and in 
front of the bullnose would require 10:1 slopes or flatter. Beyond the foot-print of the 
bullnose, the grading would need to have 4 ft (1.2 m) of 3:1 slope before any steeper 




Figure 183. Grading Requirements for Bullnose Concepts 
26.3.4 Discussion 
The analysis of both of these concepts indicated that a vehicle could be safely 
stopped inside the available space, in theory. The advantages of this system would be that 
there is a continuous rail element wrapping around the entire system, and a vehicle would 
not be able to pass in between two systems. Bullnose guardrail systems have also been 
tested under NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-3 conditions and utilize many non-proprietary 
components, which could reduce the installation cost. Another benefit is that a bullnose 
uses thrie-beam guardrail elements that could be transitioned directly into the end of the 
bridge railing. This design also eliminated the need for a guardrail system along the 
secondary roadway.  
The ‘stroke’ of the bullnose requires the net and sand barrels to be far back from 
the nose of the bullnose. Shortening and widening a standard bullnose, and an approved 
bridge rail transition into the bridge railing, may cause the system to become too stiff to 
capture the small car and pickup truck used under MASH testing conditions. NDOR 
indicated that it would be difficult to grade the area to the end of the clear zone in many 
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locations. Maintenance of this system would be difficult, because mowers would need to 
be lifted over the top of the bullnose to maintain the enclosed area.  
One advantage to using a net attenuator inside the bullnose is that there is a high 
probability of capture or controlled stopping under a wide range of impact conditions. A 
disadvantage of this system is that adapting the bullnose to fit this application would be 
difficult. Maintenance of this system would be difficult, because mowers would need to 
be lifted over the top of the bullnose to maintain the enclosed area.  
Sand barrels are an existing technology, relatively inexpensive, and can be 
installed in an array to provide staged energy absorption. Unfortunately, the 36-in. (914-
mm) maximum height criterion limits the size of sand barrel that can be installed inside 
of a bullnose and still preserve sight-lines.  
The interaction between the net and bullnose during impacts with both systems is 
unknown and would require further investigation. Because the energy absorbers are 
proprietary systems, they could also be prohibitively expensive to acquire. Depending on 
the energy absorber used, there may be maintenance required to ensure their performance 
in the field. Some development work would be required to integrate a net attenuator and 
end terminal or crash cushion system. This concept would not be recommended for 
further development because of the amount of grading that would be required and 
because the current bullnose design would require a significant development effort in 
order to make it suitable for this application. 
26.4 Recommendation 
The analytical techniques showed that all three of the concepts chosen for further 
analysis were capable of safely capturing the vehicle. These analytical solutions were 
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also used to determine potential layouts that could be used for further development. In the 
case with the bullnose with secondary energy absorption and the sand barrel and end 
terminal concept, the system sizes were too large to be feasible at many locations, 
especially if slopes are present. 
The net attenuator concept had the overall cleanest installation and was the 
concept most likely to accommodate small to moderate slopes. A net attenuator does not 
cause sight-line issues like some of the larger sand barrels could. The net attenuator and 
end terminal investigated would also use currently existing technology. Both of the sand 
barrel arrays and the bullnose concepts would require too much grading to be practical at 






Table 53. Design, Operational, and Constructability Challenges for Potential Layouts 
 










• Need higher force energy absorbers to stop 
vehicles in 30 ft or less
• Net attenuator would require more space 
than available at smaller sites, road may need 
to be moved
• Anchorage of net attenuators would require
design and consideration for integration with 
the end terminal or crash cushion
• Need to use frangible posts or lightweight 
wood to support net
• Except for expended tape, 
most major components are 
reusable
• Does not create site line 
issues
• Mowing and landscaping 
simple
• Overall the “cleanest” installation
• Energy absorbers are proprietary and 
costs are unknown
• Area in front of net needs to be flat, 
area past the net could accommodate 

























• Bullnose required for this setup would need 
to be shorter and wider than any currently 
available system
• Need to design and evaluate transition 
section
• Energy absorbers would need to be anchored
downstream of redirective section of bullnose
• Mowers would have to be 
lifted over the top of the 
bullnose to maintain the 
enclosed area 
• Height of the sand barrels 
could cause site line issues
• Net design needed if net 
chosen
• Bullnose systems are non-proprietary 
and include a crash cushion and 
bridge transition
• The area being protected would need 
to be flat, requiring grading out to the 








• Least amount of development work among 
the different concepts
• Vehicles impacting both the sand barrels and 
the end terminal would need to be 
investigated
• Landscape and mowing 
would be difficult
• Height of the sand barrels 
could cause site line issues
• Sand barrels would require 
more space than available at 
smaller sites, road may need 
to be moved
• The area being protected would need 
to be flat, requiring grading out to the 
clear zone and capture area
• 50+ barrels would be required to bring  
a truck to a stop
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CHAPTER 27 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research effort described herein detailed the design, analysis, and bogie 
testing of concepts for a MASH-compliant attenuation system for intersecting roadways, 
utilizing as small a footprint for the device as possible. The effort began with a review of 
existing short-radius, end terminal, crash cushion, net attenuation, and truck- and trailer-
mounted attenuation systems. The researchers developed a variety of design concepts that 
could potentially be used in lieu of the short-radius systems that are currently in place. 
With input from the project sponsor, three concepts were selected for further 
development: (1) net attenuator with approved end terminal, (2) array of sand barrels with 
approved end terminal, and (3) a wide bullnose with a secondary energy absorber 
enclosed. 
In order to evaluate the net attenuator concept, the performance of several 
components of the net attenuator needed to be tested. Two quasi-static component tests 
were performed on the energy absorbers used in the Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier in 
order to investigate the force required to feed steel tape from the energy absorber. The 
force-deflection data were then used in future analytical and simulation work. 
Four component tests were performed on a Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier. In 
order to evaluate the potential for using increased net energy absorber forces, three 
standard Dragnet energy absorbers were installed on both sides of the net to capture the 
vehicle. This arrangement produced a nominal resistive force of 11,700 lb (52.0 kN) per 
side. The dynamic tests demonstrated the potential capture and deceleration of vehicles 
using the Dragnet system at higher resistive forces and provided baseline data for further 
analytical and simulation work.    
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Test no. IRA-1 consisted of a 5,090-lb (2,309-kg) vehicle impacting the net 
arrestor at a speed of 60.4 mph (97.2 km/h) in the center of the net at an angle of 90 
degrees. The bogie vehicle was safely and smoothly captured. There were neither 
detached elements nor fragments from the net which showed potential for undue hazard 
to other traffic. The vehicle had a maximum dynamic deflection of 44.2 ft (13.5 m) 
downstream from the point of impact and a lateral movement of 1.3 ft (0.4 m). One of the 
energy absorber straps on the left side of the system fractured at the beginning of the test, 
resulting in asymmetric loading on the test vehicle. This asymmetric loading caused the 
vehicle to yaw to the right. The failure was likely caused by excessive whipping that 
occurred with both inside energy absorbers of the system.  
Test no. IRA-2 consisted of a 5,090-lb (2,309-kg) vehicle impacting the net 
arrestor at a speed of 59.9 mph (96.4 km/h) offset to the right from the center of the net at 
an angle of 90 degrees. The bogie vehicle was safely and smoothly captured. There were 
neither detached elements nor fragments from the net which showed potential for undue 
hazard to other traffic. The vehicle had a maximum dynamic deflection of 41.0 ft (12.5 
m) downstream from the point of impact and a lateral movement of 0.43 ft (0.13 m). Just 
as in test no. IRA-1, one of the energy absorber straps on the left side of the system 
fractured at the beginning of the test, resulting in asymmetric loading on the test vehicle. 
This asymmetric loading caused the vehicle to yaw to the right. The failure was likely 
caused by excessive whipping that occurred with both inside energy absorbers of the 
system. With a second failure in the same location, the researchers decided that this issue 
needed to be investigated. 
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When the vehicle impacted the net, the energy absorbers mounted perpendicular 
to the net compressed and rotated away from impact. As the vehicle tracked through the 
system and the innermost energy absorber on the left side was pulled tight, the steel tape 
ruptured at the connection between the tape and the turnbuckles. Even though both the 
inside energy absorbers on both sides of the net exhibited the same motion, only the left 
absorber had a failure. The solution to this problem was to mitigate the amount of 
compression that could occur by reducing the angle between the energy absorbers from 
45 degrees to 22.5 degrees. With this change, the inside and middle energy absorbers 
were moved more in-line with the net and farther from the center.  
Test no. IRA-3 consisted of a 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) vehicle impacting the net 
arrestor at a speed of 59.9 mph (96.4 km/h) 12 ft (3.7 m) offset to the right from the 
center of the net at an angle of 60 degrees. The bogie vehicle was safely and smoothly 
captured. There were neither detached elements nor fragments from the net which 
showed potential for undue hazard to other traffic.  The vehicle had a maximum dynamic 
deflection of 33.0 ft (10.1 m) downstream from the point of impact with a lateral 
movement of 18.0 ft (5.5 m), resulting in a total displacement of 37.6 ft (11.5 m). This 
test showed the net arrestor could safely capture the vehicle in impacts near the edge of 
the net.  
Test no. IRA-4 consisted of a 5,259-lb (2,385-kg) vehicle impacting the net 
arrestor at a speed of 59.5 mph (95.8 km/h) in the center of the net at an angle of 60 
degrees. The bogie vehicle was safely and smoothly captured. There were neither 
detached elements nor fragments from the net which showed potential for undue hazard 
to other traffic.  The vehicle had a maximum dynamic deflection of 42.2 ft (12.9 m) 
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downstream from the point of impact with a lateral movement of 1.82 ft (0.55 m). This 
test was a rerun of test no. IRA-1 and would serve as a baseline comparison to analytical 
and simulation work. 
 Testing on the modified Dragnet Vehicle Arresting Barrier showed that it could 
be a viable option for further development. The concept used existing technologies, and 
most of its components were reusable. The anchorage systems could be placed near the 
primary and secondary roads where the ground is level, and, though the area in front of 
the net needs to be flat, this concept could likely accommodate a moderate slope behind 
it. Some development work would be required to integrate a net attenuator and end 
terminal or crash cushion system. New posts that can be embedded in the ground are 
needed because most installations will not have a concrete or asphalt pad for the posts to 
rest on. Mowing and landscaping with this concept would be simpler than other concepts, 
because no parts of the protected area would be enclosed.  
A finite element model of the Dragnet net attenuator system evaluated in test nos. 
IRA-1 through IRA-4 was developed to further investigate its performance for treatment 
of bridge rails adjacent to intersecting roadways. These simulations were performed using 
LS-DYNA to serve as a comparison to physical component testing and analytical 
methods. LS-DYNA is a transient, nonlinear finite element analysis code that has been 
widely used in analysis and design of roadside safety hardware. The vehicle in the 
simulation had a slightly higher maximum displacement of 44.29 ft (13.50 m) compared 
with 42.2 ft (12.9 m) in test no. IRA-4. The OIV for the simulation and test no. IRA-4 
were 17.67 ft/s (5.39 m/s) and 18.34 ft/s (5.59 m/s), respectively. The ORA for the 
simulation and test no. IRA-4 were 3.91 and 4.88, respectively. This model would be 
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useful for future investigations into the net attenuator concept. Future simulations could 
involve slopes, higher energy forces, and more complex vehicle models. 
An analytical method to estimate the Dragnet net attenuator system performance 
was developed to further investigate the net attenuator system’s performance with 
different energy absorber load capacities. This method could be used to estimate the 
maximum dynamic deflection of systems using different vehicles, net widths, and energy 
absorber forces.  
The estimate for the central, perpendicular impact in test no. IRA-4 was 
conservative for maximum dynamic deflection of the net and under-predicted the ORA 
value. The estimate for the offset, angled impact in test no. IRA-3 was off by 34 percent. 
The deceleration calculated with the analytical method using test no. IRA-3 parameters 
was only 11 percent less than that of the physical crash test. Because the calculated 
acceleration is a function of X, the acceleration likely would have been much lower had 
the vehicle not traveled as far into the system. This method would be suitable for 
estimating the deflections of a system or calculating a force to provide a desired stopping 
distance. 
To reduce net attenuator deflections to below 30 ft (9.1 m), the combined force of 
the energy absorbers on each side of the system should be greater than or equal to 18 kips 
(80.1 kN). The maximum deflections estimated for the 1100C and 2270P vehicle were 
19.5 ft (5.9 m) and 30.8 ft (9.4 m), respectively. The values calculated using the 
analytical method can be considered as upper limits for the maximum deflection because 
the analytical solution considers that only the energy absorbers are dissipating the kinetic 
energy of the impacting vehicle. In reality, friction forces and system and vehicle 
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deformation would absorb some of the energy, as well. As the resistive force of the 
energy absorbers increases, it is likely that vehicles impacting at an angle will experience 
greater instabilities.  
One challenge that must be overcome is the possibility that a vehicle could pass in 
between the net and the end terminal. Anchoring the energy absorbers near the end 
terminal may interfere with the function of the end terminal. Retesting the end terminal 
system may be required if the energy absorbers could potentially interfere with the end 
terminals’ installation. This concept would also require collaboration with end terminal 
and crash cushion manufacturers. Non-gating, redirective crash cushion or end terminal 
systems are desired in this situation to limit the interference between the systems. The 
performance of this system indicates that it would be a suitable candidate for further 
development. 
A general inertia barrier analysis was used to help determine an array of sand 
barrels that could safely treat the hazards present at intersecting roadways with an end 
terminal or crash cushion used to shield the bridge railing. An array using standard 
spacing of 6 in. (152 mm) could require 65 barrels. Spreading the barrels out with heavier 
masses would allow fewer barrels to be used to shield the same area. Using a spacing of 6 
in. to 18 in. (152 mm to 457 mm) proved to provide acceptable performance while also 
reducing the number of barrels to 50. The BEAT-SSCC was used for the end terminal 
and sand barrel analysis but there could be multiple non-gating, redirective crash cushion 
or end terminal systems that would have acceptable performance. The combined sand 
barrel and end terminal impact analysis indicated that the row of barrels placed 
immediately behind the end terminal should be offset by several feet. This concept would 
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not be recommended for further development because of the amount of grading that 
would be required and due to the excessive amount of sand barrels that would be required 
to safely treat the hazard. 
The analysis of both bullnose concepts indicated that a vehicle could be safely 
stopped inside the available space using a secondary form of energy absorption. The 
advantages of this system would be that there is a continuous rail element wrapping 
around the entire system, and a vehicle would not be able to pass in between two systems. 
Bullnose guardrail systems have also been tested under NCHRP Report No. 350 TL-3 
conditions and utilize many non-proprietary components, which could reduce the 
installation cost. Another benefit is that a bullnose uses thrie-beam guardrail elements 
that could be transitioned directly into the end of the bridge railing. This design also 
eliminated the need for a guardrail system along the secondary roadway.  
The ‘stroke’ of the bullnose requires the net and sand barrels to be far back from 
the nose of the bullnose. Shortening and widening a standard bullnose and an approved 
bridge rail transition into the bridge railing may cause the system to become too stiff to 
capture the small car and pickup truck used under MASH testing conditions. NDOR 
indicated that it would be difficult to grade the area to the end of the clear zone in many 
locations. Maintenance of this system would be difficult, because mowers would need to 
be lifted over the top of the bullnose to maintain the enclosed area.  
One advantage to using a net attenuator inside the bullnose is that there is a high 
probability of capture or controlled stopping under a wide range of impact conditions. A 
disadvantage of this system was that adapting the bullnose to fit this application would be 
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difficult. Maintenance of this system would be difficult, because mowers would need to 
be lifted over the top of the bullnose to maintain the enclosed area.  
Sand barrels are an existing technology, relatively inexpensive, and can be 
installed in an array to provide staged energy absorption. Unfortunately, the 36-in. (914-
mm) maximum height criterion limits the size of sand barrel that can be installed inside 
of a bullnose and still preserve sight-lines.  
The interaction between the net and bullnose during impacts with both systems is 
unknown and would require further investigation. Because the energy absorbers are 
proprietary systems, they could also be prohibitively expensive to acquire. Depending on 
the energy absorber used, there may be maintenance required to ensure their performance 
in the field. Some development work would be required to integrate a net attenuator and 
end terminal or crash cushion system. This concept would not be recommended for 
further development because of the amount of grading that would be required, and 
because the current bullnose design would require a significant development effort in 
order to make it suitable for this application 
The net attenuator concept had the overall cleanest installation and was the 
concept most likely to accommodate small to moderate slopes. A net attenuator does not 
cause sight-line issues like some of the larger sand barrels could. The net attenuator and 
end terminal investigated would also use currently existing technology.  
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Figure A-2. Material Certifications, Test Nos. IRA-1 through IRA-4
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Figure B-36. Planar Trajectory, Test No. IRA-1 
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Figure C-32. Planar Trajectory, Test No. IRA-2 
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Figure D-32. Planar Trajectory (DTS-SLICE-2), Test No. IRA-3 
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Figure E-36. Planar Trajectory (DTS-SLICE-2), Test No. IRA-4 
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Figure F-12. Lateral Occupant Displacement, Angled Simulation
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Event (n) Object Mass (lb) x (ft)
1 head 130 0
2 Stage2 0 11
3 1 400 11.5
4 2 700 14.5
5 3 1400 17.5
6 4 1400 20.5
7 5 1400 23.5
8 6 1400 26.5
9 7 1400 29.5
n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_avg a_et a_net a_tot
91.19
1 130.00 0.0 11.0 86.55 44.16 0.16832 4.27157 7.82754 0.00000 12.09910
2 0.00 11.0 11.5 44.16 39.81 0.01191 0.00000 11.34993 0.00000 11.34993
3 400.00 11.5 13.1 34.42 0.00 0.09425 2.07172 11.34993 0.00000 13.42165
4 700.00 14.5 13.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
5 1400.00 17.5 13.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
6 1400.00 20.5 13.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
7 1400.00 23.5 13.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
8 1400.00 26.5 13.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000












Event (n) Object Mass (lb) x (ft)
1 head 130 0
2 Stage2 0 11
3 1 400 11.5
4 2 700 14.5
5 3 1400 17.5
6 4 1400 20.5
7 5 1400 23.5
8 6 1400 26.5




Figure G-2. Sand Barrel and End Terminal Impact, 2270P Truck, Full Bullnose Crush 
Force
n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_avg a_et a_net a_tot
91.19
1 130.00 0.0 11.0 88.88 71.69 0.13702 2.15533 3.89851 0.00000 6.05384
2 0.00 11.0 11.5 71.69 70.41 0.00704 0.00000 5.65284 0.00000 5.65284
3 400.00 11.5 14.5 65.32 56.35 0.04932 3.58067 5.65284 0.00000 9.23351
4 700.00 14.5 17.5 49.58 36.97 0.06932 3.71234 5.65284 0.00000 9.36518
5 1400.00 17.5 19.8 29.05 0.00 0.15970 2.71095 5.65284 0.00000 8.36379
6 1400.00 20.5 19.8 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
7 1400.00 23.5 19.8 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
8 1400.00 26.5 19.8 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
























































































































































































































































































































































































n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_et a_net a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 73.04 0.25726 2.19193 0.00000 2.19193
2 0.00 21.1 22.1 73.04 72.74 0.01378 2.19193 0.63094 2.82287
3 0.00 22.1 23.1 72.74 71.91 0.01384 2.19193 1.23681 3.42874
4 0.00 23.1 24.1 71.91 70.65 0.01400 2.19193 1.79723 3.98916
5 0.00 24.1 25.1 70.65 69.04 0.01426 2.19193 2.29930 4.49123
6 0.00 25.1 26.1 69.04 67.16 0.01459 2.19193 2.73791 4.92984
7 0.00 26.1 27.1 67.16 65.05 0.01501 2.19193 3.11409 5.30602
8 0.00 27.1 28.1 65.05 62.74 0.01550 2.19193 3.43282 5.62475
9 0.00 28.1 29.1 62.74 60.24 0.01609 2.19193 3.70097 5.89290
10 0.00 29.1 30.1 60.24 57.57 0.01676 2.19193 3.92587 6.11780
11 0.00 30.1 31.1 57.57 54.71 0.01756 2.19193 4.11447 6.30640
12 0.00 31.1 32.1 54.71 51.64 0.01850 2.19193 4.27294 6.46487
13 0.00 32.1 33.1 51.64 48.33 0.01963 2.19193 4.40653 6.59846
14 0.00 33.1 34.1 48.33 44.75 0.02101 2.19193 4.51964 6.71157
15 0.00 34.1 35.1 44.75 40.83 0.02275 2.19193 4.61585 6.80778
16 0.00 35.1 36.1 40.83 36.46 0.02503 2.19193 4.69812 6.89005
17 0.00 36.1 37.1 36.46 31.46 0.02820 2.19193 4.76882 6.96075
18 0.00 37.1 38.1 31.46 25.47 0.03301 2.19193 4.82991 7.02184
19 0.00 38.1 39.1 25.47 17.51 0.04167 2.19193 4.88294 7.07487
20 0.00 39.1 40.1 17.51 0.00 0.06583 2.19193 4.92922 7.12115
21 0.00 40.1 40.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000






Figure G-52. Combined Net Arrestor and Bullnose Impact, 2270 Truck, 75 Percent 

















n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_et a_net a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 77.98 0.24976 1.64395 0.00000 1.64395
2 0.00 21.1 22.1 77.98 77.70 0.01288 1.64395 0.63094 2.27489
3 0.00 22.1 23.1 77.70 76.93 0.01293 1.64395 1.23681 2.88076
4 0.00 23.1 24.1 76.93 75.76 0.01306 1.64395 1.79723 3.44118
5 0.00 24.1 25.1 75.76 74.27 0.01326 1.64395 2.29930 3.94325
6 0.00 25.1 26.1 74.27 72.53 0.01353 1.64395 2.73791 4.38186
7 0.00 26.1 27.1 72.53 70.59 0.01386 1.64395 3.11409 4.75804
8 0.00 27.1 28.1 70.59 68.47 0.01424 1.64395 3.43282 5.07677
9 0.00 28.1 29.1 68.47 66.20 0.01469 1.64395 3.70097 5.34492
10 0.00 29.1 30.1 66.20 63.79 0.01520 1.64395 3.92587 5.56982
11 0.00 30.1 31.1 63.79 61.23 0.01578 1.64395 4.11447 5.75842
12 0.00 31.1 32.1 61.23 58.51 0.01645 1.64395 4.27294 5.91689
13 0.00 32.1 33.1 58.51 55.62 0.01723 1.64395 4.40653 6.05048
14 0.00 33.1 34.1 55.62 52.55 0.01813 1.64395 4.51964 6.16358
15 0.00 34.1 35.1 52.55 49.27 0.01921 1.64395 4.61585 6.25980
16 0.00 35.1 36.1 49.27 45.72 0.02052 1.64395 4.69812 6.34207
17 0.00 36.1 37.1 45.72 41.86 0.02216 1.64395 4.76882 6.41277
18 0.00 37.1 38.1 41.86 37.58 0.02426 1.64395 4.82991 6.47385
19 0.00 38.1 39.1 37.58 32.73 0.02713 1.64395 4.88294 6.52689
20 0.00 39.1 40.1 32.73 27.01 0.03135 1.64395 4.92922 6.57317
21 0.00 40.1 41.1 27.01 19.66 0.03848 1.64395 4.96979 6.61373
























n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_et a_net a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 46.60 0.30664 4.51944 0.00000 4.51944
2 0.00 21.1 22.1 46.60 45.60 0.02223 4.51944 1.30091 5.82036
3 0.00 22.1 23.1 45.60 42.81 0.02276 4.51944 2.55013 7.06957
4 0.00 23.1 24.1 42.81 38.24 0.02437 4.51944 3.70563 8.22507
5 0.00 24.1 25.1 38.24 31.60 0.02760 4.51944 4.74083 9.26028
6 0.00 25.1 26.1 31.60 21.67 0.03436 4.51944 5.64517 10.16462
7 0.00 26.1 27.1 21.67 0.00 0.05708 4.51944 6.42080 10.94025
8 0.00 27.1 27.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
9 0.00 28.1 27.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
10 0.00 29.1 27.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
11 0.00 30.1 27.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000






Figure G-54. Combined Net Arrestor and Bullnose Impact, 1100C Small Car, 75 Percent 

















n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_et a_net a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 60.89 0.27782 3.38958 0.00000 3.38958
2 0.00 21.1 22.1 60.89 60.14 0.01667 3.38958 1.30091 4.69049
3 0.00 22.1 23.1 60.14 58.08 0.01689 3.38958 2.55013 5.93971
4 0.00 23.1 24.1 58.08 54.82 0.01750 3.38958 3.70563 7.09521
5 0.00 24.1 25.1 54.82 50.43 0.01859 3.38958 4.74083 8.13041
6 0.00 25.1 26.1 50.43 44.91 0.02027 3.38958 5.64517 9.03475
7 0.00 26.1 27.1 44.91 38.00 0.02290 3.38958 6.42080 9.81038
8 0.00 27.1 28.1 38.00 28.94 0.02740 3.38958 7.07798 10.46756
9 0.00 28.1 29.1 28.94 0.00 0.03715 3.38958 7.63086 11.02045
10 0.00 29.1 29.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
11 0.00 30.1 29.1 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000











Figure G-56. Combined Sand Barrel and Bullnose Impact, 2270 Truck, 75 Percent 














V0 Rank [n] Object Mass (lb) x (ft)
1 head 0 0
1 Stage2 0 0
2 1 400 21.125
3 2 1400 24.625
4 3 2800 28.125
5 4 2800 31.625
6 5 2800 35.125
7 6 2800 38.625
n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_avg a_et a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 73.04 0.25726 0.00000 2.19193 2.19193
2 400.00 21.1 24.6 67.63 63.88 0.05323 3.94277 2.19193 6.13470
3 1400.00 24.6 28.1 49.91 44.69 0.07400 8.23610 2.19193 10.42803
4 2800.00 28.1 31.6 28.65 18.08 0.14981 6.09345 2.19193 8.28538
5 2800.00 31.6 32.6 11.59 0.00 0.16433 0.99744 2.19193 3.18937
6 2800.00 35.1 32.6 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000














V0 Rank [n] Object Mass (lb) x (ft)
1 head 0 0
1 Stage2 0 0
2 1 400 21.125
3 2 1400 24.625
4 3 2800 28.125
5 4 2800 31.625
6 5 2800 35.125
7 6 2800 38.625
n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_avg a_et a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 77.98 0.24976 0.00000 1.64395 1.64395
2 400.00 21.1 24.6 72.20 69.59 0.04937 4.49326 1.64395 6.13720
3 1400.00 24.6 28.1 54.37 50.85 0.06653 9.77425 1.64395 11.41820
4 2800.00 28.1 31.6 32.59 26.31 0.11884 7.88940 1.64395 9.53335
5 2800.00 31.6 34.3 16.86 0.00 0.31883 2.11203 1.64395 3.75598
6 2800.00 35.1 34.3 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000






Figure G-57. Combined Sand Barrel and Bullnose Impact, 1100C Small Car, Full 




Figure G-58. Combined Sand Barrel and Bullnose Impact, 1100C Small Car, 75 Percent 














V0 Rank [n] Object Mass (lb) x (ft)
1 head 0 0
1 Stage2 0 0
2 1 400 21.125
3 2 1400 24.625
4 3 2800 28.125
5 4 2800 31.625
6 5 2800 35.125
7 6 2800 38.625
n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_avg a_et a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 46.60 0.30664 0.00000 4.51944 4.51944
2 400.00 21.1 24.6 40.00 24.13 0.10916 2.95969 4.51944 7.47913
3 1400.00 24.6 25.4 15.30 0.00 0.10519 1.80335 4.51944 6.32280
4 2800.00 28.1 25.4 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
5 2800.00 31.6 25.4 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
6 2800.00 35.1 25.4 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000














V0 Rank [n] Object Mass (lb) x (ft)
1 head 0 0
1 Stage2 0 0
2 1 400 21.125
3 2 1400 24.625
4 3 2800 28.125
5 4 2800 31.625
6 5 2800 35.125
7 6 2800 38.625
n Me x x' Vn Vn' t (n to n') a_avg a_et a_tot
91.19
1 0.00 0.0 21.1 91.19 60.89 0.27782 0.00000 3.38958 3.38958
2 400.00 21.1 24.6 52.27 44.37 0.07244 5.05324 3.38958 8.44282
3 1400.00 24.6 28.1 28.13 5.27 0.20962 6.09786 3.38958 9.48744
4 2800.00 28.1 28.2 2.44 0.00 0.02241 0.11274 3.38958 3.50232
5 2800.00 31.6 28.2 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
6 2800.00 35.1 28.2 0.00 0.00 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
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